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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
Many organizations (such as hospitals, tax authorities, and police departments) 
exchange data, an activity which is often regulated by law. In most cases there is a 
central institution (for example, the mother company or the ministry of Justice) that 
is interested in both optimal and legitimate data exchange, because it has to give 
account of the effectiveness and lawfulness of its operations to the outside world 
(for example, the parliament or the shareholders). Besides the central institution 
there are regionally or functionally distributed local institutions with their own 
interests. The central institutions take the interests at the distributed level into 
account by formulating legal norms and central policies, which give room for fine 
tuning in local policies and individual decisions. This is done by granting 
discretionary authority to local institutions.  
 
The regulation of data exchange serves several objectives. On the one hand, the 
privacy of the persons who are the subjects of the data must be protected. On the 
other hand, the legitimate goals of the exchanging organizations must be served. 
Typically, organizations must balance the goal to execute their tasks by exchanging 
data with the goal to protect their interests at the local level by not exchanging 
confidential data, while staying within the law. For example, in the Dutch police 
domain, departments exchange data in order to execute the department’s task to 
solve crime cases. However, when the exchanged data originates from informants, 
it is more difficult to obtain data from them when they know that they are not well 
protected. Moreover, while the police departments exchange data, departments have 
to comply with the applicable laws and regulations. 
 
The balancing act between goals is caused by two characteristics of the applicable 
laws and regulations. First, the regulations give discretionary power to 
organizations in which types of situations organizations can decide (not) to 
exchange data. In those cases where it is permitted to exchange data, an 
organization member makes a decision which is expected to further his goals. 
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Second, the regulations use open textured concepts, which can have different local 
interpretations (for example ‘the proper execution of the police task’). A concept is 
open textured if it is impossible to determine beforehand which situations can be 
classified as an instance of the concept. 
 
In practice2, data exchanging organizations can engage in dialogues and use their 
own interpretations of the regulations to further their goals. Therefore, during the 
interactions a definitive balance is sought between the goals of the organizations, 
which may give rise to interesting dialogues. For example, when an organization 
requests another organization to exchange data, the responding organization has to 
determine if its interests are served. The responding organization can negotiate by 
stating conditions under which it is willing to exchange data (for example that the 
data cannot be exchanged with other members). Furthermore, when a responding 
organization refuses a request, the requesting organization can try to persuade the 
other organization to exchange data. Ideally, these dialogues guarantee that an 
optimal and legitimate balance is found in the exchange of data characterized by 
different goals, which in some cases even conflict. However, in practice this ideal is 
not always realized: the norms from regulations are not well known and local 
policies are more aimed at the protection of local data, which has as consequences 
that only a part of what can be exchanged legitimately is actually exchanged 
(exchanges which are permitted do not occur in practice) and that sometimes data is 
exchanged illegitimately (exchanges which are forbidden do occur in practice).  
 
Making sure that organizations stay within the law falls within regulatory 
compliance, which essentially means that organizations are aware of and take steps 
to comply with relevant laws and regulations. The need to improve the compliance 
with regulations was increased with a succession of corporate scandals such as the 
Enron disaster of 2001. Well-known regulations to strengthen regulatory 
compliance are (1) the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which is a United States federal 
law to set standards for all U.S. public companies, (2) Basel II, which is an 
international standard for banking regulators, and (3) the EU Data Protection 
Directive, which regulates the processing of personal data within the European 
Union. One possible solution to support compliance with regulations is with legal 
knowledge-based systems. In practice, legal knowledge-based systems are mostly 
used to support application of regulations in public administration such as 
environmental permit law (De Vey Mestdagh 1998), income taxes and social 
                                                        
2 Between 2002 and 2005 several interviews were conducted. For example, interviews 
with Tom van der Velde the privacy officer of the Dutch police officer in Groningen, 
conducted together with Wouter Teepe n 2002-2003; an interview with Doetse 
Huizinga together with Hugo Kielman and Wouter Koelewijn on 30-3-2005 in 




security (Van Engers et al. 2001). Furthermore, legal knowledge-based systems are 
also applied to support regulatory compliance (Hagerty 2007).  
It is interesting to investigate to what extent the balancing act in regulated data 
exchange can be supported with advanced information technology. Knowledge-
based systems can be used to support the application of regulations, such as in the 
above-mentioned public administration domain. However, knowledge-based 
systems are difficult to apply in domains where the regulations have many open-
textured concepts and grant discretionary authorities Stranieri et al. (1999). 
 
The distributed nature of many organizations suggests that it may be worthwhile to 
use multi-agent technology. A multi-agent system is a collection of artificial agents, 
where each agent has some degree of control over his actions and interacts with 
other agents to fulfill his own and/or the system’s goals (Wooldridge 2002). A 
multi-agent system seems to provide a natural means to model organizations, where 
the agents represent the organization’s members. Furthermore, organizations 
typically interact with each other to try to achieve their goals, which is also typical 
for agents in multi-agent systems.  
 
The Dutch police domain provides a worthwhile example of the problem of 
regulated data exchange, as it illustrates that not always an optimal and legitimate 
balance is found in the exchange of data. The Dutch criminal investigation units 
balance the goal to execute their appointed police task by exchanging data with the 
goal to protect their investigations and informants by not disclosing data, while 
staying within the law (Koelewijn 2009, page 17). Since goals can conflict, officers 
of criminal investigation units confer whether severe-crime intelligence data can be 
exchanged (Cozijn 1996; Koelewijn 2009, page 128). However, in the Dutch police 
practice, the norms are not well known (Cozijn 1996; Schreuders and Wel 2005) 
and criminal investigation units prefer their goal to protect their own data (Kielman 
2010) by refusing to exchange data. Therefore, in practice not enough legitimate 
and too much illegitimate data is exchanged between Dutch criminal investigation 
units. This thesis investigates the idea of utilizing multi-agent technology to support 
regulated data exchange between Dutch police departments.  
1.1 Research context 
To support automated regulated data exchange in the Dutch police domain, the 
applicable laws and regulations need to be analyzed and formalized, which entails 
(1) the representation of legal knowledge and (2) the application of that knowledge 
to concrete cases. Knowledge representation and reasoning with legal knowledge 
are two related subjects, which fall within the field of AI & Law research. The 
open-texturedness of legal concepts is a classic AI & Law issue (e.g., Bench-Capon 
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and Sergot 1989; Gardner 1987; McCarty 1980). Legal concepts are inherently 
open textured, because it is difficult to determine which instances fall under a legal 
concept.  
 
Both the open-texturedness of legal concepts and the balancing act between 
different - possibly conflicting - goals can cause disagreements. Disagreements can 
occur during the internal reasoning and during the interactions between parties, 
which can both be modeled with argumentation. Argumentation (Bench-Capon and 
Dunne 2007; Rahwan and Simari 2009) is an important research area for this thesis 
because it captures two aspects in the legal domain: defeasible reasoning and the 
adversarial nature of legal argumentation. Defeasible reasoning is a form of 
reasoning in which conclusions can be withdrawn when new information becomes 
available. For example, a police officer reasons whether he can exchange 
intelligence data about the location of a drug house. Normally he reasons that the 
data can be exchanged. However, when the data is no longer up to date, the police 
officer also concludes that he cannot exchange the same data. Assuming that the 
reason for not exchanging data is stronger, he withdraws his previous conclusion. 
There are several approaches to formalize defeasible reasoning (McCarthy 1980; 
Reiter 1980). The argument-based approach is quite suitable to model legal 
reasoning because it uses concepts which are familiar in the legal domain, such as 
argument, counterargument, defeat, and dialogue (see Prakken and Vreeswijk 2002, 
and various chapters in Rahwan and Simari 2009 for overviews). In the argument-
based approach, defeasibility is modeled as the interaction between conflicting 
arguments. For example, arguments can become defeated when they are attacked by 
other arguments. The argumentation-approach can also be used for argumentation 
between two parties (Amgoud et al. 2000; McBurney and Parsons 2002; Parsons et 
al. 2003). With dialogue game systems, argumentation between two parties is 
modeled as a game, where every utterance is seen as a move in the game. A 
dialogue game system regulates a dialogue by determining (1) the allowed moves 
which a party can make, (2) the termination, and (3) the outcome of a dialogue. 
 
As discussed earlier, a multi-agent system is a natural way to model organizations 
which need to interact. In the field of multi-agent system research, argumentation 
has been gaining importance3. On the one hand, argumentation can be used for 
modeling, analyzing and implementing the internal reasoning of an agent. On the 
other hand, it can also be used to for facilitating the interactions between agents. 
Existing multi-agent system research, which applies argumentation on regulated 
data exchange does exist. For example, Doutre et al. (2005) and Perrussel et al. 
                                                        
3 For instance, since 2004 there are the argumentation in multi-agent systems (ArgMas) 





(2007) view interactions about data exchange as argumentation and both use the 
medical domain as problem domain. However, Doutre et al.’s and Perrussel’s 
research does not provide enough details to be directly usable for the present 
research (as will be explained in more detail in Chapter 7).  
As for AI & Law research on regulatory compliance, this research is mainly 
focused on how to model and formalize regulations. For example, Giblin et al. 
(2005) propose a method in which a metamodel is used to formalize different 
regulations and to manage the regulatory requirements on businesses. A second 
example is Breaux and Vail (2006), who propose a method to extract rights and 
obligations from regulations and present how semantic models can be used to 
clarify ambiguities from the regulations. However, the AI & Law research on 
regulatory compliance concerns the application of knowledge-based systems. 
Recall that legal knowledge-based systems cannot be used in the problem domain 
of this thesis, which makes the research on regulatory compliance not suitable for 
this research.  
 
There is a spectrum of different approaches to support automated regulated data 
exchange. At one end of the spectrum, there is Lessig’s (1999) approach to embed 
legal concepts directly into the code (i.e., the source code of computer software), 
where software forces users to act according to the applicable regulations. A 
drawback of this approach only works in domains where the regulations have few 
open-textured terms and give few discretionary powers. At the other end, there is 
the more theoretical research from the AI & Law field, such as research on creating 
formal representations of values and on legal argumentation about finding balances 
between conflicting values or goals (Bench-Capon 2003; Bench-Capon and Sartor 
2003; Sartor 2010). However, while this research deals with an interesting subject 
and is relevant in the problem domain, Bench-Capon’s and Sartor’s research is 
mainly theoretical and cannot be implemented directly. The approach by Buchanan 
et al. (2010) is a middle ground, because rather than formalizing the written 
regulations and the legal reasoning process, Buchanan et al. propose to mimic the 
outcomes of the legal reasoning process. In Buchanan et al.’s approach, exchanging 
organizations first have to agree which types of situations give access to which 
types of data. The agreements are the outcomes of the balancing act between 
different values or goals the organizations try to fulfill with exchanging data and are 
hard-coded into local rules, which are then automatically applied to information 
exchange requests. Buchanan et al.’s approach to support automated regulated data 
exchange is interesting because the hard-coded local rules can be used for an 
implementation. Moreover, their approach can be applied in domains where the 
regulations grant discretionary authorities and have many open-textured concepts. 
A drawback of this approach is that the balancing act is fixed for the agreed types of 
situations. Furthermore, with Buchanan et al.’s approach organizations do not 
reason with their interpretations of the applicable regulations about exchanging data 
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and cannot try to convince other organizations in case a request for data is rejected. 
Let us illustrate the possible drawbacks of Buchanan et al.’s approach with an 
example. 
 
Assume that police departments agree that they do not exchange protected data, 
because they want to protect their informants. Furthermore, let us assume that data 
which reveals the location and owners of a large quantity of drugs is protected, 
since revealing the location will also expose the informant who has provided the 
data. If Buchanan et al.’s approach is used then the protected data will not be 
exchanged. However, in some situations protected data can be exchanged. For 
example, when the police department which requests the protected data knows that 
the drug location is leaked by a newspaper, the requesting department can use this 
knowledge to persuade the other department to exchange the data. If the responding 
police department is persuaded, the data could then be used to solve a crime case 
related to the drug location. In this example the police departments balance their 
goals during their interaction by not revealing the informant and executing their 
police task by helping to solve a crime case.  
 
This thesis’ approach to support regulated data exchange is to model organizations 
as a multi-agent system, where each organization has its own rules and policies to 
reason about the consequences of (not) exchanging data. Furthermore, 
organizations are able to argue with other organizations whether data can be 
exchanged. Thus, the balance of goals is not predetermined as in Buchanan et al.’s 
approach, but is found in the interaction between organizations. This research will 
investigate how the research from the AI & Law, argumentation and multi-agent 
system fields can be further developed, combined and implemented to support 
regulated data exchange in a serious problem domain. 
1.2 Research aim 
The introduction mentioned that regulated data exchange between organizations is 
often suboptimal because not enough data is exchanged legitimately and too much 
data is exchanged illegitimately. This problem results from organizations trying to 
achieve different goals and not knowing all the applicable regulations. The research 
aim of this thesis can be stated as follows. 
 
Research aim: The research aim is to investigate how theories from multi-
agent systems research, AI & Law research, and argumentation theory 
research can be further developed and applied in a realistic problem 
domain to provide a basis for automated support of organizations in 





1.2.1 Problem statement 
Based on the research aim, the problem statement of this thesis can be formulated. 
 
Problem statement: Is it possible to develop a realistic and implementable 
architecture for a multi-agent system that can provide a basis for 
automated support of regulated data exchange between organizations? 
 
Note that supporting regulated data exchange is interpreted as facilitating fewer 
unlawful and more lawful data exchanges.  
1.2.2 Research method and research questions 
The method used to answer the problem statement is as follows. The first step is 
describing and analyzing regulated data exchange in the Dutch police domain. The 
second step is investigating the suitability of a multi-agent system as a model for 
regulated data exchange, and specifying the requirements for the system. The third 
step is to model regulated data exchange as a formally specified multi-agent system. 
The fourth step is to describe the architecture and implementation of the multi-agent 
system. Each step has its own research questions which need to be answered.  
Chosen domain with regulated data exchange 
To determine how regulated data exchange can be supported, an application domain 
is needed. The Dutch police organization is a good example because it illustrates 
the problem of regulated data exchange. The method for acquiring knowledge about 
regulated data exchange in the Dutch police is to have interviews with police 
officers, and to make a study of the literature and the legal framework. Therefore, 
the first research question (RQ 1.) reads as follows. 
RQ 1:  How does the problem of regulated data exchange manifests itself in the 
Dutch police domain?  
In order to support regulated data exchange in the Dutch police domain, a 
description of the legal framework is required. So, the first research question is 
subdivided into three subquestions.  
RQ 1.a:  What is the legal framework for the Dutch police domain?  
In addition to the description of the legal framework, typical examples of 
interactions between members of organizations regarding data exchange need to be 
described. 
What are the relevant interactions in this domain?  
AUTOMATED SUPPORT OF REGULATED DATA EXCHANGE 
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Recall that organizations must typically balance the goal to execute their tasks by 
exchanging data with the goal to protect their interests at the local level by not 
disclosing confidential data, while staying within the law. To promote the goals 
concerning the exchange of data, organizations can execute different types of local 
actions, and each chosen action can have possible undesired consequences on other 
goals. Therefore, to be able to choose which action is preferred, an analysis has to 
be made of the relations between actions, goals, and consequences on other goals. 
What is the relation between goals and actions and possible consequences 
on other goals related to data exchange?  
A multi-agent system as model for regulated data exchange  
In order for the multi-agent system architecture to be a tenable model of regulated 
data exchange in the Dutch police practice, the requirements for the architecture 
need to be specified. Therefore, the second research question reads as follows. 
RQ 2: What are the requirements for a multi-agent system suitable to support 
regulated data exchange in the Dutch police organization? 
For agents to be able to regulate distributed data exchange, the agents must have 
knowledge of their domain. 
RQ 2.a:  Which kinds of knowledge do agents need to have?  
Besides having knowledge of their domain, the agents also need to be able to reason 
with their knowledge of their domain. 
RQ 2.b:  Which reasoning capabilities do the agents need? 
The agents must be able to engage in dialogues which model the typical interactions 
of the problem domain.  
RQ 2.c: Which interaction types in this domain need to be 
supported by the multi-agent system? 
Formalization of the multi-agent system  
The requirements that result from the answers to question 2 must be formalized. 
This leads to the third research question. 
RQ 3:  How can the requirements for the multi-agent system be formalized? 
The required reasoning capabilities of an agent need to be modeled. Here research 
question RQ 3 is subdivided in four subquestions. 
How can the internal reasoning of an agent be formalized? 
Knowledge must be represented in a way which is realistically implementable. This 




inference engine and needs to have enough expressive power to model the 
knowledge of the agents. 
RQ 3.b:  How can the knowledge of an agent be represented?  
As discussed earlier, the agent interactions will be modeled with dialogue systems.  
RQ 3.c:  How can the agent interactions be represented?  
In addition, the agents must be given policies for their behavior in the dialogues and 
the policies should be designed to further the agent’s goals.  
RQ 3.d: How can dialogue policies (or strategies) be defined that 
assist agents to balance their goals?  
Agents also need internal policies to prescribe when the knowledge of an agent 
must be updated during a dialogue. For example if an agent with high authority 
states something, should the other agent update his knowledge base with the 
statement or just concede the statement? 
  
RQ 3.e: Dialogues can result in knowledge updates. How can 
these changes in knowledge be modeled?  
Specification and implementation of the architecture  
To be able to implement the multi-agent system, its architecture needs to be 
specified. 
RQ 4: What is the architecture of the multi-agent system for regulated data 
exchange between different organizations?  
A requirement for the multi-agent system architecture is that it can be used to 
support regulated data exchange in similar domains. This leads to two subquestions. 
RQ 4.a: How can the architecture of the multi-agent system be 
generalized to be applicable to similar domains?  
In order to test the architecture with examples from practice, an implementation 
must be developed. 
 
RQ 4.b: How can the architecture be implemented into a proof-of- 
concept application for a problem domain?  
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1.3 Thesis outline 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 1 presented the research aim and 
research questions for this research. Chapter 2 answers research question 1 by 
analyzing and describing regulated data exchange in the Dutch police domain. 
Chapter 3 answers research question 2 by specifying the requirements for a multi-
agent system suitable to support regulated data exchange. Chapters 4 and 5 answer 
research question 3 by specifying how the requirement for a multi-agent system can 
be formalized. Chapter 4 will specify how the knowledge of an agent can 
represented and how the internal reasoning of an agent can be modeled. 
Furthermore, chapter 4 describes how the agent interactions can be formalized. 
Chapter 5 will specify the dialogue policies, which will assist agents to balance 
their goals. In addition, chapter 5 will specify the internal policies which prescribe 
when the knowledge of an agent must be updated during a dialogue. Chapter 6 
answers research question 4 by describing the specification and implementation of 
the multi-agent system architecture that meets the requirements. Chapter 7 
discusses related research on the topic of agents engaging in argumentation 
dialogues to regulate data exchange. Finally, chapter 8 presents the conclusions and 
ideas for further research. Note that this thesis is based on earlier work published in 
(Dijkstra et al. 2005; Dijkstra et al. 2006; Dijkstra et al. 2007). In Dijkstra et al. 
(2005; 2006) the initial outline of a multi-agent system architecture for regulated 
data exchange was presented. In Dijkstra et al. (2007) an early version of the 





Chapter 2  
Regulated data exchange in the Dutch 
police domain 
This chapter presents a description and analysis of regulated data exchange in the 
Dutch police organization4. First section 2.1 discusses the problem of regulated data 
exchange. Then section 2.2 describes the information systems involved in the data 
exchange and section 2.3 presents the legal framework. Section 2.4 discusses the 
approach to translating the applicable Dutch law into an intermediate 
representation, and describes the selected applicable rules and local rules. Section 
2.5 presents three examples to illustrate the problem of regulated data exchange. 
Finally, section 2.6 analyzes patterns in the examples (in terms of goals, actions and 
possible consequences on other goals). 
2.1 The problem of regulated data exchange 
This section discusses the problem of regulated data exchange in the Dutch police 
domain. The Dutch police organization is divided into separate regional 
departments, which each operate in their own region5. Since severe crime is not 
bound by the regions of departments, departments often need data held by other 
departments in order to solve crime cases. The exchange of data between 
departments is governed by national and international privacy regulations and these 
regulations are implemented by local rules of the departments. With the exchange 
of data, organizations generally try to achieve two – sometimes conflicting – goals. 
On the one hand, they have the goal to execute their appointed police task by 
exchanging data. On the other hand, they have the goal to protect local 
                                                        
4 Note that this chapter is based on earlier work published in Dijkstra et al. (2005; 
2006).  
5 The Dutch police domain will restructure the 26 departments to one National Police 
consisting of 10 regional units. For more information, see 
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/politie/nationale-politie; accessed on 
November 3rd, 2011. 
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investigations and informants. In the regulations concerning data exchange, this 
balance of the two overall goals is also expressed. For example, some typical norms 
expressing the possible conflicting goals to exchange and to protect data are as 
follows. 
 
It is obliged to exchange data from a police register with police officers, as 
far as they need this for the execution of the police task (my translation of 
article 14, paragraph a of the Dutch Police Registers Act). 
and  
If necessary for the proper execution of the police task, the exchange from 
a severe-crime register is permitted to be refused (my translation of article 
13a, paragraph 3 of the Dutch Police Registers Act). 
 
Ideally, dialogues between agents of different local departments guarantee that an 
optimal and legitimate balance of the goal to execute their appointed police task and 
the goal to protect local investigations and informants is found in the interaction. In 
consequence, when exchanging data with each other, police officers often have to 
communicate explicitly to make sure they serve local interests and at the same time 
conform to the regulations. Each department has a criminal investigations unit 
(criminele inlichtingen eenheid, CIE) for gathering intelligence data on severe 
crime. A typical interaction between CIEs is about the exchange of data acquired 
from informants6; about 80% of police data on severe crime in the examined 
departments is obtained from informants (Bonthuis 2003). Since informants often 
have some kind of involvement in the crime they supply data about or are afraid of 
possible retaliations, criminal investigations units are extremely cautious about the 
exchange of this kind of data, even if the exchange of data is obliged or allowed by 
law. If a crime suspect confronted with data obtained from informants finds out 
who supplied the data, the safety of the informant and the continuity of the 
investigation performed by the department that supplied the data is endangered. 
Therefore, in most cases the criminal investigations unit that ‘runs’ the informant 
will not be willing to exchange the data unless the receiving criminal investigations 
unit offers certain guarantees.  
 
The activities of CIEs can be divided into three groups: collecting data from 
informants, analyzing severe-crime data, and exchanging severe-crime data 
(Werkgroep CIE 2003). Since the chosen subject of this research is regulated data 
exchange, the focus is on exchanging severe-crime data. The exchange of severe-
crime data can be further broken down into four steps (Subwerkgroep Criminele 
Inlichtingen Eenheden 2002). The first step is deciding whether the request from 
                                                        
6 An informant is a person who, other than being a witness or a suspect, supplies data to 
the police about criminal events. 
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the other party can be accepted. During the first step the authorization and the 
reason for the request from the requesting party are checked. The second step is 
selecting relevant data. In the second step, relevant data is searched in the local 
severe-crime register and MROs 7 . If needed, informants are contacted to give 
updates on the requested data. The third step is the actual exchange of data. In the 
third step, data is joined and organized into a chosen predefined format. The fourth 
step is logging the exchange. The logging step records to whom what data was 
supplied and under which agreements or conditions.  
2.2 The RBS information system 
This section discusses how the data exchange process described above occurs in 
practice. Within the Dutch police domain, there are many information systems for 
specific purposes. Most departments use the ‘Recherche Basis Systeem’ (RBS) 
information system as their tool for entering and searching information. RBS is an 
information system specifically developed for the Dutch police practice and is 
designed for capturing, analyzing, authorizing, and categorizing information (Van 
der Velde 2003). In RBS, data is divided into separate registrations. A registration 
is a digital version of a register and is only available to authorized people. A 
registration consists of mutations. A mutation is a new unit of data added to a 
registration, not a change of existing data. The rationale behind this is that data in a 
mutation is set definitive (that is, made read only) after 14 days; this ensures that the 
data has not been tampered with2. A mutation has a text source and metadata 
criteria. An example of a metadata criterion used to enable data exchange is called 
data usage code, which is added to every mutation. The data usage codes determine 
whether and how the data can be used and are further described in subsection 2.4.3. 
Besides the data usage codes, there is also metadata on the reliability of data. The 
reliability metadata is divided into two parts, the reliability of the supplier of the 
data and the reliability of the data itself. For example, if an informant was 
trustworthy in the past, data originating from him will have more value and 
consequently the data supplier reliability will be evaluated as reliable.  
 
In the Dutch police domain, the following metadata values are used for data 
reliability (Bonthuis 2003). 
Data supplier reliability values 
                                                        
7 An investigation for which it is possible to obtain an arrest warrant and which is 
expected to take more than one week is called an MRO. MRO stands for ‘Melding 
Recherche Onderzoek’, which can be translated as ‘notification for a police 
investigation’. 
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A =  reliable 
B =  usually reliable 
C =  less or not reliable 
X =  cannot be determined 
Data reliability values 
1 =  observed directly by the data supplier  
2 =  observed by someone who told it directly to the data supplier 
3 =  the data supplier heard it indirectly 
 
Note that in most cases the data supplier is an informant. 
 
The process of adding of criminal intelligence data into RBS can be illustrated as 
follows. Assume that Salvatore is an informant and tells to a CIE runner8 about the 
location where a large quantity of drugs belonging to Soprano can be found. First 
the CIE runner makes a report of the conversation. This report is then refined, 
meaning that the data is verified, evaluated, and if possible supplemented with data 
from other sources. It is also checked whether the report can be legally stored in the 
local severe-crime registration. After the refinement and legal checks, the report 
will be added in RBS as a mutation in the severe-crime register of the local police 
department. Now consider what the possible consequences are if this intelligence 
data is used to solve a crime investigation on Soprano. If Salvatore is the only 
person (besides Soprano) who is in a position to know about Soprano’s drugs 
location, then Salvatore can be in serious trouble. A possible consequence is that 
Soprano orders to kill the informant. In this scenario a crime investigation on 
Soprano is completed. However, the informant (who probably is also used for other 
investigations) is lost. A second possible consequence is that the informant is not 
killed but loses his trust in the CIE runner and stops giving criminal intelligence 
data. These example scenarios also illustrate how crime investigations and 
informants are tightly coupled and why severe-crime data needs to be protected. 
2.3 Legal framework 
This section discusses the applicable legal framework. First some legal background 
information about the Dutch police organization is presented. Then the intended 
free flow of information versus the refusals in practice is discussed. Next the 
concept ‘police task’ is discussed and finally the police registers are described.  
                                                        
8 Runners are CIE officers who are in direct contact with the informants. 
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2.3.1 Legal background information about Dutch police organization 
The two overall tasks of the Dutch police organization are assistance to the general 
public and maintaining law and order (article 2 of the law for maintenance of public 
order, Politiewet). One of the subtasks of maintenance of law and order is tracing 
criminals, where the main goal is gathering evidence in criminal cases. A second 
subtask is the general intelligence process, in which data is collected about crimes 
which are committed or intended. General intelligence data is used to decide which 
crime investigations will be started. In the Dutch police organization, the criminal 
intelligence units (CIEs) are responsible for the gathering of intelligence data for 
the police task as far it is related to severe crime. Every police department has an 
autonomous CIE and there is one national coordinating CIE.  
 
In the Netherlands the overall encompassing law concerned with the processing of 
personal data is called the Personal Data Protection Act (Wet bescherming 
persoonsgegevens, Wbp). The Wbp states that processing of criminal personal data 
in the context of criminal law is forbidden (article 16, Wbp). However, for the 
processing of data by the police an exception is made (article 22, paragraph 1, Wbp). 
  
While the primary goal of the Wbp is to protect citizens against privacy 
infringement, the primary goal for the police is the execution of their appointed 
police task. For example, the obligation from the Wbp to inform people involved in 
the processing of data can seriously damage a police investigation and interfere 
with the execution their appointed police task (De Vey Mestdagh 2008). Because of 
the special nature of police intelligence, specific laws have been issued and the 
Wbp is not applicable in this case. For the exchange of severe-crime data between 
CIEs, the Police Registers Act (Wet politieregisters, Wpolr) was applicable at the 
time of this research, which is further detailed in the Police Registers Decree 
(Besluit politieregisters, Bpolr) and the CIE regulation (regeling CIE). Since 1 
January 2008, both the Wpolr and the Bpolr have been replaced by the Police Data 
Act (Wet politiegegevens, Wpg) and the Police Data Decree (Besluit 
politiegegevens, Bpg). During the specification of the model and implementation of 
the proof of concept application, the Wpolr and Bpolr were applicable. Therefore, 
the present research uses the Wpolr and the Bpolr. However, the results of this 
research can be generalized to the present legal context in the Dutch police domain 
because both legal frameworks are similar with respect to their contents. The main 
difference between the two legal frameworks is the change of focus from individual 
registrations to individual data. However, the change of focus does not change the 
conclusions of this research since registrations consist of data. The previous and 
current legal frameworks are both characterized by the protection of data and 
informants and leave room for local decisions. For example, Wpg article 27, 
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paragraph 1, subparagraph b, allows refusing a request for data for the important 
interests of third parties; which refers to the protection of informants and 
infiltrators 9 . This ground for refusal was also expressed in Bpolr article 11, 
paragraph 1, subparagraph a. 
2.3.2 Intended free flow versus refusals in practice 
The legislator intended a free-flow of data within parts of the Dutch police 
organization (Ruth and Schreuders 2000; Schreuders and Wel 2005) and has 
created many rules which obligate the distribution of data. However, to enable data 
protection, the legislator also allows grounds for refusal as a legal way to refuse the 
exchange of data. It was the legislator’s goal that in specific cases of data protection, 
the relevant interests are weighed against each other. However, my interviews with 
police officers revealed that in practice the behavior is almost the opposite of free-
flow; the grounds for refusal are more used as default instead of using it in special 
cases with serious deliberation (see also Kielman 2010, page 133). The large 
number of refusals has as consequence that only a part of the permitted data 
exchanges occur in the Dutch police domain. The present research is aimed at 
creating fewer refusals by which regulated data exchange between organizations 
can be supported. 
2.3.3 The concept ‘police task’ 
The concept ‘police task’ is central both in the Police Registers Act (Wpolr) and the 
Police Registers Decree (Bpolr), see Ruth and Schreuders (2000). First it 
determines which types of data can be stored. Second, it determines whether it is 
obliged or permitted to refuse to exchange data. Finally, ‘police task’ is used as 
ground for applicability for the Wpolr and Bpolr. If the Wpolr and Bpolr are not 
applicable, the Wbp is applicable and therefore also its distribution regime.  
 
The main rule promoting the exchange of data is Wpolr article 14, paragraph a, 
which states that it is obliged to exchange data if the other party needs it for the 
execution of the police task; here the police task is used as a ground to promote the 
exchange of data. The main rule limiting the exchange of data from severe-crime 
registers is Wpolr article 13a, paragraph 3, which states that the exchange of data 
can be refused if necessary for the proper execution of the police task; here the 
police task is used as a ground to refuse the exchange of data and therefore limiting 
data exchange. If the concept of ‘police task’ is used as a ground for refusal, it must 
be argued for in every particular case. The two general demands which are relevant 
are proportionality and subsidiarity. As described in Mommers et al. (2007), the 
concept of ‘necessity’ in Wpolr article 13a paragraph 3 refers to the demands of 
proportionality and subsidiarity. In the context of this article, proportionality is an 
                                                        
9 Kamerstukken II, 2005-06, 30 327, nr. 3, p. 85. 
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assessment whether the (possible) negative consequences of an action are in 
proportion to the intended positive consequences. For example, the consequences of 
revealing the identity an informant for finding the location of a drug house are not 
severe compared to the benefits of protecting the informant if he is providing 
valuable data about a serial killer. The demand of subsidiarity entails that always 
the least drastic still feasible measure should be taken. In this case, it should be 
examined if there is a possibility to exchange the data in a way that has no or less 
impact on the execution of the police task. For example, instead of refusing to 
exchange data for finding the location of a drug house (because it will reveal the 
identity of the informant supplying data about a serial killer), the data could be 
exchanged for analysis purposes only. If the data is used for analysis purposes only, 
the data is analyzed to find general patterns. An example of a pattern is the typical 
location of a drug house, which can be used for starting new investigations. 
Grounds for refusal can be deeply intertwined. For example, the protection of 
informants is a part of the police task and part of privacy protection. Informants will 
not cooperate if their privacy is not protected and if they do not cooperate, the 
execution of the police task is impeded (Ruth and Schreuders 2000). 
2.3.4 Police registers 
Data needed to fulfill the police task is stored in registers. A register is defined as a 
coherent collection of personal data related to several persons that has been created 
to serve the execution of the police task (my translation of article 1, paragraph c, 
Wpolr). Every police region creates and administrates their police registers. A 
severe-crime register is a police register specifically for storing severe-crime data.  
 
Within the police organization, it is only allowed to create registers for a specific 
purpose, for example, the tracing of perpetrators of criminal offences. The tie-to-
purpose principle states that storage of data is only allowed if necessary for the 
purpose of the register. Deviations from the tie-to-purpose principle are allowed if 
necessary, for example the tracing of crimes (College bescherming 
persoonsgegevens 2004). The police organization also needs to design specific 
privacy regulations for every police register (article 9, Wpolr). Privacy regulations 
for police registers are mandatory and state the purpose and the administrator of the 
register. In addition, a privacy regulation states who have access to a register, which 
is partly done by assigning roles. The register administrator has to designate a 
specific list of people who are authorized to have access. In order to facilitate 
uniformity of the same type of registers in different departments, article 12, 
paragraph 1 of the Wpolr allows the creation of model regulations. A model 
regulation is a blueprint for privacy regulations for police registers. If a register 
administrator creates a new register based on a model regulation, he only has to 
inform the Dutch Data Protection Authority (College bescherming 
persoonsgegevens, CBP).  
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2.4 Approach to translating applicable Dutch law into an 
English intermediate representation 
In order to create a multi-agent system architecture and a proof of concept 
application to demonstrate how the regulated data exchange between different 
organizations can be optimized, the applicable rules need to be formalized. In this 
section the selected applicable rules are rewritten into an intermediate 
representation which will be formalized in later chapters. The reasons for rewriting 
the applicable rules into an intermediate representation are that an intermediate 
representation (1) creates a link between the formalization and the applicable rules, 
(2) is independent of the implementation, and (3) allows for easier validation 
(Bench-Capon and Coenen 1992; De Vey Mestdagh 1997). The intermediate 
representation rules are written from the perspective of a CIE agent who has to 
decide whether it is obliged, allowed, forbidden or it is a violation of his own 
interests to exchange intelligence data. First the approach to translating, selecting, 
interpreting, and rewriting the applicable regulations is described. Then the 
underlying assumptions used for selecting and translating the applicable laws into 
the intermediate representation are specified (2.4.1). Finally, the selected applicable 
laws (2.4.2) and (2.4.3) local rules are translated into an English intermediate 
representation. 
2.4.1 Assumptions 
This subsection presents the assumptions for creating an architecture of a multi-
agent system for regulated data exchange in the Dutch police domain. In order to 
keep the model of regulated data exchange in the Dutch police domain manageable, 
the following 11 assumptions are applied in the selection of what is relevant in the 
applicable regulations. 
• Data is stored severe-crime registers. 
• The distributor of data is an authorized CIE officer who is a member of the 
local criminal investigation unit and has permission to have full access 
(i.e., register administrator role) to the local severe-crime register. 
• The requester of data is an authorized CIE officer from another criminal 
investigation unit and has permission to receive data from other severe-
crime registers. 
• CIE officers do not exchange intelligence data outside criminal 
investigation units. Note that the condition stating that it is forbidden to 
pass on the exchanged intelligence data to other departments or criminal 
investigation units is not modeled to allow easier implementation. Of 
course, the model can be extended to allow exchanging data outside 
criminal investigation units.  
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• The goals of CIE officers are to execute the police task and to protect local 
investigations and informants. 
• CIE officers trust each other. 
• Criminal investigation units can have different interpretations of the legal 
framework and therefore can have different local rules10.  
• Criminal investigation units do not hide data11, that is, if they have data but 
they are not willing to supply it, then they tell this to each other. In 
practice, this assumption is also made by CIE officers12.  
• Within a criminal investigation unit, all CIE officers have the same 
‘attitude’ (see section 2.6) towards data exchange.  
• CIE officers only refuse to exchange data for the proper execution of the 
police task. 
• CIE officers only request data for the proper execution of the police task. 
Note that the model incorporates other norms for regulated data exchange 
between criminal investigation units, and the model can be extended to 
incorporate this norm. 
2.4.2 Selected applicable articles 
In this subsection the selected applicable three articles are translated into an English 
intermediate representation. The first step of the approach is selecting the original 
Dutch articles from applicable regulations that help to decide whether severe-crime 
data can be exchanged with other CIE agents. The original Dutch articles are 
presented first to enable validation of the translation. The second step is translating 
the selected articles into English; next in the third step the relevant excerpts from 
the articles are selected (relevance is based on the assumptions described above). In 
the fourth step, the selection and interpretation of relevant excerpts are explained 
and motivated. In the fifth step, the excerpts are rewritten into an intermediate 
representation.  
 
1: Wpolr art. 14 par. a (main rule for exchanging data with CIEs) 
Step 1: Original Dutch article  
                                                        
10 Note that local rules can also have different interpretations. 
11 Note that Teepe does not make this assumption in his thesis (Teepe 2007). 
12 Based on the interview with Doetse Huizinga, conducted with Hugo Kielman and 
Wouter Koelewijn on 30-3-2005 in Apeldoorn. 
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Uit een politieregister worden gegevens verstrekt aan: 
a. ambtenaren van politie, voor zover zij deze behoeven voor de 
vervulling van de politietaak en zij niet zijn aangesteld voor de 
uitvoering van technische, administratieve en andere taken ten 
dienste van de politie en aan ambtenaren die krachtens artikel 
13c, vijfde lid, zijn aangewezen, voor zover zij deze behoeven ter 
opsporing van strafbare feiten;  
Step 2: My translation 
It is obliged to exchange data from a police register with: 
a. police officers, as far as they need this for the execution of the 
police task and they have not been appointed for the execution of 
technical, administrative and other task as service to the police 
and to officials who have been assigned by article 13c, paragraph 
5, as far as they need this for the investigation of criminal 
offences; 
Step 3: Relevant excerpts from translated article 
It is obliged to exchange data from a police register with police officers, as 
far as they need this for the execution of the police task. 
Step 4: Interpretation and explanation 
This article contains the general norm for exchanging data and is also applicable for 
CIE agents, since they are police officers who have not been appointed for the 
execution of technical, administrative and other task as service to the police. Note 
that the section ‘as far as they need it for the execution of the police task’ has two 
implications. The first implication is ‘exchange data if the other police officer needs 
it’. The second implication is ‘do not exchange if the other police officer does not 
need it’. An assumption is that CIE officers only request data for the proper 
execution of the police task. For that reason, Wpolr article 14, paragraph a, the 
second implication is not applicable and is therefore not represented. Note further 
that the general police register is substituted by a severe-crime register, which are 
the registers used by CIEs when they exchange data.  
Step 5: Rewrite of excerpts into intermediate representation  
(Wpolr14.a implication 1) 
IF  a CIE agent needs data for the execution of the police task,  
THEN  
it is obliged to exchange the data from the severe-crime register 
with the CIE agent. 
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2: Wpolr art. 13a par. 3 (main rule for refusing the exchange of 
severe-crime data with CIEs) 
Step 1: Original Dutch article  
Indien dit noodzakelijk is voor een goede uitvoering van de politietaak, kan 
de verstrekking ingevolge de artikelen 14 en 15, eerste lid, onder b, c en d 
en f, uit een register zware criminaliteit worden geweigerd dan wel aan 
beperkende voorwaarden wat betreft het verdere gebruik worden 
onderworpen. 
Step 2: My translation 
If necessary for the proper execution of the police task, the exchange in 
accordance with articles 14 and 15 first paragraph under b, c, and d, from 
a severe-crime register is permitted to be refused, or carried out under 
restricting conditions regarding to further use. 
Step 3: Relevant excerpts from translated article 
If necessary for the proper execution of the police task, the exchange from 
a severe-crime register is permitted to be refused or carried out under 
restricting conditions regarding to further use. 
Step 4: Interpretation and explanation 
This article refers to article 14 Wpolr, which is the general norm for exchanging 
data from police registers, and contains the norm for refusing or restricting the 
exchange of severe-crime data. The translation uses ‘is permitted to’ instead of 
‘can’ to clearly specify the permission to refuse to exchange severe-crime data or to 
state conditions for further use. References to severe-crime registers are left implicit 
in the intermediate representation, which is based on the assumption that all data is 
stored in severe-crime registers. 
Step 5: Rewrite of excerpts into intermediate representation  
(Wpolr13a.3 part 1) 
IF  a refusal to exchange data is necessary for the proper execution of 
the police task, 
THEN  
it is permitted to refuse to exchange data. 
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(Wpolr13a.3 part 2) 
IF  a refusal to exchange data is necessary for the proper execution of 
the police task, 
THEN  
it is permitted to exchange data with restricting conditions 
regarding to further use. 
 
 
3: Bpolr art. 11 (grounds for refusal)  
Step 1: Original Dutch article  
1. Een beheerder is bevoegd verstrekking van gegevens uit een 
politieregister ingevolge de artikelen 14 en 15, eerste lid, onder b en c, van 
de wet te weigeren indien:  
a. het gegevens betreft omtrent personen die aan de politie 
informatie hebben verstrekt omtrent door anderen gepleegde of te 
plegen strafbare feiten;  
 
b. het gegevens uit een register betreft waarbij, mede gelet op de 
bijzondere aard van het register, in geval van verstrekking direct 
gevaar voor de geregistreerde of voor derden zou zijn te duchten.  
 
3. Het eerste en tweede lid vinden slechts toepassing indien dit 
noodzakelijk is voor de goede uitvoering van de politietaak. Bij de 
verstrekking van de daar bedoelde gegevens kunnen beperkingen aan het 
gebruik van de gegevens worden opgelegd. 
Step 2: My translation 
1. An administrator is permitted to refuse to exchange data in accordance 
with articles 14 and 15 paragraph 1, subparagraphs b and c, of the law if: 
a. it concerns data about people who have supplied data to the 
police concerning crimes which were or are going to be 
committed; 
 
b. it concerns data from a register of which, given the special 
nature of the register, in case of exchanging data, creates 
immediate danger for the registered person or third parties. 
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3. The first and second paragraph are not applicable when not necessary 
for the proper execution of the police task. During the exchange of the data 
meant above, it is permitted to enforce restrictions on the usage of data.  
Step 3: Relevant excerpts from translated article 
1. An administrator is permitted to refuse to exchange data in accordance 
with articles 14 of the law if: 
a. it concerns data about people who have supplied data to the 
police concerning crimes which were or are going to be 
committed; 
 
b. it concerns data from a register of which, given the special 
nature of the register, in case of exchanging data, creates 
immediate danger for the registered person or third parties. 
 
3. The first paragraph is not applicable when not necessary for the proper 
execution of the police task. During the exchange of the data meant above, 
it is permitted to enforce restrictions on the usage of data.  
 
Step 4: Interpretation and explanation 
Since the data exchange between CIEs is fully covered by article 14 of the Wpolr, 
the part ‘and 15 paragraph 1, subparagraphs b and c’ can be omitted in the relevant 
excerpts. The excerpt ‘people who have supplied data to the police’ from 
subparagraph a, paragraph 1, refers to informants. Therefore, in the intermediate 
representation the term informants is used. 
Step 5: Rewrite of excerpts into intermediate representation  
(Bpolr 11.1. a) 
IF   the data about informants concerns crimes which were or are 
going to be committed 
THEN  
an administrator is permitted to refuse the exchange of data. 
 
(Bpolr 11.1. b) 
IF  the data originates from a register of which, given the special 
nature of the register, in case of exchanging data, creates 
immediate danger for the registered person or third parties 
THEN  
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an administrator is permitted to refuse the exchange of data.  
 
(Bpolr 11.3 sentence 1) 
IF  a refusal to exchange data is not necessary for the proper 
execution of the police task, 
THEN  
(Bpolr 11.1) is not applicable.  
 
(Bpolr 11.3 sentence 2) 
IF  data is exchanged 
THEN  
it is permitted to enforce restrictions on the usage of data.  
2.4.3 Selected applicable local rules 
In this subsection a selection of local rules is translated, interpreted and rewritten 
into an intermediate format. The local rules were acquired using interviews with 
police officers of the Dutch police2 (Bonthuis 2003). The local rules are based on 
local interpretations which are allowed within the given discretionary power to the 
CIE units. The interpretations are in turn based upon the ‘attitude’ of a department 
organization. For example, a criminal investigation unit with a cooperative attitude 
interprets the applicable regulations in a way that leaves more room for exchanging 
data. An example of different local interpretations is that some departments 
exchange severe-crime data only after permission of the CIE-chief, while other 
departments exchange data without permission and tell the CIE-chief afterwards (in 
case of emergencies). This can be considered as two different interpretations of 
article 4, paragraph 1, subparagraph b of the CIE-regulation, which states that CIEs 
are obliged to conform to the Model Regulation Severe Crime (modelreglement 
register zware criminaliteit, MRZC) and article 4 of MRZC which states that the 
register manager has authority on the register.  
 
The first step is selecting the original local rules that help to decide whether severe-
crime data can be exchanged with other CIE agents. The second step is translating 
the local rules into English. In the third step, the local rules are interpreted and 
explained. In the fourth step, the local rules are rewritten into an intermediate 
representation.  
 
The local rules are organized as follows. First the data usage codes are rewritten 
(A), then rules stating grounds for refusal are described (B), and finally rules stating 
exceptional cases are presented (C). 
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A: Data usage codes 
The data usage codes determine the allowed usage of data (see appendix 1 of the 
CIE regulation). The usage codes are applied within the whole police organization. 
The CIE chief (Groepschef) decides, in consultation with the CIE officers who are 
in direct contact with the informants (runners), which data usage codes will be 
used. Below, the data usage codes are translated and rewritten into an intermediate 
representation.  
Step 1: Original Dutch data usage codes 
11 =  operationeel te gebruiken 
01 =  alleen gebruiken na overleg met afzender  
00 =  informatie met zware beperkingen voor gebruik  
200 =  kan niet operationeel gebruikt worden, maar kan onder bepaalde 
voorwaarden wel voor coördinatie- en analysedoeleinden worden 
gebruikt. + informatie met verhoogd afbreukrisico  
300 =  kan niet operationeel gebruikt worden, maar kan onder bepaalde  
voorwaarden wel voor coördinatie- en analysedoeleinden worden 
gebruikt. + informatie met bronbeschermingsbelangen  
Step 2: My translation 
11 = ready for operational usage 
01 =  only permitted to use after consultation with the sender of the data  
00 =  data with severe restrictions on usage  
200 =  forbidden to use for operational usage, but only permitted to use 
under certain conditions for coordination and analysis purposes. 
+ data with risk factor 
300 = forbidden to use for operational usage, but only permitted to use 
under certain conditions for coordination and analysis purposes. 
+ data with source protection 
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Step 3: Interpretation and explanation 
The data usage codes are an implementation of art. 11, par. 3. of the Bpolr ‘it is 
permitted to enforce restrictions on the usage of data’ and 11.1.a of the Bpolr ‘An 
administrator is permitted to refuse to exchange data in accordance with articles 14 
and 15 paragraph 1, subparagraphs b and c, of the law if: a. it concerns data from 
people who have supplied data to the police concerning crimes which were or are 
going to be committed’. 
 
Although all criminal investigation units use the same data usage codes, different 
interpretations create differences in the application of those codes. The data usage 
codes are tentative and leave discretionary room; this can be observed in their 
formulations. For example, usage code 01 states that data can only be used after 
consultation with the sender. How this consultation is done and when it is sufficient 
to start exchanging data is a local decision. An example of different local 
interpretations is that some regional departments with an overcautious attitude 
apply the data usage code 00 (data with severe restrictions on usage) often to make 
sure that their data is not easily shared. Furthermore some CIE units almost never 
want to exchange, while other units can be persuaded to exchange data with access 
code 002. A second example of different local interpretations is that in some 
departments, runners cannot see their own created data with data usage code 002. 
Here an example of the difference between the intended free flow and the overused 
grounds for refusal in practice can be observed. Only non-protected data which has 
data usage code 11 gives room for a free flow of data. The formulation ‘operational 
usage’ indicates that the intelligence data can also be used and exchanged freely 
with authorized police officers other than CIE officers. Bpolr 11.1 distinguishes two 
grounds for refusal: the protection of informants (Bpolr 11.1.a) and the risk of 
revealing the registered people or third parties (Bpolr 11.1.b). Data usage code 300 
is an interpretation of Bpolr article 11, paragraph 1, subparagraph a, where the 
protection of informants is called “source protection”. Data usage code 200 is an 
interpretation of Bpolr article 11, paragraph 1, subparagraph b, where the risk of 
revealing the registered people or third parties is called a “risk factor”.  
 
Exchanging data labeled with ‘source protection’ or with a ‘risk factor’ can have 
undesired consequences on the protection of local investigations: when an 
informant is at risk then also the investigation which uses the informant as a source 
can be at risk, and when the registered person or third party (for example an 
anonymous witness) is at risk then also the investigation can be at risk. Risks arise 
when the exchange of data has undesired consequences on the police or on the 
sources of intelligence data. Examples of undesired consequences are: data 
becoming useless, harming the police reputation when an anonymous witness is 
revealed, and harming the relationship with informants when an informant is 
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revealed. The risk that an informant or third party will be killed is the most serious 
risk factor (Kielman 2010, page 43; Koelewijn 2009, page 104). 
 
Data usage code 00 does not specify why the data is protected. Therefore in 
practice, a CIE agent will look into the mutation text source (see section 2.2) or ask 
the creator of the text to give reasons for the 00 usage code if a discussion with 
other CIE agents comes up. Data usage codes 200 and 300 were added later to the 
already existing code 00 to make it more clear why the data is protected (i.e., to be 
used as a ground for refusal).  
 
Let us return to the example of section 2.2, where Salvatore is an informant and 
tells a CIE runner where a large quantity of drugs belonging to Soprano can be 
found, to illustrate how the data usage codes are applied. Assume that the data was 
already disclosed by another informant and Soprano was already caught by another 
department for this crime, then the mutation could probably have 11 as usage code. 
If Salvatore is the only source and he could be important in other crime cases, the 
mutation could be evaluated as 300. If the runner knows other informants who also 
know about where a large quantity of drugs belonging to Soprano can be found, he 
might be willing to exchange the data and therefore could label the mutation as 01.  
 
Step 4: Rewrite of excerpts into intermediate representation  
Data usage code 11 
IF  data has usage code 11 
THEN   
it is obliged to exchange the data. 
 
Data usage code 01 
IF  data has usage code 01 
THEN   
it is permitted to exchange the data only after consultation with the 
sender. 
 
Data usage code 00 
IF  data has usage code 00 
THEN  
 the data has severe restrictions on usage.  
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Data usage code 200 forbidden  
IF  data has usage code 200 
THEN 
it is forbidden to use the data for operational usage. 
 
Data usage code 200 coordination and analysis 
IF  data has usage code 200 
THEN 
it is permitted to use the data only under certain conditions for 
coordination and analysis purposes. 
 
Data usage code 200 risk factor 
IF  data has usage code 200  
THEN 
the data is a risk factor.  
 
Risk factor then forbidden to exchange 
IF   data has a risk factor 
THEN  
it is forbidden to exchange the data. 
 
Risk factor and analysis permitted to exchange 
IF   data has a risk factor and is used for analysis purposes 
THEN  
it is permitted to exchange the data. 
 
Data usage code 300 forbidden 
IF  data has usage code 300 
THEN 
it is forbidden to use the data for operational usage. 
 
Data usage code 300 coordination and analysis 
IF  data has usage code 300 
THEN 
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it is permitted use the data only under certain conditions for 
coordination and analysis purposes. 
 
Data usage code 300 source protection 
IF  data has usage code 300  
THEN 
the data has source protection. 
 
Source protection forbidden to exchange data  
IF   data has a source protection 
THEN  
it is forbidden to exchange the data. 
 
Source protection and analysis permitted to exchange data  
IF   data has a source protection and is used for analysis purposes  
THEN  
it is permitted to exchange the data. 
 
B: Common grounds for refusal 
Beside the data usage codes 00, 200, and 300 other more explicit grounds for 
refusal can be used. Examples of more explicit grounds for refusal are2: when the 
data is used for an internal investigation, when the data is no more up to date, or 
when the data is traceable to informants. Traceability to informants is partly 
handled by usage code 300; the difference is that data with usage code 300 is 
directly about informants, while data labeled traceability can indirectly lead to 
informants. By giving more explicit grounds for refusals, agents have more means 
to engage in dialogues which help to optimize regulated data exchange. Below, the 
rules expressing grounds for refusals are described and rewritten into an 
intermediate format. 
 
B1: Ground for refusal: traceability of informant  
Step 1:Original Dutch rule  
Gegevens die herleidbaar zijn naar een informant hebben 
bronbescherming. 
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Step 2: My translation 
Data which are traceable to an informant has source protection.  
Step 3: Interpretation and explanation 
This domain rule is based on interviews with CIE officers in the Dutch police 
domain2. The estimation that the data can be used to trace an informant is an 
important reason for source protection. A traceability assessment is dependent on 
the number of informants who have given the data and the level of detail of the 
data. If data is too specific then the suspect could trace the person who has given 
the data. For example, if Adriana is the only one who knows that Christopher 
Moltisanti has heroin in the lower drawer of his bedside table then, when this 
information is used, Christopher will know that Adriana is an informant.  
Step 4: Rewrite of local rule into intermediate representation  
Traceable source protection 
IF  data is traceable to an informant 
THEN   
the data originating from the informant has source protection.  
 
B2: Ground for refusal: internal investigation 
Step 1: Original Dutch rule 
Het is verboden om gegevens die gebruikt worden voor een intern 
onderzoek over een collega te verstrekken. 
Step2: My translation 
It is forbidden to exchange data used for internal investigation about a 
colleague. 
Step 3: Interpretation and explanation 
An internal investigation can be conducted on a colleague police officer or a 
criminal investigation unit suspected of leaking data back to criminals. When a 
police officer or a criminal investigation unit leaks data back to criminals, local 
investigations can be at risk. Therefore this can be regarded as an interpretation of a 
risk factor of art 11. par. 1 subpar. b of the Bpolr. Recall that a risk factor is defined 
as the risk of revealing the registered people or third parties (see interpretation and 
explanation of data usage code 200 on page 27).  
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Step 4: Rewrite of local rule into intermediate representation 
Colleague then risk factor 
IF  data is used for internal investigation about a colleague  
THEN  
the data has a risk factor. 
 
 
B3: Ground for refusal: older than one year 
Step 1: Original Dutch rule 
Gegevens ouder dan 1 jaar worden niet meer verstrekt. 
Step 2: My translation 
It is forbidden to exchange data older than one year.  
Step 3: Interpretation and explanation 
This local rule is based on interviews with CIE officers in the Dutch police 
domain2. In the Dutch police practice, data older than one year is considered as not 
up to date. For that reason it is forbidden to exchange data older than one year. 
Informants first need to be consulted to revalidate the data before it can be used 
again. In the context of exchanging data this rule is more stringent than Wpolr art. 
13a par. 8. This article states that data must be deleted when older than five years 
and therefore permits to exchange data not older than five years.  
Step 4: Rewrite of local rule into intermediate representation  
Older than one year forbidden to exchange data 
IF  data is older than one year 
THEN  
it is forbidden to exchange the data. 
 
C: Exceptional situations: National importance, attempted assault on 
the queen, multiple child-murder 
The general norm for exchanging data is Wpolr art. 14 par. a. For exchanging 
severe-crime data, article 13a, paragraph 3Wpolr specifies which grounds for 
refusals can be used for exceptions for Wpolr art. 14 par. a. However, based on 
interviews with police officers2, those exceptions in turn can also have exceptions. 
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Those exceptions are called exceptional situations and specify in which cases 
exceptions can be set aside. 
Step 1: Original Dutch rule 
In uitzonderlijke gevallen (zoals nationaal belang, een aanslag op de 
koningin of een meervoudige kindermoord) kan de bescherming van 
gegevens opzij worden gezet. 
 
Step 2: My translation 
In exceptional cases (such as national importance, an attempt to assault 
the queen or a multiple child-murder) it is permitted to set aside the 
protection of data. 
 
Step 3: Interpretation and explanation 
In exceptional cases the rules forbidding the exchange of data can be set aside. The 
risk of jeopardizing the police investigations or informants then has to be accepted 
by the CIE agent who owns the data. Examples of exceptional cases are: national 
importance and an attempted assault on the queen2. Of course other examples of 
exceptional situations exist. 
Step 4: Rewrite of local rule into intermediate representation  
Exceptional situations 
IF  National importance 
 OR 
 Attempted assault on the queen 
THEN 
an exceptional situation occurs. 
 
Exceptional situation set aside protection 
IF  an exceptional situation occurs 
THEN 
then the rules forbidding the exchange of data are not applicable. 
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2.5 Examples of dialogues about regulated data exchange 
In this section examples of regulated data exchange from the Dutch police practice 
are presented. For this research the examples are utilized to clarify the requirements 
for developing a multi-agent system (MAS) architecture for regulated data 
exchange. The examples will also be used to illustrate the communication protocol 
in Chapter 4 and the policies of Chapter 5. The chosen examples are based on data 
gathered from interviews2. Police officers have confirmed that the chosen scenarios 
are exemplary dialogues about regulated data exchange.  
 
The exchange of severe-crime intelligence data between CIEs can be broken down 
into three classes. The first class is where requests for data are always granted 
directly. The second class is where data is never exchanged. The third class is the 
most interesting, it is the class where agents try to persuade or negotiate with each 
other in order to exchange data. The selected examples fall in the third class  
 
Example 1 source protection & analysis purposes  
In this example, agent p of criminal investigation unit P requests the responding 
agent o of criminal investigation unit O to give him intelligence data about Adriana. 
 
p1: Tell me all you know about Adriana.  
 
After searching and finding data about Adriana in his severe-crime 
register, the responding agent o sees that the data has source protection 
since the data is traceable to his informant Adriana. Furthermore, agent o 
infers that informant Adriana has no protection when the data is 
exchanged. This is a violation of the interests of agent o since his goal to 
protect his informant Adriana conflicts with the conclusion that Adriana is 
not protected when the data about Adriana is exchanged. As a possible 
way to enable data exchange, agent o tries to find a condition under which 
the data can be exchanged. This is possible and agent o makes an offer to 
exchange the data on the condition that it only can be used for analysis 
purposes.  
 
o2: I will give you this data about Adriana under the following condition: the 
exchanged data may only be used for analysis purposes. 
 
The requesting agent deliberates whether he can accept the condition with 
the offer. This is possible, since his query was made for analysis purposes 
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and he will use that data for analysis purposes only. Therefore, the 
requesting agent p accepts the offer 
 
p3: I agree with this condition. 
 
Requesting agent p agrees with the condition and the responding agent 
sends him the requested intelligence data about Adriana.  
 
Example 2 terrorist assault on the queen 
In this scenario, CIE agent p of criminal investigation unit P has anonymously 
received a tip-off and asks agent o of criminal investigation unit O about a terrorist 
group in Amsterdam which is possibly planning an assault on the queen. Initially 
the responding agent rejects his request. However, the requesting agent persuades 
him to exchange the requested data 
 
p1: Give me all data about a possible terrorist attack. 
 
At this moment, the responding agent o internally deliberates whether it is 
obliged, forbidden or whether there is violation of his interests to exchange 
the found data about a possible terrorist attack. The responding agent 
concludes that it is forbidden to exchange the data about explosive 
materials, since the data is older than one year. Therefore, the responding 
agent rejects the request. 
 
o2: I will not give you this data. 
 
Since requesting agent p wants to gather as much data as possible, he will 
always ask for the reason after a rejection in order to try to create a 
counterargument. Hence, the requesting agent p asks why. 
 
p3: Why don’t you give me that data? 
 
Since all agents need to cooperate, for the proper execution of the police 
task, the responding agent o gives the reason for his rejection. 
 
o4: Because it is forbidden to exchange data about a possible terrorist attack. 
 
The requesting agent p asks for a reason why it is forbidden to exchange 
data. 
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p5: Why is it forbidden to exchange that data? 
 
The responding agent o gives as reason that the action to exchange the 
data is forbidden since the data is older than one year.  
 
o6: Because the data is older than one year. 
 
The requesting agent p agrees that generally data cannot be exchanged if 
the data is older than one year. However, in this case the data must be 
exchanged because of an exceptional situation. 
 
p7: You may be right in general but in this case it not forbidden to exchange 
the data since this is an exceptional situation. 
 
The responding agent o asks for a reason why it is an exceptional situation. 
 
o8: Why is this an exceptional situation? 
 
Because the requesting agent wants to convince the responding agent, he 
gives the attempted assault on the queen as a ground for the exceptional 
situation. 
 
p9: Because there is an attempted assault on the queen. 
 
Responding agent o reasons that an attempted assault on the queen is more 
significant than not exchanging data older than one year. Thus he agrees 
that in this exceptional case the data must be exchanged.  
 
o10 Ok, I concede that in this case it is not forbidden to exchange the data, so I 
retract that it is forbidden to exchange the data; I will offer you the 
requested data. 
 
The requesting agent agrees with the offer. 
 
p11: I accept the offer. 
 
The dialogue is completed and the outcome of the dialogue is that the data 
is sent to the requesting agent.  
 
The initial refusal is based on article 13a, paragraph 3 of the Wpolr. However, in 
practice, in exceptional cases the rules forbidding the exchange of data can be set 
aside (see subsection 2.4.3 on page 31).  




Example 3 investigation protection & national importance  
In this example, agent p of criminal investigation unit P requests data about trading 
in explosive materials from agent o of criminal investigation unit O. Agent o is of a 
criminal investigation unit with an ‘overcautious’ attitude and therefore is 
extremely reluctant to exchange data. 
 
p1: Give me all data about trading in explosive materials. 
 
When searching for data based on the request, agent o notices that his 
found data about trading in explosive materials has a risk factor since it 
can endanger the continuity of a local investigation. Therefore agent o 
initially rejects the request. 
 
o2: I will not give you this data. 
 
After the refusal, the requesting agent p asks for the reason of the refusal 
 
p3: Why don’t you give me that data? 
 
Since all agents need to cooperate, for the proper execution of the police 
task, agent o gives the reason for his rejection. 
 
o4: Because it is forbidden to exchange data about trading in explosive 
materials. 
 
Agent p asks for a reason why it is forbidden to exchange the data. 
 
p5: Why is it forbidden to exchange that data? 
 
Agent o gives as reason that the action to exchange the data is forbidden 
since exchanging the data could endanger the continuity of an 
investigation. 
 
o6: Because exchanging the data could endanger the continuity of an 
investigation. 
 
Agent p agrees that generally the requested data cannot be exchanged. 
However, in this case the data must be exchanged because claiming it is a 
matter of national importance. 
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p7: You may be right in general but in this case it not forbidden to exchange 
the data because this is an exceptional situation since it is a matter of 
national importance.  
 
Responding agent o reasons that national importance is more significant 
than the protection of a local investigation and he is therefore willing to 
exchange the data under the condition that the data cannot be exchanged 
with other police officers.  
 
o8: Ok, I admit that in this case it is not forbidden to exchange the data, so I 
retract that it is forbidden to exchange the data; I will give you this data on 
the following condition: the given data can not be exchanged with other 
police officers. 
 
Agent p agrees with the offer. 
 
p9: I agree with this condition. 
 
The dialogue is completed and responding agent p sends agent o the 
requested intelligence data about trading in explosive materials.  
 
As discussed in Example 2, the initial refusal is based on article 13a, paragraph 3 of 
the Wpolr but in cases such as national importance, the rules forbidding the 
exchange of data can be set aside.  
 
2.6 Relations between goals, actions and consequences 
As stated in the introduction of this chapter, with the exchange of data police 
organizations generally try to achieve two – sometimes conflicting – goals. On the 
one hand, they have the goal to execute their appointed police task by exchanging 
data with other criminal investigation units. On the other hand, they have the goal to 
protect local investigations and informants. In this section an analysis of relations 
between goals, actions and possible consequences on other goals is presented. First 
the specific goals for criminal investigation units are presented (2.6.1). Then the 
types of actions concerning exchanging data are presented (2.6.2). Finally, relations 
between goals, the actions and the possible consequences are analyzed (2.6.3).  
2.6.1 Goals 
From the analysis of the police domain (the literature study and interviews with 
police officers2), three specific goals involved in severe-crime investigations can be 
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distinguished. The three goals are (1) the execution of the appointed police task, (2) 
the protection of individual privacy, and (3) the protection of local investigations 
and informants. The goal to execute the appointed police task is formulated in the 
Dutch police registers act (Wpolr). In the context of data exchange between CIEs, it 
means that CIEs are allowed to gather general intelligence data on severe crime in 
order to properly fulfill their task. The goal to protect personal privacy is also 
expressed in the Wpolr. This is based on the thought that a citizen needs protection 
against invasion of his private life by the government. The goal to protect privacy is 
not explicitly considered during the exchange between CIEs. However, the goal to 
protect privacy is an implicit general goal of the legal framework and intertwines 
with the other goals. For example, the goal to protect local investigations and 
informants has as consequence that the privacy of informants is also protected. 
Furthermore, as described in subsection 2.3.3 informants will not cooperate if their 
privacy is not protected and if they do not cooperate, the execution of the appointed 
police task is impeded (Ruth and Schreuders 2000). As a result the protection of 
privacy is not used as a ground for refusal in data exchange within the police 
organization (Ruth and Schreuders 2000). The goal to protect local police 
investigations and informants is derived from the criminal intelligence practice. In 
the Dutch police practice, the protection of investigations and informants is 
considered as a single goal13 and is therefore combined as one goal. To summarize, 
for severe-crime data exchange between CIEs the two goals are:  
• the proper execution of the appointed police task, and  
• the protection of local investigations and informants.  
2.6.2 Actions 
In order to promote the goals concerning the exchange of severe-crime data, 
different types of local actions can be executed. Based on interviews with police 
officers, four local action types can be distinguished. The first action type is to 
exchange non-protected data, the second action type is to exchange protected data, 
the third action type is exchange protected data under a condition, and the fourth 
action is to refuse the exchange of protected data. Note that non-protected data is 
data which can be freely exchanged with other police officers. During the 
interaction of CIE agents, sometimes a non-local action is required to be executed 
by the other CIE agent as a condition before data is allowed to be exchanged. In the 
Dutch police domain, the condition is almost always that the other party is required 
to use the intelligence data only for analysis purposes. To summarize, the four local 
action types are: 
                                                        
13 This is also described in the internal rapport ‘Verstrekkingsafwegingen van Criminele 
Inlichtingen Eenheden Tussenrapportage Empirsch Onderzoek’ written by Kielman and 
Koelewijn used for the ANITA research project meeting in Leiden March 13 2006. 
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• exchange non-protected data, 
• exchange protected data, 
• exchange protected data under analysis purposes condition, and 
• refuse to exchange protected data. 
2.6.3 Possible consequences on other goals 
Next, an analysis of the relations between actions, goals, and consequences on other 
goals is presented. The local action types described in subsection 2.6.2 can have 
possible undesired consequences on other goals. A way to describe this relation is 
to list for each action type the possible consequences on all goals. The relation 
between actions and goals is domain dependent and therefore has to be based on 
empirical research. The goal shared by all CIEs is to properly execute the police 
task, which is promoted by exchanging data. From my analysis of the Dutch police 
domain, the relationships can be specified as follows:. 
1. The action to exchange non-protected data has the likely consequences that it 
a. promotes the goal to properly execute the police task 
b. does not violate the goal to protect local investigations and informants 
2. The action to exchange protected data has the likely consequences that it 
a. promotes the goal to properly execute the police task 
b. violates the goal to protect local investigations and informants 
3. The action to exchange protected data under analysis purposes condition has 
the likely consequences that it 
a. promotes the goal to properly execute the police task 
b. does not violate the goal to protect local investigations and informants 
4. The action to refuse to exchange protected data has the likely consequences that 
it 
a. violates the goal to properly execute the police task 
b. promotes the goal to protect local investigations and informants 
 
When data is non-protected, the choice for exchanging that data is obvious since 
exchanging non-protected data both satisfies the goal to execute the police task and 
does not violate the goal to protect local investigations and informants. Refusing or 
stating that the non-protected data can be used for analysis purposes only is not 
sensible since exchanging that data does not violate the protection of local 
investigations. Therefore, for exchanging non-protected data the actions to refuse 
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non-protected data or to state that the non-protected data can be used for analysis 
purposes only is omitted in the specification.  
 
Points 2, 3 and 4 specify the possible consequences of actions when exchanging 
protected data. The exchange of data can become problematic if the data is 
protected as a result of informant or local investigation protection. When the data is 
protected, the possible consequence of the action to exchange the data is the 
satisfaction of the goal to properly execute the police task; however the same action 
can have the consequence that it violates the goal to protect local investigations and 
informants. In most cases a request to exchange protected data will be (initially) 
refused since CIEs regard the protection of local informants as their primary goal 
(Kielman 2010).  
 
The chosen action is based on which likely consequence on the goals is preferred. 
Preference in turn is based on the local rules and the local attitude of a criminal 
investigation unit. The attitude of CIEs is reflected in the local application of usage 
codes to data and the willingness to exchange protected data. For example, an 
overcautious criminal investigation unit will label data as protected more often than 
required. Table 1 shows the preferred action based on the role a CIE officer has (i.e. 
, requesting or responding agent). A CIE officer requesting data is not concerned 
with the protection of informants and investigations of the responding agent. 
Therefore, his preference is to always to exchange data and never refuse the 
exchange of data. The only case in which the requesting agent individually has to 
decide whether data can be exchanged, is when the data can be exchanged under a 
condition. This condition is an action the requesting agent has to perform, and his 
decision will be based on his local attitude. A responding CIE officer has a 
preference to exchange non-protected data. In all other cases, a responding CIE 
officer has to decide for each individual case whether to exchange or refuse to 
exchange data. Similar to a requesting CIE officer, this decision is based on his 
local rules and his attitude. For instance, a cooperative CIE officer is more easily 
persuaded to exchange protected data.  















yes yes ? no 
responding 
CIE agent 
yes ? ? ? 
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Table 1 will be used for designing policies in Chapter 5, where every question mark 
in the table signifies when an agent individually has to decide whether data can be 
exchanged or can be exchanged under a condition. 
2.7 Chapter summary 
This chapter presented a description and analysis of regulated data exchange in the 
Dutch police domain. The chapter started with a discussion of the problem of 
regulated data exchange and continued with a description with the used information 
systems. Then the applicable Dutch law was presented and rewritten into an 
intermediate representation, which will be formalized in Appendix 1. Subsequently 
examples of dialogues were presented to illustrate the problem of regulated data 
exchange. The scenarios and the formalized rules will also be used to illustrate the 
communication protocol in Chapter 4 and the policies of Chapter 5. Finally, 
patterns in the examples (in terms of goals, actions, and possible consequences on 
other goals) were analyzed and these patterns will be used for designing policies in 
Chapter 5. First, however, a multi-agent system as a model for the regulated data 
exchange will be introduced in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3  
A multi-agent system for regulated data 
exchange 
This chapter introduces a multi-agent system as a model for the exchange of severe-
crime intelligence data in the Dutch police domain14. Section 3.1 discusses the most 
common definitions of agents and multi-agent systems. Section 3.2 describes how a 
multi-agent system can model regulated data exchange between organizations and 
argues why the Dutch police organization is a representative problem domain. 
Section 3.3 describes the requirements for a multi-agent system architecture, which 
can be implemented as a proof of concept system (see Chapter 6).  
3.1 Agents and multi-agent systems 
Multi-agent systems (MAS) provide a natural way to model distributed 
organizations in which people have different roles and goals. Although there is no 
single agreed definition of what an agent is, a commonly used definition originates 
from Wooldridge and Jennings (Wooldridge and Jennings 1995, page 4) who 
specify an agent as a hardware and/or software-based computer system which has 
the following properties: 
 
• “autonomy: agents operate without the direct intervention of humans or 
others, and have some kind of control over their actions and internal state 
(Castelfranchi 1995); 
• social ability: agents interact with other agents (and possibly humans) via 
some kind of agent-communication language (Genesereth and Ketchpel 
1994); 
                                                        
14 Note that this chapter is based on earlier work published in Dijkstra et al. (2005; 
2006). 
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• reactivity: agents perceive their environment, (which may be the physical 
world, a user via a graphical user interface, a collection of other agents, 
the internet, or perhaps all of these combined), and respond in a timely 
fashion to changes that occur in it; 
• pro-activeness: agents do not simply act in response to their environment, 
they are able to exhibit goal-directed behavior by taking the initiative.” 
 
Although different definitions and attributes are used to describe agents, the general 
consensus is that autonomy is central to the notion of agency (Weiss 1999) and that 
in almost all cases autonomous agents need to interact to fulfill their goals or 
improve their performance (Rahwan et al. 2004). Autonomy is a key characteristic 
that distinguishes agents from objects used in object-oriented software. While both 
objects and agents are defined as entities that encapsulate some state, are able to 
perform actions, and communicate by passing messages (Weiss 1999); it is the 
autonomy of agents that distinguishes them from objects, i.e., their ability to choose 
their actions. Agents send requests to other agents and the decision whether to 
perform the action is made by the agent receiving the request. By contrast, objects 
can invoke any publicly accessible method on any other object and the ‘decision’ is 
made by the external object invoking the method. Agents range from plain reactive 
agents which act in straightforward stimulus-response manner to agents which have 
additional human-like attributes, such as knowledge, beliefs and obligations 
(Shoham 1993). Other human-like attributes for agents are having a model of the 
environment, goals, plans to achieve those goals and being able to reason about 
actions. The selection of attributes for agents is made by the designer based on the 
relevant attributes in the chosen application domain. For example, for some 
applications the ability to learn from experiences is mandatory while for other 
applications it is undesirable (Carabelea and Boissier 2005).  
 
Just as there is no single agreed definition of what a single agent is, there is no 
single definition of a multi-agent system. In the present research the definition 
(Wooldridge 2002) is adopted, who defines a multi-agent system as: ‘a system that 
consists of a number of agents, which interact with one-another. In the most general 
case, agents will be acting on behalf of users with different goals and motivations. 
To successfully interact, they will require the ability to cooperate, coordinate, and 
negotiate with each other, much as people do’. Furthermore, Sycara identifies the 
following properties for a multi-agent system (Sycara 1998, page 80): 
 
• “each agent has incomplete information or capabilities for solving the 
problem and, thus, has a limited viewpoint; 
• there is no system global control; 
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• data is decentralized; and 
• computation is asynchronous.” 
 
In the next section, the elements of the definitions above will be applied to the 
Dutch police domain to illustrate the suitability of this domain. 
3.2 Suitability of a MAS for regulated data exchange  
The previous chapter described the problem of regulated data exchange between 
criminal investigation units. In essence, this problem is that only a part of what can 
be exchanged legitimately is actually exchanged (exchanges which are permitted do 
not occur in practice) and that sometimes data is exchanged illegitimately 
(exchanges which are forbidden do occur in practice). This problem is a 
consequence of the different goals that criminal investigation units try to achieve, 
even though criminal investigation units belong to the same organizations and they 
all need to exchange data for the goal to execute their appointed police task. They 
also have the goal to protect local investigations and informants, which can have the 
consequence that data is not exchanged which could be exchanged legitimately. 
Furthermore, sometimes data is exchanged illegitimately as a result of CIE officers 
not knowing all applicable regulations and the local interpretations of those 
regulations.  
 
This section describes why a multi-agent system is suitable to model regulated data 
exchange in the Dutch police domain. To illustrate this, the elements of the 
definitions of agents and multi-agent systems are mapped to elements from the 
problem domain. 
Data is decentralized  
In the Dutch police domain, data is decentralized since criminal investigation units 
try to keep their data local in order to protect local investigations and informants. A 
way to decrease illegitimate data exchanges and increase legitimate data exchanges 
between criminal investigation units is to centralize all data. By centralizing data, 
all data is available to every criminal investigation unit and more data can be 
exchanged. The problem of more illegitimate data exchanges could be solved by 
assigning privacy officers to supervise the exchange of data. However, in practice 
this solution is not feasible. In the past, attempts have been made in the Dutch 
police domain to centralize data. These attempts caused criminal investigation units 
to keep their protected data local. The wish to control protected data by storing it 
locally is a direct result of the goal to protect their informants and local 
investigations. This shows that even if the criminal intelligence data were 
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physically centralized, criminal investigation units still wish to keep the data 
functionally decentralized so that the exchange of data is controlled by them.. 
Agents acting on behalf of users with different goals and motivations 
While all CIE officers have the same two goals: the proper execution of the 
appointed police task by exchanging data and the protection of local investigations 
and informants, their preference is based on their role they play (see section 2.6 on 
page 37). On the one hand, a CIE officer in a requesting role is not concerned with 
the protection of informants and investigations of the responding CIE officer. 
Therefore, his goal is the proper execution of the appointed police task by always 
exchanging and never refusing the exchange of data with other criminal 
investigation units. On the other hand, a CIE officer in a responding role has to 
balance the two goals. Therefore software agents acting on behalf of their CIE 
officers have possibly conflicting goals as result of the different roles they play. 
Autonomy; no system global control; pro-activity 
In the Dutch police domain, criminal investigation units want to keep their 
autonomy from the other departments (i.e., they want to decide autonomously 
whether to exchange data, without the supervision of a centralized coordinator). 
Furthermore, CIE officers pro-actively search for severe-crime intelligence data 
from other criminal investigation units. The autonomy of CIEs is also related to the 
local interpretations of the applicable regulations. The legislator takes the interests 
of the criminal investigation units into account by formulating legal norms and 
central policies; these give room for local autonomy for fine tuning in local policies 
and individual decisions. 
Each agent has incomplete information or capabilities for solving the 
problem 
Each criminal investigation unit only has direct access to locally kept intelligence 
data and CIE officers do not always know the applicable regulations and the local 
interpretations of those regulations. Thus, CIE officers (and their supporting 
software agents) sometimes have incomplete information to be capable to help 
solving crime cases. In order to obtain all the available intelligence data, CIE 
officers need data held by other departments.  
Interaction; social ability; reactivity 
Since data is decentralized and CIE officers can have incomplete information to 
help solving crime cases, CIE officers need the social ability to interact in order to 
exchange data. CIE officers interact to coordinate their efforts to gather intelligence 
on severe crime. In most cases, CIE officers can request intelligence data and their 
requests are granted directly. In other cases, CIE officers negotiate and try to 
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persuade each other to determine if data can be exchanged. For instance, in 
Example 3 on page 36, CIE officers negotiate whether data about trading in 
explosive material can be exchanged. Initially, the CIE officer who is requested 
about exchanging data refuses. However, when the requesting CIE officer 
persuades him with the argument that the data about trading explosive materials is 
of national importance, he agrees to exchange his intelligence data. The interactions 
with negotiation and persuasion can be modeled in different ways, this will be 
further described in section 3.3 and those interactions are typical for what multi-
agent systems try to model. 
Computation is asynchronous 
Each criminal investigation unit acquires intelligence data, and independently tries 
to help solve crime cases based on their own local data (i.e., they process their 
intelligence data asynchronously). However, severe crime is not always bound by 
the regions’ criminal investigation units, therefore CIE officers need to coordinate 
their efforts in order to help solving crime cases (see section 2.1 on page 11). The 
coordination of CIE officers by engaging in dialogues is synchronous, since they 
have to wait for the responses of the other CIE officers before continuing. 
 
As illustrated above, there is a strong relation between the attributes of multi-agent 
systems and the required functionalities for supporting regulated data exchange. A 
multi-agent system therefore provides a natural means to model the problem of 
regulated data exchange in the Dutch police domain. The CIE officers following 
their own goals and interacting with other CIE officers can be mapped directly on 
autonomous software agents. Agents can support regulated data exchange by 
autonomously engaging in dialogues on behalf of their CIE officers. Furthermore, 
the application of a multi-agent system makes it possible that the current distributed 
organizational and information structure of the CIEs is maintained. Thus, the 
knowledge of the local interpretations of the applicable regulations and intelligence 
data and are kept local and the decisions whether to exchange data is still made at 
the level of the criminal investigation units. Therefore, the Dutch police domain is 
quite suitable to determine whether a multi-agent system with agents who engage in 
dialogues can support regulated data exchange. 
3.3 Requirements for the MAS architecture 
In this section the requirements for the multi-agent system architecture in order to 
be a tenable model of regulated data exchange in police practice are presented. 
Briefly, based on the examples of section 2.5 on page 33, the requirements are that 
the agents (A) have knowledge, (B) have goals, (C) are able to reason, and (D) are 
able to interact.  




For agents to be able to regulate distributed data exchange, the agents must have 
knowledge of the relevant regulations and the local interpretations of those 
regulations, their goals and the likely consequences of their actions. Below the 
knowledge requirements are further described. 
Knowledge of the relevant regulations and the local interpretations 
All agents need to have knowledge of the relevant regulations and each agent must 
have knowledge of the local interpretations of those regulations. Furthermore, each 
agent must have knowledge of the local intelligence data. Data will only be 
exchanged if the local agent decides to do this. Finally, in order to represent 
knowledge and being able to exchange data, the agents must have an ontology 
(Gruber 1993) of the domain.  
B: Goals 
The agents in the problem domain have - possibly conflicting - goals. As described 
in section 3.2, there are two agent roles: a requesting agent who has the goal to 
properly execute his appointed police task by exchanging intelligence data with 
other criminal investigation units and a responding agent who has to balance out the 
goal to execute his appointed task by exchanging intelligence data and the goal to 
protect his local investigations and informants. The agents and their interactions 
should be designed in such a way that their behavior agrees with their goals.  
The likely consequences of their actions 
Agents representing CIE officers should have knowledge of the possible 
consequences of their actions for the realization of their goals (see section 2.6 on 
page 37 for an analysis). A typical example of the likely consequences of actions is 
the satisfaction of the goal to execute the appointed police task by exchanging data. 
However, the same action can have the consequence that it conflicts with the goal 
to protect local investigations and informants. 
C: Reasoning 
Agents must be able to reason with their knowledge of the relevant regulations, 
their goals they try to realize and the likely consequences of their actions. As 
illustrated by the examples in section 2.5, the interaction between agents often 
involves argumentation. For instance, in Example 3 (page 36), CIE officers 
negotiate and try to persuade each other whether intelligence data about trading in 
explosive material can be exchanged. Therefore, the agents should be capable of 
generating and evaluating arguments for and against certain claims and they must 
be able to revise their beliefs as a result of the dialogues. The agents especially 
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reason about whether something is obligatory, forbidden, or whether something 
violates their interest. With respect to the latter, it is useful to remark that conflicts 
between arguments on this issue can be resolved in the reasoning process.  
D: Interaction 
As described in the examples, agents engage in dialogues to negotiate and persuade 
each other whether intelligence data must be exchanged. Therefore, the interactions 
are modeled as dialogues between agents. A well known typology of dialogue types 
is defined by Walton and Krabbe (1995). They distinguish six dialogue types 
depending on the goal of the dialogue. The goal of information-seeking dialogues is 
exchanging information, the goal of negotiation dialogues is resolving a conflict of 
interests, the goal persuasion dialogues is resolving differences of opinion, the goal 
of deliberation dialogues is making a decision on a course of action, the goal of 
inquiry dialogues is the growth of knowledge and the goal of eristic dialogues is to 
vent grievances.  
  
During a dialogue, the responding agent’s goals sometimes lead him to state 
conditions under which he is willing to exchange data. Therefore, the agents must 
be able to negotiate with each other (see Example 1 on page 33). In addition, the 
responding agent may be mistaken in believing that he must or should not exchange 
the requested data (see Example 2 on page 34). So, the agents must be able to 
engage in persuasion dialogues. Thus, three types of dialogues are necessary to 
model the regulated data exchange: (1) information-seeking, (2) negotiation, and (3) 
persuasion dialogues.  
 
There are (at least) two ways to model the relation between the three types of 
(information-seeking, negotiation, and persuasion) dialogues, depending on two 
ways to model the start of a dialogue in this domain.  
 
i. The first interpretation is that each dialogue starts as an information-seeking 
dialogue. It then shifts to another type of dialogue, either persuasion or negotiation. 
It shifts to a persuasion dialogue if the responding agent states he will not grant the 
request since doing so would have negative consequences for his investigations and 
the requesting agent starts to persuade the responding agent that he is wrong about 
this. The dialogue instead shifts to negotiation if the requesting agent promises to 
do or refrain from doing something on the condition that the responding agent gives 
him the data. Further shifts may occur, for instance, from a persuasion to a 
negotiation dialogue or vice versa.  
 
ii. The second interpretation is that each dialogue starts as a negotiation, viz. as a 
request to exchange data about something. Such a dialogue may shift to embedded 
persuasion if the requesting agent tries to persuade the responding agent that he is 
AUTOMATED SUPPORT OF REGULATED DATA EXCHANGE 
 
 50
wrong about a rejection, e.g., that granting would endanger the protection of local 
investigations. After the persuasion terminates the interrupted negotiation resumes. 
If that terminates successfully, a (trivial) information-seeking dialogue starts; its 
termination also terminates the overall interaction. In the literature, interactions of 
type (ii) are also referred to as ‘service request dialogues’ (Bentahar et al. 2007; 
Torroni et al. 2007). 
 
In the police domain, most dialogues are of type (ii) since usually the requesting 
agent will not only ask a question but will inquire whether the other agent is willing 
to provide him with a certain body of data. This seems more like negotiation than 
like information-seeking. Therefore, in this research the focus on will be on 
dialogues of the second type. To enable such interactions where reasons for 
rejections are given which can become the subject of the dialogue, a suitable 
dialogue protocol must be implemented. In addition, the agents must be given 
policies for their behavior in the dialogues. These policies should be designed to 
further the agent’s goals. Since these goals also include the goal of the overall 
organization (i.e., the execution of the appointed police task), the agents’ policies 
should induce a fair degree of cooperativeness.  
3.4 Chapter summary and preview 
This chapter described how a multi-agent system can model regulated data 
exchange between organizations and argued why the Dutch police organization is a 
representative problem domain. The examples of dialogues about regulated data 
exchange from chapter 2 were used to clarify the functional requirements. The 
examples illustrate that the agent interactions often involve argumentation about 
regulated data exchange, and that they can be interpreted as negotiation with 
embedded persuasion dialogues. The four requirements of multi-agent system 
(knowledge, goals, reasoning, and interaction) will be formalized in the next two 
chapters. Chapter 4 formalizes the requirements concerning knowledge, goals, the 
likely consequences of actions and the ability to reason and engage in dialogues. 
Chapter 5 formalizes the requirement that agents and their interactions should be 
designed in such a way that their behavior agrees with their goals. For this 
negotiation and persuasion dialogue policies will be specified. The key idea of the 
dialogue policies is that they prescribe the best reaction during the dialogues, i.e., 
the reaction which is expected to further the different goals while respecting the 
attitude of the criminal investigation unit towards data exchange. 
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Chapter 4  
Formalization of the multi-agent system 
This chapter describes the formalization of the requirements for a multi-agent 
system supporting regulated data exchange with argumentation15. In section 4.1, the 
chosen logical argument system to model the internal inferences of an agent is 
presented, while in section 4.2, the dialogue system to model the interaction 
between agents to support regulated data exchange is specified. 
4.1 Logics for defeasible argumentation 
This section describes logics for defeasible argumentation. For overviews see 
Prakken and Vreeswijk (2002) and various chapters in Rahwan and Simari (2009). 
First ASPIC as a logic for defeasible argumentation and the representation of 
knowledge in ASPIC is discussed (4.1.1). Then the representation of deontic 
modalities and agent goals is specified (4.1.2). 
 
Nonmonotonic (or defeasible) reasoning is a form of reasoning in which 
conclusions can be withdrawn when new information becomes available. A 
straightforward example of defeasible reasoning in the Dutch police domain is a 
CIE officer who deliberates whether he can exchange data labeled with usage code 
11 (ready for operational usage, see chapter 2 on page 27). Normally he reasons that 
the data can be exchanged. However, when the data is no longer up to date, the CIE 
officer also concludes that the same data cannot be exchanged. Assuming that the 
reason for not exchanging data is stronger, the previous conclusion is withdrawn. A 
second example is the national importance scenario described in Example 3 on page 
36. In this example, a responding CIE officer first reasons that he cannot exchange 
intelligence data about trading in explosive materials. However, when the 
requesting agent tells him that he needs the data for national importance, the 
responding CIE officer reasons that this is an exception to the general rule. 
                                                        
15 Note that this chapter is based on earlier work published in (Dijkstra et al. 2005; 
Dijkstra et al. 2006; Dijkstra et al. 2007).  
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Therefore, in that specific case, the general rule is not applicable and he is willing 
to exchange the requested data. Logics for defeasible argumentation (or 
argumentation systems for short) conceptualize and formalize this type of reasoning 
as the construction and comparison of arguments for and against a certain 
conclusion. The nonmonotonicity is conceptualized in terms of interactions between 
conflicting arguments: that is, when new information allows for new stronger 
arguments that defeat the original argument. An argumentation system has a logical 
language to represent the knowledge, and arguments are defined in terms of the 
chosen logical language. An elementary argument has a conclusion, premises, and 
an inference connecting the conclusion. A complex argument can be constructed by 
chaining elementary arguments.  
 
To illustrate how argumentation systems formalize defeasible reasoning, consider 
the following example. Assume that there is a collection of arguments that can be 
constructed, where some arguments attack and other arguments support each other. 
Furthermore, assume that in this collection, some arguments are for conclusion c 
and other arguments are against conclusion c. What can be concluded about 
conclusion c in this situation? Argumentation systems formalize this problem. 
 
Arguments can attack each other in different ways. In the literature, three kinds of 
attack are distinguished: when arguments have contradictory conclusions (rebut), 
when the conclusion of an argument denies a premise of another argument 
(premise-attack) and when an argument shows that an inference is incorrect 
(undercut). Argumentation systems use a binary defeat relation to determine which 
argument of two attacking arguments wins. The criteria for the defeat relation are 
domain-specific. For example, a criterion can be that the most specific argument 
wins. A second example of a criterion is that an argument originating from someone 
with a higher authority wins. 
 
Given a set of arguments and a binary defeat relation defined over it, an 
argumentation system classifies arguments into three types: winning (justified), 
losing (overruled) and ties (defensible). This classification can be seen as the 
inference relation of this system. One way to define the inference relation of an 
argumentation system is in the dialectical form of an argument game. In an 
argument game, defeasible reasoning is modeled as a dispute between a proponent 
and opponent of a claim. The proponent defends the claim by constructing 
arguments and the opponent attacks the claim by constructing counterarguments. 
The claim is proven, if for some argument for the claim, the proponent has a 
winning strategy. The interpretation of proven is having a defensible or justified 
argument, which is dependent on what the argument game tries to formalize. 
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4.1.1 ASPIC as a logic for defeasible argumentation 
In this section ASPIC as a logic for defeasible argumentation and the representation 
of knowledge is presented. First some background information of the ASPIC 
argumentation system is given (A), after which the representation of knowledge 
using the ASPIC logic is described (B). Then it is specified how arguments can be 
formed (C) and how they can defeat each other in ASPIC (D). Finally the supported 
argument games are discussed (E).  
A: Background ASPIC 
In order to illustrate how a multi-agent system described in chapter 3 can support 
regulated data exchange, a proof-of-concept implementation is needed. 
Furthermore, since the internal reasoning of CIE officers is modeled as defeasible 
argumentation, an argumentation system to support this type of reasoning is 
required. For the proof-of-concept implementation, the ASPIC argumentation 
system is used, which was developed within the ASPIC project (IST-FP6-002307). 
ASPIC is an inference engine for an argument-based nonmonotonic logic and is 
based upon the model described in Amgoud et al. (2006) and the algorithms 
specified in Vreeswijk (2006). The tool computes the dialectical status of arguments 
according to grounded or preferred semantics Dung (1995). Knowledge is 
represented in the prolog-like syntax of the ASPIC logic. As in prolog, function 
symbols, predicate symbols, and constants start with a lower case letter, variables 
start with a capital letter or underscore, and negation is expressed through the ~ 
character. Using a degree of belief, the strength of rules and facts can be evaluated. 
In ASPIC the degree of belief is expressed by a number greater than 0 and less or 
equal to 1, where 1 is the default value. In order to decide conflicts between rules, 
preference rules can be implemented using the degree of belief. ASPIC also 
supports rule naming with variables, which makes it possible to refer to rules in 
other rules. Variables in rule names allow for distinguishing between rule schemes 
and particular instances of rules. To enable talking about the validity of rules, 
antecedents of rules will be extended with an additional condition ‘valid(r(X))’.  
B: Rules and factual statements 
Let us now look how knowledge can be represented as rules and factual statements 
in the ASPIC logic. Two examples will be provided. In the first example, the 
domain rule stating that if the requested data has source protection then it is 
forbidden to exchange the data (see Appendix 1, page 166) can in ASPIC be 
represented as: 
 
[rSourceProtection_F(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)]  
obliged(not(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)))  
<-  
holds(sourceProtection(DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)),  
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requested(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)),  
valid(rSourceProtection_F(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)) 
0.6. 
 
The consequent of the rule is: 
 
obliged(not(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID))). 
 
The antecedents of the rule are: 
 
holds(sourceProtection(DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)), 
requested(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)), and 
valid(rSourceProtection_F(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)).  
 
The reason for using the holds and obliged predicates will be explained in 
subsection 4.1.2. In this example, the rule is named:  
 
rSourceProtection_F(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT) 
 
by preceding the rule with 
  
[rSourceProtection_F(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)]. 
 
The degree of belief in this rule is ‘0.6’, which is added to the end of the rule. The 
additional valid condition which encloses the name of the rule by the valid 
predicate is 
 
valid(rSourceProtection_F(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)) 
 
A second example is the factual statement that data-unit identifier16 2 has source 




The factual statement that agent p has requested agent o to exchange data-unit 
identifier 2 matching the query about Adriana, can in ASPIC be represented as: 
 
requested(exchangeData(p, o, adriana, 2)). 
 
For every rule with an additional valid condition, a corresponding additional 
factual statement can be added to match the valid condition, which in this case is: 
                                                        
16 Data-unit identifiers are described in subsection 6.1.1. 
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valid(rSourceProtection_F(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)) 
0.6. 
 
Note that only rules can be named in ASPIC, therefore facts are not preceded by 
rule names in the knowledge representation. 
C: Arguments 
In the context of inference, arguments provide reasons to believe in a conclusion. 
As described in section 4.1, an elementary argument has a conclusion, premises, 
and an inference connecting the conclusion. A complex argument can be 
constructed by chaining elementary arguments. Conceptually, in ASPIC two types 
of premises can be distinguished. Factual statements are premises which represent 
facts, and rules are premises which represent (domain) rules. However, technically, 
rules are domain-specific inference rules, just as, for example in default logic 
(Reiter 1980).  
 
According to ASPIC an argument is defined as follows: for a given argument, the 
function PREM returns all the formulas of the knowledge base KB (called premises) 
used to build the argument, CONC returns its conclusion, and SUB returns all its 
subarguments. According to Amgoud et al. (2006, Definition 12), an argument can 
be defined as follows. 
Definition 1 Arguments 
An argument A constructed from KB (where KB consists of KBR representing the 
rules and KBF representing the facts) is defined as 
 
P if P ∈ KBF with: 
 
PREM(A)  = {P} 
CONC(A)  = P 
SUB(A)  = {P} 
 
P since A1…An if A1…An are arguments constructible from KB such that 
there exists a rule P ← CONC(A1), …, CONC(An) in KBR with 
 
PREM(A)  = PREM(A1) ∪ … ∪ PREM(An) 
CONC(A)  = P 
SUB(A)  = SUB(A1) ∪ … ∪ SUB(An) ∪ {A} 
 
AUTOMATED SUPPORT OF REGULATED DATA EXCHANGE 
 
 56
For notational convenience, the inference rules will be listed together with the 
premises. For example, using the previous rule and factual statements, argument1 
can be constructed as follows: 
 
obliged(not(exchangeData(p, o, adriana, 2)))  
since 
 
obliged(not(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)))  
<-  
holds(sourceProtection(DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)),  
requested(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)),  
valid(rSourceProtection_F(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)). 
 
holds(sourceProtection(2, adriana)). 
requested(exchangeData(p, o, adriana, 2)). 
valid(rSourceProtection_F(p, o, adriana, 2, adriana)).  
 
In argument1, the conclusion is: 
 
obliged(not(exchangeData(p, o, adriana, 2))) 
 
The rule premise of argument1 is: 
  
obliged(not(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)))  
<-  
holds(sourceProtection(DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)), 
requested(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)), 
valid(rSourceProtection_F(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)) 
0.6.  
 
The factual statements (fact premises) of argument1 are: 
 
holds(sourceProtection(2, adriana)).,  
requested(exchangeData(p, o, adriana, 2)). and 
valid(rSourceProtection_F(p, o, adriana, 2, adriana))..  
 
The degree of belief of argument1 is ‘0.6’ since the degree of belief of an argument 
is equal to the weakest degree of belief of its constituting elements.  
D: Conflict relations between arguments 
Let us now specify the conflict relations between arguments. If argumenta has an 
equally strong or stronger degree of belief than argumentb then the following defeat 
relations between those arguments are possible: argumenta successfully rebuts 
argumentb if the arguments have contradicting conclusions. Argumenta successfully 
undercuts argumentb if argumenta excludes a rule used in argumentb by stating that 
the rule is not applicable; argumenta successfully premise-attacks argumentb if the 
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conclusion of argumenta contradicts premisep of argumentb and the degree of belief 
of argumenta is stronger than premisep of argumentb. As discussed in the 
construction of argument1 above, the degree of belief of an argument is equal to the 
weakest degree of belief of its constituting elements. Therefore, even when 
argumenta has an equally strong or stronger degree of belief than argumentb, 
premisep of argumentb still can have a higher degree of belief than argumenta. The 
defeat relations also have an indirect version, i.e., attacking a subargument of an 
argument. For example, if argumenta defeats subargumentb then argumenta 
indirectly defeats argumentb. The defeat relation is the evaluation of the relative 
strength of a pair of conflicting arguments. However, the ultimate status of an 
argument is dependent on the interaction of all available arguments. For example, if 
argumentb defeats argumenta but argumentb itself is defeated by argumentc then 
argumentc reinstates argumenta.  
Rebuttal 
Let us next look how an argument can be rebutted in the ASPIC logic. An argument 
(argument2) will be constructed which rebuts argument1. The domain rule stating 
that if the requested data originating from the informant have source protection and 
the CIE officer uses the data for analysis purposes only, then it is not forbidden to 
exchange data (see page 166) can in ASPIC be represented as: 
 
[rSourceProtectionAnalysis_P(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID, 
CIE_OFFICER, INFORMANT)]  




requested(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)), 
valid(rSourceProtectionAnalysis_P(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID, 
CIE_OFFICER, INFORMANT)) 0.7. 
 
The factual statements stating that data labeled with data-unit identifier 2 have 
source protection and that CIE officer Dwight uses data labeled with data-unit 
identifier 2 for analysis purposes only, can be represented in ASPIC as: 
 
holds(sourceProtection(2, adriana)). 
holds(analysisPurposesOnly(cie_officer_dwight, 2)).  
 
Using the above rule and factual statements, argument2 can be constructed: 
 
~obliged(not(exchangeData(p, o, adriana, 2)))  
since 
 
~obliged(not(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)))  
<-  





requested(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)), 




holds(analysisPurposesOnly(cie_officer_dwight, 2)).  
valid(rSourceProtectionAnalysis_P(p, o, adriana, 2, 
cie_officer_dwight, adriana)). 
 
Argument2 successfully rebuts argument1 since the arguments have conflicting 
conclusions and the degree of belief in argument2 is stronger than the degree of 
belief in argument1. The degree of belief of argument2 is ‘0.7’, which originates 
from the degree of belief of the rule premise. The degree of belief of argument1 is 
‘0.6’, which also originates from the degree of belief of the rule premise. 
 
Undercut 
Each defeasible rule can have one or more undercutters, which specify under which 
circumstances the inference rule is not applicable. To be able to argue about the 
applicability of an inference rule, the rule first has to be established as legally valid. 
An inference rule is legally valid if its source is legally recognized (such as the 
applicable law or being stated by a legal authority). It is also possible to argue about 
the legal validity of domain rules, see the ‘giving grounds for a rule’ section on 
page 60. In the next example, however, the validity of the domain rules is assumed 
by accompanying them with a factual statement matching the valid condition. The 
example illustrates how an argument can be undercut in the ASPIC logic. An 
argument (argument3) will be constructed which undercuts argument2. Assuming 
the domain rule stating that if a CIE officer is under internal investigation, the rule 
stating: ‘if data has source protection and the CIE officer uses the data for analysis 
purposes only, then it is not forbidden to exchange the data’ cannot be applied, 
which can be represented in ASPIC as follows: 
 
[r3a(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID, CIE_OFFICER, INFORMANT)]  
~rSourceProtectionAnalysis_P(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID, 
CIE_OFFICER, INFORMANT)  
<-  
holds(internalInvestigation(CIE_OFFICER)),  
valid(r3a(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID, CIE_OFFICER, INFORMANT)) 0.8. 
 
The domain rule stating ‘if an internal investigation has been started for a CIE 










The factual statement that an internal investigation has been started for CIE officer 




The factual statements that rules r3a and r3b are valid can be represented as: 
 
valid(r3a(o, p, adriana, 2, cie_officer_dwight)). 
valid(r3b(cie_officer_dwight)). 
  
Using the above rules and factual statements, argument3 can be constructed: 
 




QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID, CIE_OFFICER)  
<-  
holds(internalInvestigation(CIE_OFFICER)), 












Based on the validity of the rSourceProtectionAnalysis_P domain rule (which is 
used to construct argument2) and the validity of rules r3a and r3b (which are used to 
construct argument3), both arguments are valid. Although the 
rSourceProtectionAnalysis_P domain rule is valid, there can be circumstances 
where this rule is not applicable. Those circumstances are specified by the 
instantiated rules r3a and r3b. Therefore, at this point argument3 successfully 
undercuts argument2, which in turn reinstates argument1. 
Premise-attack 
Let us look how an argument can premise-attack another argument in the ASPIC 
logic. The domain rule stating that if a CIE officer is cleared from investigation, 
then the CIE officer is no longer under internal investigation and the factual 
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statement that CIE officer Dwight is cleared from internal investigation are 























At this point argument4 successfully premise-attacks argument3, given that the 
conclusion of argument4 conflicts with a premise of argument3 and the degree of 
belief in argument4 is not lower than the conflicting premise of argument3. 
Therefore, argument2 is reinstated. 
Giving grounds for a rule 
Since the knowledge in the police domain is not only elicited from the applicable 
law but also from (possibly contradictory) local interpretations, it should be 
possible to argue about the validity of those different local interpretations. In the 
previous formalized examples, every rule is accompanied with a factual statement 
matching the additional valid condition. To enable arguing about grounds for a rule, 
the factual statements about the validity can be replaced by rules. For example, in 
rule r4 the matching factual statement is ‘valid(r4(CIE_OFFICER))’. To enable 
arguing about the validity of rule r4, the matching factual statement is replaced by 
rule r5 where its conclusion is a ground for r4. An example of a possible ground for 
rule r4 is that the decision for clearance has been granted by an internal 
investigations organization (denoted by the ORG variable). This example can be 
formalized in ASPIC as: 
 
[r5(CIE_OFFICER, ORG))]  
valid(r4(CIE_OFFICER))  
<-  
holds(decisionGranted(CIE_OFFICER, ORG)),  







Of course, also further grounds for r5 can be given. From the previous rules and 












E: Argument games 
In the final stage of argumentation, argument games are used to determine the 
dialectical status of an individual argument. Given a collection of arguments, the 
defeat relations and the semantics it is now possible to define the acceptability of an 
individual argument. The ASPIC inference engine supports grounded (skeptical) 
and preferred credulous semantics; see section 2.5 of ASPIC deliverable D 2.1 
(Amgoud et al. 2004) for a specification of the algorithms. The first argument game 
supported by ASPIC is the argument game with grounded semantics, where only 
justified arguments are accepted, i.e., whether it is a member of the (unique) 
grounded extension. An argument is overruled if it is defeated by a justified 
argument and not in the grounded extension and an argument is defensible 
otherwise. The second supported argument game is with preferred semantics, where 
also defensible arguments are accepted. The argument game with grounded 
semantics is more restrictive. In this chapter, always one of the conflicting example 
arguments is stronger, in those examples the chosen semantics do not give rise to 
different outcomes. However, if the examples are equally strong and therefore 
mutually defeating, then with grounded semantics both arguments are not 
acceptable while with preferred credulous semantics both arguments are acceptable.  
4.1.2 Representation of deontic modalities and agent goals 
This subsection discusses the choices for the representation of deontic modalities 
and the goals of agents in the ASPIC logic. The goals are represented in the agent’s 
internal knowledge base, together with knowledge that is relevant to respecting the 
agent’s goals, such as knowledge on when exchanging data is obligatory, permitted 
or forbidden, and the effect of exchanging data on the other goal of the agent. 




In standard deontic logic, the deontic notion obliged can be used to define the other 
two notions forbidden and permitted (McNamara and Prakken 1998). Using obliged 
p, forbidden p is then defined as obliged ¬p, and permitted p in turn is defined as 
¬forbidden p:  
 
Obliged  O(p)  
Forbidden  F(p) = O(¬p)  
Permitted  P(p) = ¬F(p) 
 
The deontic modalities obliged, forbidden, and permitted are not part of the ASPIC 
logic. However, by using reification the meaning of deontic operators can be 
respected. Reification enables reasoning about statements. Formulas from the object 
language are converted into terms, which can be used as terms in the scope of first-
order predicates. With reification, the deontic notions from standard deontic logic 
are defined as first-order predicates in the ASPIC logic. In the knowledge 
representation, only the obliged operator is used. Therefore, in every rule 
‘forbidden(P)’ is substituted with ‘obliged(not(P))’ and ‘permitted(P)’ is 
substituted with ‘~obliged(not(P))’. The holds predicate is used to simulate 
modalities, since distinguishing that p is true and that p is obligatory (or that p is a 
goal) requires that p has to be a term in both formulas. With the addition of the 
holds predicate, the expressions that p is true and p is obligatory (or a goal) then can 
stated as ‘holds(P)’ and ‘obliged(P)’ (or ‘goal(P)’) in the ASPIC logic. To 
preserve the meaning of holds, obliged, and not, the following axioms are 
necessary: 
 
~holds(not(P)) <- holds(P).  
~holds(P) <- holds(not(P)).  
 
~obliged(not(P)) <- obliged(P). 
~obliged(P) <- obliged(not(P)). 
 
Let us look at an example of a domain rule to illustrate how to reify deontic 
modalities in the ASPIC logic. The domain rule stating that if data has usage code 
11, then it is obliged to exchange the data (see page 162) can be represented with 
reification as: 
 
[rDataUsageCode11_O(S, R, QUERY,DATA_UNIT_ID)] 
obliged(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID))  
<-  
holds(dataUsageCode11(DATA_UNIT_ID)), 
requested(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)), 
valid(rDataUsageCode11_O(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)) 0.5. 
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In the example, the variable S denotes the responding agent and the variable R 
denotes the requesting agent. Furthermore, the expression ‘exchangeData(S, R, 
QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)’ is regarded as a term from the object language, which 
makes it possible to determine which deontic predicate is applicable, which in this 
case is ‘obliged’.  
Agent goals 
Let us now illustrate how goals and violations of those goals can be represented in 
the ASPIC logic. Note that other agent research has been done on agent goals, for 
instance Belief-Desire-Intention agents (see for example Rao and Georgeff 1995). 
In the present research, for practical purposes goals are simply expressed with 
reification. An example of an agent goal is the protection of his local investigations 
and informants (see page 171), which can be represented in ASPIC as: 
 
[rProtectionGoal(S, DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)] 
goal(S, protection(DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT))  
<-  
holds(informantOf(INFORMANT, DATA_UNIT_ID, S)), 
valid(rProtectionGoal(S, DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)). 
 
The domain rule rProtectionGoal states that if data originates from an agent’s 
informant, then the goal of the agent is to protect the informant. Let us now see how 
an agent is able to infer that his interests are violated. The violation of interests rule 
states that if something is (not) a goal of an agent but the opposite holds, then his 










holds(P), goal(S, not(P)). 
 
To illustrate how an agent goal relates to a violation of an agent’s interests, consider 
the following example. The domain rule stating that if data has source protection 
and the data is exchanged then the informant who has supplied the data has no 
protection (see page 165) can be represented as: 
 
[rSourceProtection_NP(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)] 
holds(not(protection(DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)))  
<-  
holds(sourceProtection(DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)),  
happens(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)), 
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valid(rSourceProtection_NP(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)). 
 
When rule rSourceProtection_NP is applicable there is a violation of interests since 
the goal of the agent to protect informants is violated by the fact that the informant 
has no protection.  
 
In chapter 5, goals, violations of interests and deontic modalities are used in the 
deliberation process of agents to determine whether intelligence data can be 
exchanged. In the next section, the dialogue system for argumentation is discussed 
that will enable dialogues between software agents. 
4.2 Dialogue system for argumentation 
This section presents the dialogue system for the agent interaction. Subsection 4.2.1 
specifies the communication language and subsection 4.2.2 describes the protocol. 
This section builds on the work of Van Veenen and Prakken (2006) and Prakken 
(2005). The dialogue system is adapted to be compatible with the ASPIC inference 
engine and to support the regulated data exchange between CIE officers. 
 
Whereas an argument game system models the internal inferences of an agent as a 
dialectical argument game, a dialogue game system models the dialogical 
interaction as dialogue game between agents. Dialogue systems have a topic 
language Lt with an associated logic L to represent and reason with domain 
knowledge and a communication language Lc to specify the speech acts, i.e., the 
performatives and their propositional content represented in the topic language. 
Furthermore, a communication language has an associated protocol P to specify 
which moves are allowed at each point in a dialogue. Dialogue systems also have 
effect rules to specify the effects of utterances on the players’ commitments, and 
outcome rules to define the outcome of a dialogue.  
 
The dialogue system of Van Veenen and Prakken (2006) combines a negotiation 
protocol of (Wooldridge and Parsons 2000) with a persuasion language and 
protocol of (Prakken 2005). The system of Van Veenen and Prakken (2006) seems 
appropriate for the modeling purposes since, as described in section 3.3, the agent 
interactions typically have the form of negotiation with embedded persuasion. Also, 
this embedding occurs especially when the requesting agent asks why the 
responding agent rejects the request for data, and this is precisely the kind of 
embedding modeled in Van Veenen and Prakken (2006). Since the dialogue 
systems are defined within Prakken’s framework (Prakken 2005), let us now look at 
the formal definitions of the framework 
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As for the logic for defeasible argumentation, Prakken uses a general definition for 
the logic of defeasible argumentation. In the present research, ASPIC is used as the 
argumentation system.  
Definition 2 Communication language 
A communication language is a set of Lc of speech acts. Each speech act s ∈ Lc is 
of the form p(content) where p is an element of a given set P of performatives and 
content is defined in topic language Lt with associated logic L. On Lc a reply 
structure is assumed, where each move is either an attack or a surrender to its target. 
The protocol for Lc is defined in terms of the notion of a dialogue, which in turn is 
defined in terms of a move. 
Definition 3 Moves and dialogues 
The set M of moves is defined as N × {P, O} × Lc × N, where the four elements of a 
move are denoted by: 
• id(m), the identifier of the move, 
• pl(m), the player of the move, 
• s(m), the speech act performed in the move, 
• t(m), the target of the move. 
 
The set of dialogues, denoted by M*, is the set of all sequences m1, ..., mi, ... from M 
such that:  
• each ith element in the sequence has identifier i, 
• t(m1) = 0, 
• for all i > 1 it holds that t(mi) = j for some mj preceding mi in the sequence. 
 
For any dialogue d = m1, ..., mn, ... the sequence m1, ..., mi is denoted by di, where d0 
denotes the empty dialogue. When t(m) = id(m’) then m replies to m’ in d and that 
m’ is the target of m in d. Sometimes the notation is slightly abused to let t(m) 
denote a move instead of just its identifier. When s(m) is an attacking (surrendering) 
reply to s(m’) then m is an attacking (surrendering) reply to m’. A protocol also 
assumes a turntaking rule to assign a player for every move. 
 
A protocol is a function Pr that for each legal finite dialogue specifies the legal next 
moves. If it returns an empty set, then and only then, the dialogue is terminated. For 
a complete definition of protocols, see Definition 7 in Prakken (2005). All protocols 
are further assumed to satisfy the following basic conditions for all moves mi and 
all legal finite dialogues d. 




If m ∈ Pr(d), then: 
• R1: pl(m) ∈ T(d); 
• R2: If d ≠ d0 and m ≠ m1, then s(m) is a reply to s(t(m)) according to Lc; 
• R3: If m replies to m’, then pl(m) ≠ pl(m’); 
• R4: If there is an m’ in d such that t(m) = t(m’) then s(m) ≠ s(m’); 
• R5: For any m’∈ d that surrenders to t(m), m is not an attacking counterpart 
of m’. 
 
Rule R1 states that a move is legal only if moved by the player-to-move (T returns 
the player whose turn it is to move in dialogue d). R2 says that a replying move must 
be a reply to its target according to communication language Lc, and R3 states that a 
player cannot reply to one’s own moves. Rule R4 states that if a player backtracks, 
the new move must be different from the first one. (in Prakken’s framework 
backtracking is interpreted as any alternative reply to the same target in a later 
turn). Finally, R5 says that once a move is surrendered, it may not be ‘revoked’. 
Below the communication languages (4.2.1) and the communication protocols 
(4.2.2) are discussed. 
4.2.1 Communication languages 
In this section the sublanguages for negotiation and persuasion and their 
combination are defined.  
 
As specified in Definition 2, a communication language consists of speech acts 
p(content) where p is a performative and content is defined in topic language Lt 
with associated logic L. In the persuasion communication language, content has one 
element Arg or P to denote an argument or proposition. For the negotiation 
communication language, the elements of content are literals A and C which denote 
the action and the condition (except for withdraw speech acts). (Literals are atomic 
formulas or negated atomic formulas). The negotiation language differs from Van 
Veenen and Prakken (2006), where content is expressed as a conjunction of literals. 
A condition can be used to state an action (not) to be performed by the requesting 
party. For instance, an offer “I will give you the found intelligence data about 
Soprano on the condition that the data will not be exchanged with other CIEs” can 
be decomposed into the action “I will give you the found intelligence data about 
Soprano” and the condition “the data will only be used for analysis purposes”.  
 
The following table specifies the negotiation communication language with the 
reply structure of Van Veenen and Prakken (2006). 
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Table 2: Negotiation communication language (Lcn) 
 
The idea of Table 2 is that request(A, C) is an initial request for an offer for the 
other party to do something (possibly with a condition to-be accepted by the 
requesting party). Here A and C are partially uninstantiated and the offer(A’, C’) 
speech act is a fully instantiated proposal (see Example 4). The reason that a request 
has free variables is that an agent making a request for an offer does not know 
which (if any) data unit matches the request. Therefore, when a responding agent 
offers his found data unit, he instantiates the free variables with data-unit identifier 
referring the found data unit (data-unit identifiers were described in subsection 
6.1.1 on page 125). By means of the withdraw speech act an agent withdraws from 
a negotiation (see Example 1). With accept(A, C) an agent accepts an offer and with 
reject(A, C) an agent rejects a request or offer made by another agent. At first sight, 
the negotiation language is simple and the distinction between attacking and 
surrendering replies would seem to make no sense. However, the tables specifying 
the negotiation and persuasion languages will be extended and combined in a way 
that makes this distinction sensible for negotiation also.  
 
The move notation specified in Definition 3 (page 65) is below for readability 
purposes slightly changed. Moves are of the form p(S, R, A, C), where the 
performative p is written outside the move, the identifier and target of a move are 
left implicit and the other player in the dialogue is added. In the altered notation, the 
elements S, R, A, C denote the sender, the receiver, the action and the condition. For 
instance, with Definition 3, the request to exchange data about Artie Bucco from 
agent p can be represented as:  
  
(1, p, request(exchangeData(o, p, bucco, DATA_UNIT_ID),), 0) 
 
In the new notation, the request will be represented as: 
 
p1:  request(p, o, exchangeData(o, p, bucco, DATA_UNIT_ID),) 
 
speech acts attacks surrenders 
request(A, C) offer(A’, C’) (A ≠ A’) 
reject(A’, C’) (A ≠ A’) 
withdraw 
accept(A, C) 




reject(A, C) offer(A, C’) (C ≠ C’) withdraw 
accept(A, C)   
withdraw   
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In the example, ‘request’ is the performative, p denotes the sender, o denotes the 
receiver, ‘exchangeData(o, p, bucco, DATA_UNIT_ID),’ denotes the action and the 
condition is empty. Furthermore, p1 precedes the move to denote that the first move 
of the dialogue is made by player p.  
 
Let us now look at two examples (Example 4 and Example 5) of negotiation 
dialogues to illustrate the negotiation language specified within the ASPIC logic.  
Example 4 no data found about Artie Bucco 
In this example, agent p requests agent o to give him intelligence data about Bucco. 
However, agent o cannot offer anything since he has no intelligence data about 
Artie Bucco. The initial move starting the dialogue can be represented as: 
 
p1:  request(p, o, exchangeData(o, p, bucco, DATA_UNIT_ID),) 
 
Since the responding agent o cannot find intelligence data about Artie Bucco, he 
cannot offer him the requested data. A possible way to model the response from an 
agent who cannot find intelligence data is doing a reject move. For example 
‘reject(p, o, exchangeData(o, p, bucco, DATA_UNIT_ID),)’. However, since 
only request speech acts can contain uninstantiated terms this is not syntactically 
correct. This is why a withdraw speech act has been added as a possible reply to the 
negotiation sublanguage of Van Veenen and Prakken (2006) indicating that no 
intelligence data is found. Therefore the response in this example is: 
 
o2:  withdraw 
Example 5 requested data about Irina Peltsin granted under a condition 
In this example, agent p requests agent o to give him intelligence data about Irina 
Peltsin. Agent o finds intelligence data about Peltsin and offers to give him this data 
under the condition that agent p does not pass on the data to other agents.  
 
In move p1, the data-unit identifier ‘DATA_UNIT_ID’ is uninstantiated, which can be 
used by agents to refer to a data unit17.  
 
p1:  request(p, o, exchangeData(o, p, peltsin, DATA_UNIT_ID),)  
 
In move o2 the speech act is fully instantiated; the responding agent o offers the 
found data-unit, identified by ‘1’ about Peltsin. Furthermore, the responding agent o 
                                                        
17 A data unit is a grouped piece of data, which has a data-unit-id as its associated 
identifier (see subsection 6.1.1). 
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states the condition that agent p does not pass on the data to other agents, denoted 
by ‘holds(not(passOn(p, 1)))’.  
 
o2:  offer(o, p, exchangeData(o, p, peltsin, 1),  
  holds(not(passOn(p, 1)))) 
 
Finally, in move o3 the requesting agent accepts the offer, which terminates the 
negotiation dialogue. 
 
p3:  accept(p, o, exchangeData(o, p, peltsin, 1),  
  holds(not(passOn(p, 1)))) 
 
 
In the persuasion communication language specified in Table 3, argue speech acts 
state arguments in the ASPIC logic L and P is a formula from the topic language Lt. 
Furthermore, in Table 3, argue(Arg’) defeats argue(Arg) according to L. Note that a 
difference between the persuasion communication language of Van Veenen and 
Prakken (2006) is the addition of the deny(P) speech act. The deny(P) speech act is 
an attacker on the argue(Arg) speech act and allows expressing that a premise 
cannot be accepted (agree to disagree). Deny(P) is similar to why(P) in that they 
both are replies on argue(Arg) speech acts. However, why(P) allows for further 
discussion while deny(P) does not.  
 
Table 3: Persuasion communication language (Lcp) 
speech acts attacks Surrenders 
claim(P) why(P) concede(P) 
why(P) argue(Arg) (conc(Arg) = 
P) 
retract(P) 
argue(Arg) why(P) (P ∈ prem(Arg)) 
argue(Arg’)  
deny(P) (P ∈ prem(Arg)) 
concede(P) (P ∈ 
prem(Arg) or P = 
conc(Arg)) 
 
concede(P)   
retract(P)   
deny(P)   
 
Table 4 shows the combination of the two communication languages. The idea of 
Van Veenen and Prakken (2006) is to add a speech act to the negotiation language 
that triggers a persuasion dialogue: a new attacking reply is added in Lcnp to a 
reject(A, C) speech act, namely why-reject(A, C). The only possible reply to this 
speech act is claim(P), where P is a ground for the rejection. This claim starts a 
persuasion dialogue.  




Table 4: Combined communication language (Lcnp) 
Speech acts attacks surrenders 
request(A, C) offer(A’, C’) (A ≠ A’) 
reject(A’, C’) (A ≠ A’) 
withdraw 




reject(A, C) offer(A, C’) (C ≠ C’) 
why-reject(A, C) 
withdraw 
accept(A, C)   
withdraw   
why-reject(A, C) claim(P)  
claim(P) why(P) concede(P) 
why(P) Argue(Arg) (conc(Arg) = 
P) 
retract(P) 
argue(Arg) why(P) (P ∈ prem(Arg)) 
argue(Arg’)  
deny(P) (P ∈ 
prem(Arg)) 
concede(P) (P ∈ 
prem(Arg) or P = 
conc(Arg)) 
 
concede(P)   
retract(P)   
deny(P)   
 
4.2.2 Communication protocols 
In this subsection the protocols for negotiation and persuasion and their 
combination is defined. There are several design choices for protocols (Prakken 
2005): a player can make one move or several moves before the turn shifts (unique-
move vs. multi-move protocols); a player can make only one or try several 
alternative replies to a move (unique-reply vs. multi-reply protocols); and whether 
the turn shifts after a player is on the winning side (immediate vs. non-immediate 
reply protocols). Strict protocols are more efficient by constraining the possible 
moves agents are allowed to make. However, the efficiency comes at the price that 
not everything can be said. For example, if an agent learns something new during a 
dialogue and wants to make an alternative reply to a previous turn, then a unique-
reply protocol forbids this move. In liberal protocols an agent can make any move 
as a reply to some earlier move based on Lc, and the turn shifts when the other agent 
succeeds in making his move(s). Therefore, in the present research a liberal 
protocol is used. The protocol of this research is multi-reply since it gives agents 
the freedom to make alternative replies; the protocol is multi-move because during 
embedded persuasion, agents can make several moves before the turn shifts. The 
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notion of who is on the winning side is used in the protocol of this research in 
determining who will reply immediate after terminating an embedded persuasion. 
Thus the protocol of this research is immediate-reply. 
 
The negotiation protocol is straightforward. The requesting agent begins with a 
request, and then the agents take turns after each move, replying to the last move of 
the other party. Thus negotiations can be of arbitrary length and terminate after an 
accept or a withdraw move, since those speech acts have no replies. Negotiations 
are not guaranteed to terminate.  
 
The persuasion protocol is more involved, and is defined as follows. 
Definition 4 Protocol for persuasion language Lcp 
For all dialogues d and moves m it holds that m ∈ Pr (d) if and only if m satisfies all 
of the following rules: 
• R6: m satisfies R1 – R5 of Definition 4 where in R2 Lc is replaced by Lcp; 
• R7: if d = d0, then s(m) is of the form claim(P); 
• R8: if m concedes the conclusion of an argument moved in m’, then m’ does 
not reply to a why move; 
• R9: if the last move of d is a retraction by the proponent or a concession by 
the opponent of the initial claim of d, then Pr(d) = ∅. 
 
Rule R6 particularizes the general structure of the protocol to the persuasion 
protocol. R7 states that each persuasion dialogue starts with a claim. The initial 
claim is the topic of the dialogue. R8 restricts concessions of an argument’s 
conclusion to conclusions of counterarguments. Rule R8 ensures that propositions 
are conceded at the move in which they were introduced. R9 formalizes the idea that 
a persuasion dialogue terminates when the proponent has retracted his initial claim 
or when the opponent has conceded the initial claim.  
Definition 5 Turntaking function T for persuasion language Lcp 
• T:M<∞ → Pow({P,O}) 
 
where a dialogue is always started with player P, therefore T(∅) = {P}. The 
turntaking function T allows both players to take turns. However, since dialogue 
M<∞ is a sequence of moves, players cannot make moves at the same time.  




Definition 6 Winning criterion for persuasion language Lcp 
For any dialogue d, the proponent is the winner if the opponent has conceded the 
initial claim, and the opponent is the winner if the proponent has retracted his initial 
claim.  
 
Note that agents are trusted not to abuse the winning criterion from Definition 6 by 
never giving in and thus avoid losing. To illustrate how the winning criterion can be 
abused, consider the following start of a dialogue: 
p1:  claim c(1) 
o2:  why c(1) 
p3:  c(1) since c(X) <- b(X). b(1). 
Let us assume that o’s knowledge base contains the following rule and factual 
statement: 
{ c(X) <- b(X). b(1).}  
When player o can be trusted, he will concede premise b(1) of the argument and 
also concede c(1), because b(1) and c(1) can be derived from his knowledge 
base. Since c(1) is the initial claim, and the opponent o concedes to this claim, 
proponent p is the winner according to Definition 6. However, when player o cannot 
be trusted, he can avoid losing by repeating why moves. For example,  
O4:  why b(1) 
P5:  b(1) since b(1) 
At this stage, player p gives a circular argument, which in the present research is 
used to express that b(1) is a factual statement from p’s knowledge base (see 
section 5.2). Also in response to move P5, player o can avoid losing the dialogue by 
repeating the why b(1) move, and thus avoid losing by not conceding to the initial 
claim: 
O6:  why b(1) 
In the present research the agents are given dialogue policies which prevent agents 
to abuse the winning criterion from Definition 6. The dialogue policies (see chapter 
5) prescribe the best choices from the allowed moves specified by the 
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communication protocol, and the agents are trusted to apply the given dialogue 
policies. 
As for the combined protocol, the main idea is that if a negotiation dialogue shifts 
to a persuasion dialogue, their relation is one of embedding (see McBurney and 
Parsons 2002): the embedded persuasion dialogue is undertaken until its 
termination, after which the embedding negotiation dialogue is resumed. So 
whenever a persuasion move is allowed by the protocol, no negotiation move is 
allowed. In addition, the structural rules of the persuasion system now also hold for 
negotiation. This allows for alternative explanations for rejections and for accepting 
an offer (perhaps conditionally) that was first rejected for reasons that could not be 
upheld in a persuasion dialogue.  
 
The combined protocol is defined as follows. 
Definition 7 Protocol for combined negotiation and persuasion language Lcnp 
For all dialogues d and moves m it holds that m ∈ Pr(d) if and only if m satisfies all 
of the following rules. 
• R10: m satisfies R1 – R8 of Definition 4 and 5 where in R2 Lc is replaced by 
Lcnp, and in R6 Lcp is replaced by Lcnp, in R7 claim(P) replaced by request(A, 
C); 
• R11: if the last move of d is a retraction by the proponent or a concession by 
the opponent of the last claim of d, then s(m) is from Lcn; 
• R12: if s(m1) = request(A, C) and s(m) = offer(A’, C’) or s(m) = reject(A’, 
C’) then A’ and C’ do not contain any free variables; 
• R13: if s(m) = offer(A, C) then no m’ ∈ d, s(m’) = offer(A, C), where m’ is 
unequal to m; 
• R14: if s(m) = offer(A, C) or reject(A, C) or accept(A, C) then A and C 
contain no free variables;  
• R15: if the last move m’ of d is a persuasion move and there is no move m ∈ 
Pr(d) such that s(m) is a persuasion move, then the player who retracts or 
concedes to the last claim of d, makes an alternative reply to the last 
negotiation move in d, according to Lcn; else if m’ is a negotiation move 
then m replies to m’; 
• R16: if m is a negotiation move then there is no move m’∈ Pr(d) such that 
s(m’) is a persuasion move. 
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Rule R10 generalizes the general structure of the persuasion protocol to the 
combined protocol and says that each combined dialogue starts with a request for 
an offer. R11 is a replacement for R9, which states that when an embedded 
persuasion dialogue terminates, the next move must be a negotiation move which is 
made by the player who has lost the embedded persuasion. Note that every 
embedded persuasion dialogue starts with a claim; therefore the last claim of a 
dialogue is also the last persuasion. Rules R12 - R14 formalize the negotiation 
protocol rules of Wooldridge and Parsons (2000) that are not implied by R10. 
Protocol rule R15 prevents unnecessary negotiation backtracking moves. Finally, 
rule R16 performs a key role in the embedding of persuasion in negotiation. R16 
enforces that the relation between the negotiation and persuasion parts of dialogues 
is one of embedding of the latter in the former (cf. McBurney and Parsons 2002): as 
long as a persuasion move is legal, no negotiation move is legal. 
Definition 8 Turntaking function T for combined negotiation and persuasion 
language Lcnp 
T(d0) =  P; 
T(d)  =  O if the last move m’ of dialogue d, s(m’) is a negotiation move and  
  pl(m’) = P; 
T(d)  =  P if the last move m’ of dialogue d, s(m’) is a negotiation move and  
  pl(m’) = O; 
T(d)  =  {P,O} if the last move m’ of dialogue d, s(m’) is a persuasion move and 
there is at least one move m ∈ Pr(d) such that s(m) is a persuasion move; 
T(d)  =  P if the last move m’ of dialogue d, s(m’) is a persuasion move and  
  Pr(d) = ∅ and player P has lost the persuasion dialogue; 
T(d)  =  O if the last move m’ of dialogue d, s(m’) is a persuasion move and  
  Pr(d) = ∅ and player O has lost the persuasion dialogue; 
 
In the combined protocol, agents take turns after each negotiation move and during 
embedded persuasion dialogues both agents are free to make take turns after the 
initial claim. In embedded persuasion dialogues turntaking is left to the agents, 
since they are trusted not to abuse their freedom given by the liberal protocol. As 
for turntaking a after a terminated embedded persuasion dialogue, the next 
negotiation move must be made by the player who has lost the embedded 
persuasion. In (Prakken 2005; Van Veenen and Prakken 2006) the flexibility of 
protocols is constrained by the use of the notion of relevance. Relevance is defined 
in terms of the notion of dialogical status of a move. Briefly, a move is in if it has a 
surrendering reply or else all its attackers are out; and a move is out if is it not 
surrendered and has an attacking reply that is in, see Prakken (2005).  
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Example 6 terrorist assault on the queen 
Let us illustrate the combined negotiation and persuasion protocol with an example. 
In this scenario, which is based on Example 2 (page 34), the requesting agent p 
requests the responding agent o to offer him intelligence data about a terrorist 
group in Amsterdam which is possibly planning an assault on the queen. Initially 
the responding agent rejects his request. However, the requesting agent persuades 
him to exchange the requested data. Note that this example assumes that both 
agents have a knowledge base and that only legal moves to previous moves are 
shown, unless backtracking is relevant. The dialogue starts with the request from 
agent p to agent o to give him intelligence data about a possible terrorist assault: 
 
p1:  request(p, o, exchangeData(o, p, terrorists, DATA_UNIT_ID),) 
 
This is the only legal move type according to protocol rule R10 combined 
with R7 which state that dialogues start with a request move. 
 
Based on protocol rule R10 combined with rule R2, the next legal replies 
are: to offer the found data, or to reject the request, or to withdraw from the 
dialogue. Assuming that the responding agent o finds matching data, he 
chooses to reject the request. Furthermore, the replying move satisfies rule 
R12. Protocol rule R12 states that the free variables from the request must 
be instantiated, i.e., DATA_UNIT_ID is instantiated with 3.  
 
o2:  reject(o, p, exchangeData(o, p, terrorists, 3),) 
 
The allowed reply moves (based on R10 combined with R2) to a reject are 
making a counteroffer with another condition or making a why-reject 
move. Agent p chooses a why-reject move to try to persuade the 
responding agent o. Therefore the agent p states ‘why don’t you give me 
that data?’ 
 
p3:  why-reject(p, o, exchangeData(o, p, terrorists, 3)) 
 
Based on R10 combined with R2 the only legal reply to a why-reject move is 
a claim (see the combined negotiation and persuasion language Lcnp 
specified in Table 4 on page 70). Therefore the agent claims that it is 
forbidden to exchange data about a possible terrorist assault. 
 
o4:  claim(o, p, obliged(not(exchangeData(o, p, terrorists, 3))) 
 
The claim is the start of an embedded persuasion dialogue. Protocol rule 
R16 states that only persuasion language moves are allowed during 
persuasion.  




According to R10 combined with R2, the legal replies to a claim are making 
a why or concede move. Agent p chooses to do a why move and asks ‘why 
is it forbidden to exchange that data?’. 
 
p5:  why(p, o, obliged(not(exchangeData((o, p, terrorists, 3)))) 
 
The allowed replies to a why move are retracting the claim or giving an 
argument for the claim (based on R10 combined with R2). Agent o gives an 
argument ‘it is forbidden to exchange the data since the data is too old’ for 
the claim. 
  
o6:  argue(o, p, 
 obliged(not(exchangeData(o, p, terrorists, 3))).  
 
obliged(not(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID))  
<- 
holds(dataOlderThanOneYear(DATA_UNIT_ID)), 
requested(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)), 
valid(rOlderThanOneYear_F(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)).  
 
holds(dataOlderThanOneYear(3)). 
requested(exchangeData(o, p, terrorists, 3)). 
valid(rOlderThanOneYear_F(o, p, terrorists, 3))). 
) 
 
Assuming that agent p checks the conclusion and the premises of the 
argument, the requesting agent p makes several moves at this turn in the 
dialogue. The legal reply moves to an argument are conceding the 
conclusion or premises of the argument, denying premises of the argument, 
making why moves targeted at premises of the argument or creating a 
counterargument.  
 
The argument is constructed using the ‘rOlderThanOneYear_F(S, R, 
QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)’ domain rule. The agent states the argument that the 
rule is not applicable in this case: 
 
p7-o6: argue(p, o,  
~rOlderThanOneYear_F(o, p, terrorist, 3). 
 
~rOlderThanOneYear_F(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID) 
 <- 
holds(exceptionalSituation(DATA_UNIT_ID)), 
valid(rExceptionalSituation_OTOY(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)).  
 
holds(exceptionalSituation(3)) 
valid(rExceptionalSituation_OTOY(o, p, terrorists, 3)). 
) 
FORMALIZATION OF THE MULTI-AGENT SYSTEM 
 77
 
The agent decides to continue with the premises of the argument. 
 
The first premise of the argument is ‘holds(dataOlderThanOneYear(3))’. 
This is an unknown premise for agent p. Therefore the agent asks why. 
 
p8-o6: why(p, o, holds(dataOlderThanOneYear(3)))  
 
The second premise of the argument is ‘requested(exchangeData(o, p, 
terrorists, 3))’ . Assuming that the agent can derive this premise from 
his knowledge base, he concedes the second premise. 
 
p9-o6: concede(p, o, requested(exchangeData(o, p, terrorists, 3)) 
 
Although protocol rule R8 invalidates conceding to the conclusion of the 
argument, this concede is targeted at a premise of the argument and is 
therefore legal.  
 
p10-o6:concede(valid(rOlderThanOneYear_F(o, p, terrorists, 3))) 
 
 At this turn, the responding agent checks the incoming moves p7, p8, p9 and 
p10.  
 
Move p7 is an argument, and similar to the reaction to move o6, agent p 
chooses to continue with the premises of the argument. 
 
The first premise of the argument is ‘holds(exceptionalSituation(3))’. 
This is an unknown premise for agent o. Therefore the agent asks why. 
 
o11-p7:why(o, p, holds(exceptionalSituation(3)))  
 
The second premise of the argument is 
 ‘valid(rExceptionalSituation_OTOY(o, p, terrorists, 3))’, which the 
agent chooses to concede. 
 
o12-p7: concede(o, p, valid(rExceptionalSituation_OTOY(o, p, terrorists, 
3)))  
 
In response to move p8, agent p gives a trivial circular argument indicating 
a factual statement ‘the data is older than one year because it is older than 
one year’. 
 
AUTOMATED SUPPORT OF REGULATED DATA EXCHANGE 
 
 78




  ) 
 
Since no replies are defined on a concede move (see Table 4 on page 70), 
agent p does not reply to move P9.  
 
At this turn the requesting agent p checks the incoming moves o11, o12 and 
o13.  
 
Based on protocol rule R10 combined with R2, the allowed replies to the 
why move o11 are retracting the premise of the argument or giving an 
argument for the premise. Agent p decides to gives an argument for the 
premise ‘there is an exceptional situation because there is a possible 














Move o13 is a trivial circular argument indicating a fact, assuming agent p 
trusts agent o, he chooses to accept the premise. 
 
p15-o13:concede(p, o, holds(dataOlderThanOneYear(3))) 
 
At this turn the responding agent checks the incoming moves p14 and p15.  
Agent o does not reply to move p15 since no replies are defined on a 
concede move (see Table 4 on page 70).  
 
Move p14 is an argument and agent o checks the conclusion and the 
premises of the argument. Assuming that the agent cannot concede the 
conclusion of the argument and also cannot create a counterargument or 
undercut for the argument, he continues with the premises of the argument. 
 
The first premise of the argument is ‘holds(attemptAssaultQueen(3))’. 
This is an unknown premise for agent o. Therefore the agent asks why. 
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o16-p14:why(o, p, holds(attemptAssaultQueen(3))) 
 
The second premise of the argument is ‘valid(rQueen_ES(3))’. Assuming 
that the agent can derive this premise from his knowledge base, he 
concedes the second premise. 
 
o17-p14:concede(o, p, valid(rQueen_ES(3))) 
 
At this turn the requesting agent checks moves o16 and o17. In response to 
move o16, agent p gives a trivial circular argument ‘there is an attempted 
assault on the queen because there is an attempted assault on the queen’: 
 






Since no replies are defined on a concede move, agent p does not reply to 
move o17.  
 
At this turn responding agent o checks move p18 which is a trivial circular 
argument. Assuming that agents trust each other, he chooses to concede the 
premise. 
 
o19-p18:concede(o, p, holds(attemptAssaultQueen(3))) 
 
By conceding to move p18, agent o’s original reason for 
‘obliged(not(exchangeData(o, p, terrorists, 3))’ is now defeated and 
therefore o concedes to p’s negotiation: ‘I concede that in this case it is not 
forbidden to exchange the data, so I retract that it is forbidden to exchange 
the data’. 
 
o20-p5:retract(o, p, obliged(not(exchangeData(o, p, terrorists, 3))) 
 
With move o20 the responding agent o backtracks to move p5, now 
surrendering to that move. Agent o has retracted his initial claim of the 
embedded persuasion. Therefore, according to protocol rule R11 the 
persuasion is now terminated and the dialogue shifts back to the 
negotiation dialogue. Based on protocol rule R16 the legal next move must 
be a negotiation move. Furthermore, R4 requires that if a player backtracks, 
the new move must be different from the first one.  
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Based on protocol rule R15 the legal next move must be an alternative reply 
to the last negotiation move made by agent o (since he has retracted the last 
claim). Therefore after move o20 agent o backtracks to move p1. At this 
moment agent o infers that it is not forbidden to exchange the requested 
data about terrorist attacks. Therefore, he chooses to offer the requested 
data. 
 
o21-p1: offer(o, p, exchangeData(o, p, terrorists, 3))) 
 
The replying move satisfies rule R12 which states that the free variables 
from the request must be instantiated, i.e., DATA_UNIT_ID is instantiated 
with 3.  
 
In response to move o21, the requesting agent accepts the offer. 
 
p22-o21:accept(p, o, exchangeData(o, p, terrorists, 3))) 
 
Move p22 terminates the dialogue since agent o must reply to agent p’s last move 
and no reply moves are defined on accept moves (see Lcnp specified in Table 4 on 
page 70). 
 
4.3 Chapter summary 
This chapter has specified the argumentation system to model the internal 
inferences of an agent and the dialogue system to model the interaction between 
agents. Section 4.1 presented ASPIC as a logic for defeasible argumentation and as 
knowledge representation language. As discussed in section 3.3 (page 47), agents 
especially reason about whether something is obligatory, forbidden, or whether 
something violates their interest. The deontic modalities are not part of the ASPIC 
logic. However, they are expressed with reification. Also the agent goals (see 
section 3.2 on page 45) are expressed with reification. Section 4.2 specified the 
dialogue system for the interactions between agents. In the police domain, the agent 
interactions are interpreted as negotiation with embedded persuasion dialogues, and 
this is precisely the kind of embedding modeled in Van Veenen and Prakken 
(2006). Therefore, the chosen language and protocol is based on their work. To be 
compatible with the ASPIC inference engine and to support the regulated data 
exchange between CIE officers the dialogue systems are adapted in several ways. 
The negotiation language differs from Van Veenen and Prakken (2006), where the 
content of a speech act is expressed as a conjunction of literals. While in the present 
research the elements of content are literals A and C, which denote the action and 
the condition. The condition can be used to state an action (not) to be performed by 
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the requesting party. A second difference is the addition of the deny(P) speech act 
and the withdraw speech act as a reply to a request to the communication languages 
of Van Veenen and Prakken (2006). The present research uses liberal protocols to 
allow agents to explore alternative moves. In (Prakken 2005; Van Veenen and 
Prakken 2006), excessive flexibility of protocols is constrained by the use of the 
notion of relevance. In this research, the notion of relevance is not required for the 
protocols, since CIE agents are trusted not to abuse their freedom given by liberal 
protocols. The next chapter will specify and formalize policies for negotiation and 
persuasion dialogues between agents. 
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Chapter 5  
Dialogue policies 
The previous chapter specified the argumentation system to model the internal 
inferences of an agent and the dialogue system to model the interaction between 
agents. This chapter presents the policies for negotiation and persuasion dialogues 
between agents18. First the idea of policies for dialogue systems is presented. Then 
in section 5.1 and section 5.2, the policies for negotiation and for persuasion are 
described. Finally in section 5.3 the application of the policies in the Dutch police 
domain is discussed and an example is presented to illustrate the policies.  
 
Whereas a communication protocol specifies all the allowed moves, a policy 
specifies the best choices from those moves. In case of dialogues between CIE 
agents about regulated data exchange, the best move is one that is expected to 
further the goal to execute the appointed police task and the goal to protect local 
investigations and informants, while incorporating the attitude of the criminal 
investigation unit. The attitude of CIEs is reflected in their application of usage 
codes to data and their willingness to exchange protected data. For example, a 
criminal investigation unit with an overcautious attitude labels data as protected 
more often than required. Furthermore, an overcautious criminal investigation unit 
is mainly focused on the goal to protect local data and therefore will not easily 
provide data, while a cooperative criminal investigation unit is more easily 
persuaded to exchange protected data.  
 
For the proof-of-concept application, two types of dialogue policies need to be 
specified, viz. for negotiation and for persuasion. A responding agent considers the 
normative issue whether performing a requested action is obligatory or forbidden, 
and the teleological issue whether performing an action is a violation of his 
interests. A requesting agent considers the normative issue whether agreeing with a 
condition stated in an offer is obligatory or forbidden, and the teleological issue 
                                                        
18 Note that this chapter is based on earlier work published in (Dijkstra et al. 2005; 
Dijkstra et al. 2006; Dijkstra et al. 2007). 
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whether agreeing is a violation of his interests. Persuasion policies determine, for 
example, what kinds of arguments (e.g., defensible, justified) an agent should 
accept, when it is allowed to give a counterargument to an argument moved by the 
other agent and whether a claim or argument can be accepted. The agents’ policies 
should induce a fair degree of cooperativeness since the policies are designed to 
further the agent’s goals and these goals include those of the overall organization. 
 
The policies use the ASPIC reasoner (see subsection 4.1.1) to determine whether it 
is possible to create a justified or defensible argument for a given conclusion. As 
for notation, the style of Karacapilidis and Moraitis (2002) ‘ [A] ⊢status-type B’ is 
adopted to denote that a reasoner is called to infer that the set of rules A implies 
conclusion B, and the status-type denotes if conclusion B is defensible or justified. 
The ASPIC language does not contain double negation; therefore the occurrence of 
not(A), when A is a negated formula, should strictly speaking be replaced with A. 
For simplicity, this complication is left implicit. Finally, the policies assume a 
selection mechanism which chooses the moves to be replied to in a dialogue.  
5.1 Negotiation policies 
This section presents the specification of the negotiation policies. First the 
negotiation policies for (A) offer, (B) request, (C) reject and (D) why-reject speech 
acts are formalized. Then an example is given to illustrate the negotiation policies. 
As specified in subsection 4.2.1 (page 66) the negotiation communication language 
consists of speech acts p(content) where p is a performative and content is defined 
in topic language Lt with associated logic L. The elements of content are literals A 
and C, which denote the action and the condition. Furthermore, moves are of the 
form p(S, R, A, C) where the performative of the speech act p is written outside the 
move, the identifier and target of a move are left implicit and the other player in the 
dialogue is added. The elements of a move are p to denote the performative and S, 
R, A, C denote the sender, the receiver, the action and the condition. Finally, C is of 
the form ‘holds(D)’ or ‘happens(D)’. 
A: Reacting to an offer 
When an agent is in a responding role and receives an offer, he deliberates whether 
it is obliged, forbidden or whether it is a violation of its own interests to perform the 
action specified in the offer. If the agent concludes that it is obliged to perform the 
action, he accepts the offer. If he concludes that it is forbidden to perform the 
action, then he rejects the offer. If the agent concludes that it is permitted to 
perform the action but there is a violation of the agent’s own interests then he tries 
to find a condition under which there will be no violation of its own interests. If he 
DIALOGUE POLICIES 
 85
has succeeded in finding such a condition, he makes a counteroffer with the 
condition. If he has not succeeded in finding a condition, he rejects the offer. 
 
When a requesting agent receives an offer, he deliberates whether it is obliged, 
forbidden or whether it is a violation of his own interests to agree with the condition 
stated in the offer. The agent accepts the offer when he concludes that it is obliged 
to agree with the condition. The agent rejects the offer when he concludes it that is 
forbidden to agree with the condition. If the agent concludes that it is permitted to 
agree with the condition but there is a violation of the agent’s own interests then he 
tries to find a condition under which there will be no violation of his own interests. 
If he has succeeded in finding such a condition, he makes a counteroffer with the 
extra conditions, else he rejects the offer. 
 




Agents have different negotiation policies for an offer depending on their role. 
Therefore, the first step of the negotiation policy for an offer is to determine the 
agent role, which in this case is the role of responding agent.  
 
1.1.  
IF agentRole(R) = responding  
 
 
Step 1.1.1 of the negotiation policy for an offer checks whether it is 
possible to create a justified or defensible argument (status-type) for the 
conclusion that the requested action is obliged. If that is possible, the 
negotiation policy returns the answer to accept the requested content. The 
condition C, which is the action to be performed by the other requesting 
agent S, is conjoined with the knowledge base to determine whether it is 
obliged to offer the requested data. Moreover, another thing which has to 
be added to the knowledge base is requested(A), since determining whether 
an action is obliged, presupposes that the action is requested. Because of 
the assumption that the agents trust each other (see section 2.4 on page 18), 




IF [KBargumentation-engine ∪ {requested(A)} ∪ {C}] 
⊢status-type obliged(A) 
THEN  
  OutgoingMoves <- OutgoingMoves + accept(R, S, A, C) 
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The policies assume a selection mechanism to choose the moves to be 
replied to in a dialogue, where each chosen move serves as input for the 
policies. For each applicable policy step, the policy stores the reply move 
in OutgoingMoves. When every applicable policy step is taken, the policy 
returns all the reply moves contained in OutgoingMoves.  
 
The negotiation policy for an offer could reject the request for data if there 
is no justified argument which says that it is obliged to exchange the found 
data.  
 
However, this action is not in line with the goal of CIEs to execute their 
appointed police task by exchanging data (see section 2.6 on page 37). 
Therefore, in the next negotiation policy steps, the policy tries to exchange 
data such that the requested data is not forbidden to exchange and the 
agents’ own interests are not violated. 
 
 
Step 1.1.2 of the negotiation policy checks whether it is possible to create a 
justified or defensible argument for the conclusion that the requested action 
is forbidden. If that is possible, the negotiation policy returns the answer to 
reject the offer. Since only the ‘obliged’ operator is used (see subsection 
4.1.2 on page 61), ‘forbidden(A)’ is rewritten as ‘obliged(not(A))’.  
 
1.1.2.  
ELSEIF [KBargumentation-engine ∪ {requested(A)} ∪ {C}] 
⊢status-type obliged(not(A)) 
THEN  
   OutgoingMoves <- OutgoingMoves + reject(R, S, A, C) 
 
 
Step 1.1.3 of the policy checks whether it is possible to create a justified or 
defensible argument for the conclusion that the offer is a violation of the 
agent’s (denoted by R) own interests. If that is impossible, the negotiation 
policy returns the answer to accept the offer. Moreover, another thing 
which has to be added to the knowledge base is happens(A), instead of 
requested(A). Since determining whether an action is a violation of 
interests presumes that the action happens. 
 
1.1.3.  
ELSEIF [KBargumentation-engine ∪ {happens(A)} ∪ {C}]  
⊬status-type violationOfOwnInterests(R) 
THEN  





In step 1.1.4 of the negotiation policy for an offer, the argumentation 
system tries to find a condition for the conclusion such that the responding 
agent’s own interests are not violated and that the requested action is not 
forbidden. If that is possible, the negotiation policy returns the answer to 
make a counteroffer with the new condition C’ (where C’ is unequal to 
every other C before). If that is not possible, the negotiation policy returns 
the answer to reject the offer. Step 1.1.4 of the negotiation policy uses 
abductive reasoning to find a condition under which a new offer can be 
made. The ASPIC reasoner is not capable yet of abductive reasoning; 
therefore in the current implementation this is done manually. 
 
1.1.4.  
ELSEIF there exists a C’ such that 
[KBargumentation-engine ∪ {happens(A)} ∪ {C’}] 
⊬status-type violationOfOwnInterests(R) 
∧ [KBargumentation-engine ∪ {requested(A)} ∪ {C’}] 
⊬status-type obliged(not(A)) 
THEN  
   OutgoingMoves <- OutgoingMoves + offer(R, S, A, C’) 
ELSE  
   OutgoingMoves <- OutgoingMoves + reject(R, S, A, C) 
 
 
Step 1.2 of the negotiation policy for an offer checks if the agent has the role of 
a requesting agent. 
  
1.2.  




Step 1.2.1 of the negotiation policy for an offer checks whether it is 
possible to create a (justified or defensible) argument for the conclusion 
that the stated condition C is obliged. If that is possible, the negotiation 
policy returns the answer to accept the offer.  
 
1.2.1.  
IF [KBargumentation-engine ∪ {requested(A)}] 
⊢status-type obliged(C) 
THEN  
   OutgoingMoves <- OutgoingMoves + accept(R, S, A, C)  
 
 
Step 1.2.2 of the negotiation policy checks whether it is possible to create a 
(justified or defensible) argument for the conclusion that the stated 
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condition C is forbidden. If that is possible, the negotiation policy returns 
the answer to reject the offer.  
 
1.2.2.  
ELSEIF [KBargumentation-engine ∪ {requested(A)}]  
⊢status-type obliged(not(C)) 
THEN  
   OutgoingMoves <- OutgoingMoves + reject(R, S, A, C) 
 
 
Step 1.2.3 of the policy checks whether it is possible to create a justified or 
defensible argument for the conclusion that the requested action with the 
stated condition is a violation of the agent’s (denoted by R) own interests. 




ELSEIF [KBargumentation-engine ∪ {happens(A)} ∪ {C}]  
⊬status-type violationOfOwnInterests(R) 
THEN  
   OutgoingMoves <- OutgoingMoves + accept(R, S, A, C) 
 
Note that determining whether accepting a condition causes a violation of 
interests presumes that the condition ‘holds’ or ‘happens’. Therefore the 
condition is conjoined with the knowledge base. 
 
 
In step 1.2.4 of the negotiation policy for an offer, the argumentation 
system tries to find a new condition such that the requesting agent’s own 
interests are not violated and that the new condition is not forbidden. If that 
is possible, the negotiation policy returns the answer to make a 
counteroffer with the new condition C’ (where C’ is unequal to every other 
C before). If that is not possible, the negotiation policy returns the answer 
to reject the offer.  
 
1.2.4.  
ELSEIF there exists a C’ such that 
[KBargumentation-engine ∪ {happens(A} ∪ {C’}] 
⊬status-type violationOfOwnInterests(R) 
∧ [KBargumentation-engine ∪ {requested(A}] 
⊬status-type obliged(not(C’)) 
THEN  
   OutgoingMoves <- OutgoingMoves + offer(R, S, A, C’) 
ELSE  





B: Reacting to a request 
A request is a special case of an offer and is only applicable for responding agents. 
When an agent receives a request and he cannot perform the requested action, he 
withdraws from the dialogue. If he can perform the requested action, the agent takes 
the same steps as a requesting agent receiving an offer, i.e., he deliberates whether 
it is obliged, forbidden or whether it is a violation of his own interests to perform 
the action specified in the request. 
 
2.  




As described in subsection 6.1.2 on page 127, the responding agent first searches 
for a matching data-unit in his data source when receiving a request. The free 
variable in the request (data-unit identifier) is instantiated in his offer, depending on 
whether the responding agent finds a matching data unit. If he succeeds finding a 
matching data-unit, the free variable is instantiated with a data-unit identifier 
referring to the found data unit. If he cannot find a matching data unit, the request is 
instantiated with ‘empty’ placeholders.  
 
Step 2.1 of the negotiation policy for a request checks if no matching data unit 
is found. If that is the case (denoted by the ‘empty’ constants), the policy 
returns the answer to withdraw. 
  
2.1.  
IF request(S, R, A, C) = request(S, R, empty, empty)  
THEN  
  OutgoingMoves <- OutgoingMoves + withdraw(R, S, A, C) 
 
 
Step 2.2 is equal to step 1.1.1 of the negotiation policy for an offer. 
 
2.2.  
ELSEIF [KBargumentation-engine ∪ {requested(A)} ∪ {C}] 
⊢status-type obliged(A) 
THEN   
  OutgoingMoves <- OutgoingMoves + accept(R, S, A, C) 
 
 
Step 2.3 equals step 1.1.2 of the negotiation policy for an offer. 
 




ELSEIF [KBargumentation-engine ∪ {requested(A)} ∪ {C}] 
⊢status-type obliged(not(A)) 
THEN   
  OutgoingMoves <- OutgoingMoves + reject(R, S, A, C) 
 
 
Step 2.4 of the policy for a request is equal to negotiation policy step 1.1.3  
 
2.4.  
ELSEIF [KBargumentation-engine ∪ {happens(A)} ∪ {C}] 
⊬status-type violationOfOwnInterests(R) 
THEN  
  OutgoingMoves <- OutgoingMoves + accept(R, S, A, C) 
 
 
Step 2.5 is equal to step 1.1.4 of the negotiation policy for an offer. 
 
2.5.  
ELSEIF there exists a C’ such that: 
[KBargumentation-engine ∪ {happens(A)} ∪ {C’}] 
⊬status-type violationOfOwnInterests(R) 
∧ [KBargumentation-engine ∪ {requested(A)} ∪ {C’}]  
⊬status-type obliged(not(A)) 
THEN  
  OutgoingMoves <- OutgoingMoves + offer(R, S, A, C’) 
ELSE  
  OutgoingMoves <- OutgoingMoves + reject(R, S, A, C) 
 
  
C: Reacting to a reject 
When an agent receives a rejection, he first determines whether the reject move was 
made earlier in the dialogue. If the reject move was not made earlier to the previous 
move, he will do a why-reject move to challenge the rejection and this why-reject 
move initiates an embedded persuasion dialogue. If the rejection was made earlier, 
and therefore an embedded persuasion dialogue has occurred during the dialogue, 
the agent checks if he has lost the embedded persuasion. If that is the case, the agent 
tries to make an offer with a new condition such that the requested action is not 
forbidden and does not violate his interests. Else, he withdraws from the dialogue. 
 
3.  






In step 3.1 the agent first checks if the reject move was not made earlier as a 
reaction to the previous move. If that is the case, the agent returns a why-reject 
move to start an embedded persuasion dialogue. 
 
3.1.  
IF the reject move has not yet been replied to before  
THEN  





The ‘else’ part of step 3.1 implies that there has already been an embedded 
persuasion dialogue which challenged the rejection. Moreover, since the 
policies assume a selection mechanism to choose the moves to be replied to 
in a dialogue, the agent infers that reselection of the reject move implies 
that the persuasion has been lost. Therefore, the agent will not start another 
embedded persuasion dialogue and tries to make an offer with a new 
condition in step 3.1.1. If he succeeds he makes the offer, else he 
withdraws from the dialogue. 
 
3.1.1.  
IF [KBargumentation-engine ∪ {happens(A)} ∪ {C’}] 
⊬status-type violationOfOwnInterests(R) 
∧ [KBargumentation-engine ∪ {requested(A)} ∪ {C’}]  
⊬status-type obliged(not(A)) 
THEN  
   OutgoingMoves <- OutgoingMoves + offer(R, S, A, C’) 
ELSE  
   OutgoingMoves <- OutgoingMoves + withdraw 
 
 
D: Reacting to a why-reject 
When an agent receives a why-reject move, he will use the argument he has already 
constructed for his rejection. The conclusion of the argument is then returned as the 
claim, which starts an embedded persuasion dialogue. There are two situations 
when an agent rejects an offer or a request. The first situation is that the proposal 
was rejected on the basis that the requested action is forbidden. The second 
situation is that the proposal was rejected on the basis that the requested action is a 
violation of the agent’s interests 
 
4.  
IF selectedMove(Move) = why-reject(S, R, A, C) 
THEN  





In step 4.1 the negotiation policy queries the argumentation system if it can 
create an (status-type) argument for the conclusion that the action is forbidden. 
If this is possible, the negotiation policy returns the conclusion as the claim. 
 
4.1.  
IF [KBargumentation-engine ∪ {requested(A)} ∪ {C}] 
⊢status-type obliged(not(A))  
THEN  
  OutgoingMoves <- OutgoingMoves  
  + claim(R, S, obliged(not(A))) 
 
In step 4.2 the policy queries the argumentation system if it can create an 
(status-type) argument for the conclusion that the agent’s interests are violated. 
If this is possible, the policy returns the conclusion (that there is a violation of 
the agent’s interests) as the claim. 
 
4.2.  
ELSEIF [KBargumentation-engine ∪ {happens(A)} ∪ {C}] 
⊢status-type violationOfOwnInterests(R))  
THEN 
  OutgoingMoves <- OutgoingMoves  
  + claim(R, S, violationOfOwnInterests(R)) 
 
Finally, at the end of the previous negotiation steps, the resulting move is returned 






Example 7 source protection & analysis purposes 
This scenario, which is based on Example 1 (page 33), illustrates how a responding 
agent can state a condition and how a requesting agent can accept an offer with a 
condition. In this example, the requesting agent p requests the responding agent o to 
give him intelligence data about Adriana.  
 
p1:  request(p, o, exchangeData(o, p, adriana, DATA_UNIT_ID),) 
 
The responding agent o tries to find a matching data-unit identifier for the 
request (for simplicity, only one data-unit identifier matches the query). 
The responding agent finds a matching data-unit identifier (‘2’) and 
instantiates the move as:  
DIALOGUE POLICIES 
 93
request(p, o, exchangeData(o, p, adriana, 2),).  
 
Since the selected move is a request, step 2 of the negotiation policy is 
applicable. First agent o applies Step 2.1 to check if no matching data unit 
is found; this is not the case. Therefore, o applies step 2.2 of the policy. In 
step 2.2, the negotiation policy queries the argumentation system whether it 
can find a justified argument for the conclusion that it is obliged to 
exchange the found intelligence data. 
 
IF [KBargumentation-engine ∪ {requested(exchangeData(o, p, 
adriana, 2))}] 
⊢justified obliged(exchangeData(o, p, adriana, 2)) 
THEN  
accept(o, p, exchangeData(o, p, adriana, 2),) 
 
Since no justified argument is found in step 2.2, agent o continues with 
step 2.3 of the negotiation policy for a request. Step 2.3 checks whether the 
argumentation system can find a justified argument for the conclusion that 
it is forbidden to give the found intelligence data. 
 
IF [KBargumentation-engine ∪ {requested(exchangeData(o, p, 
adriana, 2))}] 
⊢justified obliged(not(exchangeData(o, p, adriana, 2))) 
THEN  
reject(o, p, exchangeData(o, p, adriana, 2),) 
 
Note that ‘forbidden(P)’ is substituted with ‘obliged(not(P))’, see 
subsection 4.1.2 on page 61. Also in step 2.3, the argumentation system 
cannot find a justified argument for the conclusion that is forbidden to 
exchange intelligence data. Therefore, agent o applies step 2.4 of the 
negotiation policy. Step 2.4 checks if there is no violation of the agent’s 
own interests if the agent exchanges the requested data. 




accept(o, p, exchangeData(o, p, adriana, 2),) 
 
Based on domain rule rTraceable_SP (see page 167), the agent infers that 




holds(sourceProtection(DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT))  





valid(rTraceable_SP(DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)) 0.3. 
  




holds(sourceProtection(2, adriana))  
 
Furthermore, based on domain rule rSourceProtection_NP (see page 171), 
the agent infers that informant Adriana who has supplied the data, has no 
protection when the data is exchanged.  
 
[ 
holds(not(protection(DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)))  
<-  
holds(sourceProtection(DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)),  
happens(exchangeData(S, R, ,QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)), 
valid(rSourceProtection_NP(S, R, ,QUERY, 
DATA_UNIT_ID,INFORMANT)). 
 
happens(exchangeData(o, p, ,adriana, 2)), 
valid(rSourceProtection_NP(o, p, adriana, 2, adriana)). 
] 
⊢justified  
holds(not(protection(2, adriana)))  
 
Based on the rProtectionGoal domain rule (see page 171), the agent 
concludes that a goal for him is to protect informant Adriana who has 
supplied the data. 
 
[ 
goal(S, protection(DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT))  
<-  
holds(informantOf(INFORMANT, DATA_UNIT_ID, S)), 
valid(rProtectionGoal(DATA_UNIT_ID)). 
 
holds(informantOf(adriana, 2, o)). 
valid(rProtectionGoal(o, 2, adriana)). 
] 
⊢justified  
goal(o, protection(2, adriana)))  
 
 
Finally, based on domain rule rViolationOfOwnInterestsA (see page 172), 
the agent infers that his interests are violated since his goal to protect 
informant Adriana conflicts with the conclusion that Adriana is not 







holds(not(P)), goal(S, P).   
 
holds(not(protection(2, adriana)). 





Now the agent continues with step 2.5 of the policy and tries to find a 
condition under which there is no violation of his interests. By abductive 
reasoning, agent o finds a condition ‘holds(analysisPurposesOnly(p, 
2)).’ in domain rule rSourceProtectionAnalysis_P (see page 166) . Based 
on this rule the agent infers that it is permitted to exchange the requested 
data, if Adriana who has supplied that data has source protection and that 
the data will be used for analysis purposes only:  
 
[ 
~obliged(not(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)))  
<-  
holds(sourceProtection(DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)),  
holds(analysisPurposesOnly(CIE_OFFICER, DATA_UNIT_ID)), 
requested(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)),  
valid(rSourceProtectionAnalysis_P(S, R, QUERY, 
DATA_UNIT_ID, CIE_OFFICER)). 
 
holds(sourceProtection(2, adriana)).  
holds(analysisPurposesOnly(p, 2)). 
requested(exchangeData(o, p, adriana, 2)).  
valid(rSourceProtectionAnalysis_P(o, p, adriana, 2, p)). 
] 
⊢justified  
~obliged(not(exchangeData(o, p, adriana, 2)))  
 
therefore step 2.5 of the negotiation policy for a request succeeds: 
 
[KBargumentation-engine ∪ {happens(exchangeData(o, p, adriana, 
2))} ∪ {holds(analysisPurposesOnly(p, 2))}]  
⊬justified violationOfOwnInterests(o) 
∧  
[KBargumentation-engine ∪ {requested(exchangeData(o, p, adriana, 
2))}  
∪ {holds(analysisPurposesOnly(p, 2))}] 
⊬justified obliged(not(exchangeData(o, p, adriana, 2))) 
THEN  
offer (o, p, exchangeData(o, p, adriana, 2), 
holds(analysisPurposesOnly(p, 2))) 




The negotiation policy for a request is completed and the responding agent 
o puts the resulting move in the dialogue. 
 
o2:  offer(o, p, exchangeData(o, p, adriana, 2), 
holds(analysisPurposesOnly(p, 2))) 
 
At dialogue step o2, agent o offers the requesting agent to give him 
intelligence data about Adriana under the condition that the data can be 
used for analysis purposes only. Since agent p receiving the offer is in a 
requesting role, negotiation policy step 1.2 is applicable. The first step 
(1.2.1) of the policy is to check whether it is possible to create a justified or 
defensible argument (status-type) that the condition is obliged: 
 
IF [KBargumentation-engine ∪ {requested(exchangeData(o, p, 
adriana, 2))}] 
⊢justified obliged(analysisPurposesOnly(p, 2)) 
THEN   
accept(o, p, exchangeData(o, p, adriana, 2),  
holds(analysisPurposesOnly(p, 2))) 
 
This is possible, based upon domain rule rAnalysisQuery_AP (see page 
171) which states that if a query from a CIE officer was made for analysis 
purposes and data is exchanged based on the query, then it is obliged for 
the CIE officer to use that data for analysis purposes only: 
 
[ 
obliged(analysisPurposesOnly(R, DATA_UNIT_ID))  
<-  
holds(analysisQuery(R, QUERY)), 
requested(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)), 
valid(rAnalysisQueryAP(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)). 
 
requested(exchangeData(o, p, adriana,2)). 
holds(analysisQuery(o, adriana)). 
valid(rAnalysisQueryAP(o, p, adriana, 2)). 
] 
⊢justified obliged(analysisPurposesOnly(p, 2))  
 
 
Therefore, the requesting agent p accepts the offer and makes the following 
move. 
 
p3:  accept(p, o, exchangeData(o, p, adriana, 2), 
holds(analysisPurposesOnly(p, 2))) 
 
Finally the responding agent sends the requested intelligence data about Adriana. 
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5.2 Persuasion policies 
This section presents the policies for persuasion. First the design choices are 
discussed. Then the persuasion policies are specified.  
5.2.1 Design choices 
Assumptions like cooperativeness and protection of own data are “hard coded” into 
the policies since they are applicable in all domains where data is exchanged 
between organizations. For example, an agent is cooperative in that he only asks 
why P questions if he does not have an argument for P. A second example of 
cooperativeness is that an agent only moves arguments in dialogues which are not 
overruled by his own arguments. So even though the opponent may not have a 
stronger counterargument to a certain argument, the agent does not move the 
argument if it is overruled by one of his own arguments. In the context of regulated 
data exchange between CIEs, cooperativeness promotes the goal to execute the 
police task by enabling more data exchange and data protection promotes the goal 
to protect local investigations and informants.  
 
The persuasion policies are partly domain-specific in the parameterization of the 
required status types of arguments and the evaluation of arguments an agent needs 
for his decisions. Therefore, when applying the policies in an application domain, 
the required status types of arguments (justified or defensible) and the evaluation of 
arguments need to be specified. Specifying the status types of arguments can have a 
significant impact on the behavior of an agent and can be used to incorporate the 
attitude of CIEs towards data exchange (see section 2.6 on page 37). For example, a 
cooperative agent who accepts defensible arguments that say that it is not forbidden 
to exchange data will be easier persuaded than an overcautious agent who only 
accepts justified arguments for the conclusion that giving the data is not forbidden. 
So the cooperative agent, who needs a defensible argument, will not be as 
protective of his intelligence data as an overcautious agent, who needs a justified 
argument. The evaluation of arguments is also partly domain-specific. For the 
evaluation of arguments, domain-specific context criteria are used to determine 
whether arguments can be accepted, challenged or preferred to other arguments (see 
section 5.3 on page 111). For instance, domain-specific elements are that arguments 
are always accepted when a person with a particular role states them or that domain 
rules based on legislation are preferred to local rules or that factual statements 
which are considered reliable are never challenged.  
Top-level arguments 
Let us first look how an agent can respond to a why P move in a persuasion 
dialogue and determine how detailed the response should be. Consider the 
following start of a persuasion dialogue: 
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p1:  claim c(2) 
o2:  why c(2)  
What is at step p3 the optimal move for agent p to promote his goals? To further the 
goal to execute the appointed police task by cooperating, p should give the 
argument as reaction to the ‘why c(2)’ move. However, to further the goal to 
protect local investigations and informants, p must give no or minimal intelligence 
data. Now assume that the complete argument for ‘c(2)’ p can construct on the 
basis of his knowledge base is ‘c(2) since c(X) <- b(X). b(X) <- a(X). a(2).’. 
The balance of goals is found by giving the minimal version of the argument (the 
top-level argument), which in this case is ‘c(2) since c(X) <- b(X). b(2).’. The 
top-level argument promotes the goal to execute the appointed police task by 
cooperating by giving an argument, while furthering the goal to protect local 
investigations and informants by giving the minimal version of the argument. 
Therefore, at step p3 agent p makes the following move: 
p3:  c(2) since c(X) <- b(X). b(2). 
Definition 12 of Amgoud et al. (2006) does not explicitly define how to construct 
top-level arguments. Therefore, the persuasion policy must be able to construct top-
level arguments from arguments. Generally, a top-level argument can be defined as:  
 
Given an argument A with conclusion c, the top-level argument Atop is the minimal 
subargument of A with conclusion c. Using the ASPIC definition of an argument 
ASPIC, the top-level can now be defined. 
 
Definition 9 Top-level arguments  
Given argument P since A1…An, its top-level argument Atop is: 
 
P since CONC(A1)…CONC(An). 
 
Challenging factual statements 
Let us comment on the design choices on how to challenge factual statements. 
Consider the following start of a persuasion dialogue: 
p1:  claim c(2) 
o2:  why c(2) 
p3:  c(2) since c(X) <- b(X). b(2). 
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If ‘b(2)’ is derivable (with sufficient force) from o’s knowledge base, then o 
should concede ‘b(2)’ to further the goal to execute the appointed police task. 
However, assume instead that nothing follows from o’s knowledge base about 
‘b(2)’. As described above, the idea is that o can apply context criteria to check 
whether ‘b(2)’ can be conceded. Assume that this check succeeds, so that o could 
concede ‘b(2)’. At first sight, it would seem that the goal to execute the appointed 
police task requires that o concedes ‘b(2)’. However, upon closer inspection it 
turns out that there are good reasons why o should instead challenge ‘b(2)’. The 
reason is that it might be that p’s argument ‘c(2) since c(X) <- b(X). b(2).’ is 
just a top-level argument and that p’s premise ‘b(2)’ is based on an other argument, 
say, ‘b(2) since b(X) <- a(X). a(2).’. Now, it might be that o has a strong 
counterargument against this argument, or that o has strong reasons to believe 
‘¬a(2)’. By challenging ‘b(2)’, o can check whether this is indeed the case.  
o4:  why b(2) 
Now assume that the factual statement ‘b(2)’ was the complete argument p can 
create, and that he cannot construct a more detailed argument for ‘b(2)’. Then p has 
to reply with the trivial argument: 
p5:  b(2) since b(2) 
At this stage, o knows that p has no further grounds for ‘b(2)’, because the 
argument is of the form ‘P since P’. If o replied at step o6 with a ‘why b(2)’move, 
then p would repeat his ‘b(2) since b(2)’ reply which causes an infinite dialogue 
loop. Therefore, in situations where an argument is of the form ‘P since P’ agents 
use their context criteria to determine whether the premise of the argument can be 
accepted. Assuming that o can accept the premises based on his context criteria, o 
concedes ‘b(2)’. 
o6:  concede b(2) 
Otherwise if o cannot accept the premises on his context criteria, o denies ‘b(2)’. 
o6: deny b(2) 
This example also illustrates why an extra speech act deny P is added to the 
communication language of Van Veenen and Prakken (2006).  
5.2.2 Specification of the persuasion policies 
Persuasion policies determine how an agent should respond to (A) arguments, (B) 
why moves and (C) claims. The persuasion policies assume that an agent reasons 
with his internal knowledge base, which can be modified as a result of concede 
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moves. Recall further that the policies assume a selection mechanism to choose the 
moves to be replied to in a dialogue, where each chosen move serves as input for 
the policies. For each applicable policy step, the policy stores the reply move in 
OutgoingMoves. When every applicable policy step is taken, the policy returns all 
the reply moves contained in OutgoingMoves.  
A: Reacting to an argument 
The general idea of responding to arguments is to start with checking the context 
criterion on role authority. If, based on this criterion, the argument must be accepted 
then the premises and the conclusion of the argument are conceded. Otherwise, the 
second step is to determine whether the conclusion can be derived from the 
knowledge base. If this is possible then the conclusion of the argument is conceded. 
Otherwise, the third step is to check whether a counterargument can be derived 
from the knowledge base. If this is possible, a top-level argument for the negated 
conclusion is returned. Finally, the premises of the argument are evaluated. 
 
1.  
IF IncomingMove = argue(S, R, Arg)  
THEN   
 
 
If the agent can derive from the context criterion on the role of the other agent 
that the argument must be accepted then he concedes the premises and the 
conclusion of the argument. Recall that the satisfiesContextCriteria function 




IF  satisfiesContextCriteria(S) 
THEN  
  FOREACH P in prem(Arg) 
   OutgoingMoves <- OutgoingMoves + concede(R, S, P) 
    
    
  OutgoingMoves <- OutgoingMoves + concede(R, S, conc(Arg)) 
 
 
Else, if the agent can derive the conclusion of the argument from his knowledge 
base, he concedes the conclusion.  
 
1.2.  
ELSEIF [KBargumentation-engine]⊢status-type conc(Arg) 
THEN  





Else, if the agent can create an undercut from his knowledge base, he returns an 
undercut for the argument. The domainrule function uses the valid(R) premise 
of the given argument to return the domain rule R used to construct the 
argument.  
 
Note that only top-level arguments are created in the policy (see page 97), 




  [KBargumentation-engine]⊢status-type ~domainrule(Arg) 
 
THEN  
  OutgoingMoves <- OutgoingMoves + argue(R, S, Arg’) 
 
  Where argument Arg’ is a top-level argument with the 
  required status (defensible or justified) which has 
  ~domainrule(Arg) as its conclusion.  
 
 
Else, if the agent can derive the negated conclusion for the argument from his 
knowledge base, he returns a top-level argument for the negated conclusion 
(see the discussion about top-level arguments in subsection 5.2.2 on page 97).  
 
1.4.  
ELSEIF [KBargumentation-engine]⊢status-type ~conc(Arg) 
THEN   
  OutgoingMoves <- OutgoingMoves + argue(R, S, Arg’) 
 
  Where argument Arg’ is a top-level argument with the 
  required status (defensible or justified) which has 
  ~conc(Arg) as its conclusion.  
 
 
Persuasion policy step 1.5 evaluates the premises of the argument. Note that the 
context criterion on role authority is not used in the evaluation of the premises 
since this is already applied in previous steps of the policy. Note also that the 
premises of an argument are always checked. 
 
1.5.  
FOR-EACH P in prem(Arg) 
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If premise P is the same as the conclusion of the argument (i.e., the argument is 
of the form P since P), then apply the remaining context criteria to determine 








If the agent can derive from the context data that premise P must be 
accepted, then he concedes P. Note that the satisfiesContextCriteria 
function now only checks P (denoting the premise). Note further that in 
this step also the agent’s knowledge base will be updated (see 
subsection 5.2.3 on page 106 for the discussion about this). 
 
1.5.1.1.  
  IF satisfiesContextCriteria(P) 
  THEN  
    OutgoingMoves <- OutgoingMoves +  
   concede(R, S, P) 
 
   updateKnowledgeBase(R, P) 
    
 
else the agent denies P. Policy step 1.5.1.2 states that premise P is 
denied if the argument is of the form P since P and it is not possible to 
concede P based on the applied context criteria, see also Challenging 
factual statements on page 97).  
 
1.5.1.2.  
  ELSE  
    OutgoingMoves <- OutgoingMoves +  
   deny(R, S, P) 
 
 




ELSEIF [KBargumentation-engine]⊢status-type P 
THEN   





else if the agent can derive ~P (the negation of P) from the knowledge 
base he returns the top-level argument for ~P, see ‘Top-level 
arguments’ on page 97. 
 
1.5.3.  
ELSEIF [KBargumentation-engine]⊢status-type ~P 
THEN   
   OutgoingMoves <- OutgoingMoves + argue(R, S, Arg’) 
 
   Where argument Arg’ is a top-level argument with 
   the required status (defensible or justified) which 
   has ~P as its conclusion. 
 
 
Policy step 1.5.4 states that if P is a premise and cannot be derived from the 
agent’s knowledge base and of the argument is not of the form P since P, 
then the agent asks why P. In policy step 1.5.4 an agent is cooperative in 




    OutgoingMoves <- OutgoingMoves + why(R, S, P) 
 
B: Reacting to a why  
The general idea for responding to why P moves is, when possible, to give an 
argument for P. 
 
2.  




At this stage in the policy, it is possible that the agent can no longer derive P 
from his knowledge base as a result from updating his knowledge during the 
processing of other parts of the dialogue. If this is the case, the agent retracts P. 
 
2.1.  
IF [KBargumentation-engine] ⊬status-type P 
THEN  
  OutgoingMoves <- OutgoingMoves + retract(R, S, P) 
 
 
Else, the agent returns a top-level argument for P. 
 





  OutgoingMoves <- OutgoingMoves + argue(R, S, Arg’) 
 
  Where argument Arg’ is a top-level argument with the 
  required status (defensible or justified) which has P  
  as its conclusion.  
 
  
C: Reacting to a claim  
The idea of responding to a claim is to start with checking the role authority 
criterion. If, based on this criterion, the agent concludes that the claim must be 
accepted then he concedes the claim. The second step is to determine whether the 
claim can be derived from the knowledge base. If this is possible then the claim is 
conceded. The third step is to check whether a counterargument for the claim can 
be derived from the knowledge base. If this is possible, a top-level argument for the 
negation of the claim is returned. If this is not possible a why move is returned  
 
3.  
ELSEIF IncomingMove = claim(S, R, P) 
 
 
If the agent can derive from the context criterion on the role of the other agent 
that the claim must be accepted, then he concedes the claim. Recall that the 
satisfiesContextCriteria function now only checks S (denoting the sending 
agent) to determine the role of the agent role. 
 
3.1.  
IF  satisfiesContextCriteria(S) 
THEN  
  OutgoingMoves <- OutgoingMoves + concede(R, S, P) 
   
 
Else, if the agent can derive the claim from his knowledge base, he concedes 
the claim.  
    
3.2.  
ELSEIF [KBargumentation-engine]⊢status-type P 
THEN  
  OutgoingMoves <- OutgoingMoves + concede(R, S, P) 
 
 
Else, if the agent can derive the negation of the claim from his knowledge base, 





ELSEIF [KBargumentation-engine]⊢status-type ~P 
THEN   
  OutgoingMoves <- OutgoingMoves + argue(R, S, Arg’) 
 
  Where argument Arg’ is a top-level argument with the 
  required status (defensible or justified) which has ~P  
  as its conclusion. 
 
 




  OutgoingMoves <- OutgoingMoves + why(R, S, P) 
 
 
Finally, in step 4, the persuasion policy returns the resulting move(s) from the 






   
The persuasion policy steps can be summarized as follows.  
 
1. If argument Arg, then 
1.1. if Arg satisfies context criterion about role authority, then concede 
premises and conclusion; 
1.2. else if KB implies conclusion Arg, then concede conclusion Arg; 
1.3. else if KB implies undercut for Arg, then state undercut argument for Arg; 
1.4. else if KB warrants counterargument for Arg, then state counterargument 
for Arg; 
1.5. check each premise P of Arg 
1.5.1. if Arg is of the form P since P, then 
1.5.1.1.  if P satisfies other context criteria (factual statements and 
domain rules), then concede P; 
1.5.1.2.  else deny P; 
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1.5.2. if KB implies P, then concede P; 
1.5.3. if KB warrants argument for ~P, then state argument for ~P; 
1.5.4. else why P; 
 
2. else if why P, then 
2.1. if KB does not imply conclusion P, then retract P;  
2.2. else give argument for P; 
 
3. else if claim P, then  
3.1. if satisfies context criterion about role authority, then concede P; 
3.2. else if KB implies P, then concede P; 
3.3. if KB implies ~P, then state argument for ~P; 
3.4. else ask why P. 
 
5.2.3 Knowledge updates 
One remaining issue in the specification of the persuasion policies is the 
determination in which cases the agent’s internal knowledge base must be updated 
because of concede or retract moves. Furthermore, as a result of knowledge base 
updates, it is possible that previous concede moves can no longer be maintained at 
later stages in dialogues. For that reason, also the cases in which (intended) concede 
moves need to be reevaluated must be determined. 
 
Let us first investigate if knowledge must be updated as a result of concede moves. 
The first case in which an agent’s knowledge possibly needs an update as result of 
making concede moves is: if the conclusion or premise of an argument is conceded 
because it is derivable from the knowledge base, should they also be added to the 
agent’s knowledge base? In this case, updating the knowledge base is not required 
since the conclusion or premise can already be derived from the knowledge base.  
 
The second case in which an agent’s knowledge base possibly needs an update as 
result of making concede moves is: if both the premises and the conclusion of an 
argument are conceded based on the role of the other agent, should they be added to 
the agent’s knowledge base? If the conclusion of an argument is added to the local 
knowledge base, then the conclusion becomes a factual statement in the knowledge 
base, which is not desired, since a conclusion has a different status than a factual 
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statement. Another option is to concede the conclusion but not add it to the 
knowledge base. This option is more desirable, since it allows for conceding moves 
based on agent role, while not changing the status of the conclusions. Moreover, 
when a conclusion is conceded based on agent role, while a justified argument 
against the conclusion can be created based on the knowledge base, then a choice 
has to be made which premise must be removed from the knowledge base to be able 
to create a justified argument for the conclusion. Choosing which premises must be 
removed from the knowledge base is a problem of belief revision (see Gärdenfors 
1992), which is beyond the scope of this thesis and is a subject for further research. 
Similar to conceding a conclusion based on agent role, it is more desirable that 
premises will not be added to the knowledge base. The policies of this research 
allow conceding both the premises and the conclusion of an argument based on 
satisfying the context criterion on agent role (see persuasion policy step 1.1 on page 
100 and step 3.1 on page 104). Since it is more desirable to not update the 
knowledge base if both the premises and the conclusion of an argument are 
conceded based on agent role, the policies of this research implement this 
preference. Recall that by using context criteria, the policies are made partly 
domain-specific. An example of satisfying a context criterion on agent role is that 
the other agent is trusted. In the Dutch police domain, both the premises and the 
conclusion of an argument are conceded if the other agent has a high authority (see 
also section 5.3 on context criteria on page 111).  
 
The third case in which an agent’s knowledge possibly needs an update as result of 
making concede moves is: if premises of an argument are conceded based on other 
criteria, should they be added to the agent’s knowledge base? The policies of the 
present research also allow conceding premises of an argument based on other 
criteria. In the Dutch police domain, example criteria for accepting premises are: 
whether the origin of the domain rule is the law or whether the supplier of the 
factual statement is reliable (see also section 5.3 on page 111). Adding those 
premises does not change their status, since premises which are conceded based on 
other context criteria are unknown domain rules or factual statements. Therefore, in 
the policies of this research, premises of an argument are added to the knowledge 
base if they are conceded based satisfying other criteria (see persuasion policy step 
1.5.1.1 on page 102). Note that the policies of the present research use the following 
method to add unknown domain rules to a knowledge base: when an agent 
concedes a valid(r) premise, he also adds domain rule r to his knowledge base. 
 
Let us next investigate if knowledge must be updated as a result of retract moves. 
The first case in which an agent’s knowledge possibly needs an update as result of 
making retract moves is: if a conclusion is retracted, should premises then be 
removed from the knowledge base? Removing premises from the knowledge base 
as a result of retracting a conclusion will also lead to belief revision problems. 
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However, this situation does not occur in the persuasion policies of the present 
research, since only premises or claims can be retracted as a possible reaction to 
why moves. The why moves can be observed in persuasion policy step 1.5.4 (page 
103) and in persuasion policy step 3.4 (page 105).  
 
The second case in which an agent’s knowledge possibly needs an update as result 
of making retract moves is: if a premise is retracted, should things be then be 
removed from the knowledge base? Similar to retracting conclusions, this will lead 
to belief revision problems. Fortunately, in the policies of the present research, 
retract moves are only made when an agent cannot derive a premise or claim as a 
result from previous knowledge base updates. This can be observed in persuasion 
policy step 2.1 (page 103), which is the only case when the policy prescribes a 
retract move. Therefore, the knowledge base does not need to be updated and belief 
revision problems do not occur. 
 
One complication is that during dialogues, previous concede moves can be 
undermined by knowledge updates at later stages. To illustrate this complication, let 
us assume that a knowledge base of o consists of the following factual statement 
and rules:  
{c(X) <- a(X) 0.1. ~c(X) <- b(X) 0.9. a(2).} 
and consider the following start of a persuasion dialogue between p and o:  
p1:  d(2) since d(X) <- c(X), b(X). c(2). b(2). 
The first premise of the argument is ‘c(2)’, which is derivable from o’s knowledge 
base. Therefore, based on persuasion policy step 1.5.2 (page 102), agent o intends 
to concede to the first premise in move o2 and puts this move in his outgoing 
moves: 
OutgoingMoves = {concede c(2)} 
For the second premise of the argument is ‘b(2)’, persuasion policy step 1.5.4 (page 
103) is applicable. Based on step 1.5.4, which states that if ‘b(2)’ is a premise and 
cannot be derived from the agent’s knowledge base and of the argument is not of 
the form P since P, he adds ‘why b(2)’ to his outgoing moves: 
OutgoingMoves = {concede c(2), why b(2)} 
Agent o has processed the incoming move and states the outgoing moves at his turn 
in the dialogue: 
o2:  concede c(2) 
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o3:  why b(2) 
At this turn, agent p chooses to react to move o3 with ‘b(2) since b(2)’ and makes 
the following move: 
p4:  b(2) since b(2) 
Assuming that b(2) satisfies agent o’s context criteria, persuasion policy step 
1.5.1.1 (page 102) is applicable. Thus o puts ‘concede b(2)’ in his outgoing moves.  
OutgoingMoves = {concede b(2)} 
At this moment o’s knowledge base is updated with the addition of factual 
statement ‘b(2)’. As a result, o’s knowledge base now consists of the following 
factual statements and rules:  
KBo = {c(X) <- a(X) 0.1. ~c(X) <- b(X) 0.9. a(2). b(2).}.  
However, at this stage o can no longer derive ‘c(2)’ because domain rule ‘~c(X) <- 
b(X)’ is stronger than ‘c(X) <- a(X)’. Thus move o2 where c(2) was conceded can 
no longer be maintained. After updating his knowledge base, agent o makes the 
following move: 
o5:  concede b(2) 
This example illustrates that it is possible that previous concede moves no longer 
can be maintained at later stages in dialogues. The concession made at dialogue step 
o2 could no longer be maintained after knowledge update after dialogue step o4. A 
pragmatic solution is to regard concedes at previous turns as definitive. This is in 
fact modeled by protocol rule R5 from chapter 4 (on page 65) which states that once 
a move is surrendered, it may not be revoked.  
 
Intended concede moves can also be undermined by knowledge updates within a 
turn. To illustrate this, let us start with the same dialogue as in the previous 
example: 
KBo = {c(X) <- a(X) 0.1. ~c(X) <- b(X) 0.9. a(2).} 
p1:  d(2) since d(X) <- c(X), b(X). c(2). b(2). 
The first premise of the argument ‘c(2)’ is derivable from o’s knowledge base. So, 
at this turn o intends to concede to the first premise and agent o puts this move in 
his outgoing moves: 
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OutgoingMoves = {concede c(2)} 
Assume next that agent o intends to concede to the second premise ‘b(2)’ of the 
argument based on reliability. In the persuasion policies of the present research, this 
move is not allowed because premises of arguments are only accepted if they have 
the form P since P. However, a persuasion policy with a different design could 
accept premises of an argument based on context criteria. Since agent o intends to 
concede to the second premise ‘b(2)’, he adds ‘concede b(2)’ to his outgoing 
moves: 
OutgoingMoves = {concede c(2), concede b(2)} 
At this moment o’s knowledge base is updated with the addition of factual 
statement ‘b(2)’. As a result, o’s knowledge base now consists of the following 
factual statements and rules:  
KBo = {c(X) <- a(X) 0.1. ~c(X) <- b(X) 0.9. a(2). b(2).}.  
However, at this stage o can no longer derive ‘c(2)’ since domain rule ‘~c(X) <- 
b(X)’ is stronger than ‘c(X) <- a(X)’.  
A practical way to solve this knowledge update complication is for every turn to 
reassess the intended concede moves before putting them in the dialogue. A way to 
reassess the intended moves is to do a knowledge update after every concession 
based on context criteria. When an intended concede is undermined by the 
knowledge update(s), the intended concede move is retracted from the outgoing 
moves. With this pragmatic solution, agent o checks his outgoing moves {concede 
c(2), concede b(2)}. The first intended concede move ‘concede c(2)’ is no 
longer possible. Therefore, this move is retracted from the outgoing moves. The 
second intended move ‘concede b(2)’ is still possible and remains in o’s outgoing 
moves. Thus with the pragmatic solution, the dialogue continues with move o2 as: 
o2:  concede b(2) 
To the best of my knowledge the complication that concede moves can be 
undermined by knowledge updates in a dialogue is a new problem. For the present 
research I have chosen for a pragmatic solution. However, in future research this 
identified knowledge update problem needs to be investigated more systematically. 
DIALOGUE POLICIES 
 111
5.3 Application of dialogue policies in the Dutch police 
domain 
This section discusses the application of the policies in an application domain. First 
the dialogue policies are made domain-specific, i.e., the evaluation of arguments 
particular for the Dutch police domain is specified. Then an example is presented to 
illustrate the policies for the Dutch police domain.  
Context criteria 
For the evaluation of arguments, domain-specific context criteria are used to 
determine whether arguments can be accepted, challenged or preferred to other 
arguments. In the Dutch police domain, three categories of context criteria can be 
discerned. The first context criteria category is related to agents, the second 
category is associated to domain rules and the third category is related to factual 
statements.  
Context criterion about agents: role authority 
The context criterion on role authority indicates the authority derived from the role 
that a person fulfils in an organization. For example, if a software agent has the role 
of someone who has a high authority in the organization then arguments from that 
agent are more easily accepted.  
Context criterion about domain rules: rule source 
The context criterion about rule source indicates the source of a domain rule. For 
instance, if the source of a domain rule is the law, then this rule will be more easily 
accepted than local interpretations. 
Context criterion about factual statements: data reliability 
The context criterion about data reliability indicates the trustworthiness of factual 
statements. For example, an argument based on an unreliable factual statement will 
not easily be accepted. As described in section 2.2 (page 13), in the police domain 
data reliability is split up into two parts: the reliability of the supplier of the data 
and the reliability of the data itself. For instance, if an informant was trustworthy in 
the past, then data originating from him will have more value and therefore the data 
supplier reliability will be evaluated as trustworthy, and if the supplied data is 
confirmed by an police officer or police report then the data itself are considered to 
be reliable. 
 
For the specification of the context criteria for the Dutch police domain, two 
algorithms are required. The first algorithm, which implements the context criterion 
on role authority, has the sending agent as parameter (denoted by S). The first 
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algorithm states that if the other agent has a high role authority, then the 
SatisfiesContextCriteria(S) returns true, in all other cases the algorithm returns 
false. When the SatisfiesContextCriteria(S) algorithm returns true, the agent 




IF roleAuthority(S) = high 
THEN  
 RETURN true 
ELSE 
 RETURN false 
 
The second algorithm, which implements the context criteria on domain rules and 
factual statements, has a premise as parameter (denoted by P). The second 
algorithm distinguishes between premises based on inference rules to apply the 
context criterion on rule source, and factual statements to apply the context criterion 
on factual statements. 
 
When the premise is an inference rule and the source of the rule is the law or a local 
interpretation of the law, then the SatisfiesContextCriteria(P) algorithm returns 
true, otherwise it returns false. When the premise is a factual statement and the 
reliability of the data is considered as true and the data supplier is considered to be 
reliable, then the SatisfiesContextCriteria(P) algorithm returns true. Note that 
data reliability value 1 (specified in the algorithm with reliabilityData(P) = 1) 
denotes that the data is considered as true, for instance because the data is verified 
by a police officer. Furthermore, reliabilityDataSupplier(P) = a denotes that the 




IF inferenceRule(P) = true 
THEN  
 IF ruleSource(P) = law OR ruleSource(P) = localInterpretation  
 THEN  
RETURN true 
 ELSE 
  RETURN false 
 
ELSE //P is a factual statement 









Example 8 terrorist assault on the queen 
Let us illustrate a combination of negotiation and persuasion dialogue policies with 
an example from the Dutch police domain. In this example (which is based on 
Example 2), the requesting agent p requests the responding agent o to offer him 
intelligence data about a terrorist group in Amsterdam which is possibly planning 
an assault on the queen. Initially the responding agent rejects his request. However, 
the requesting agent persuades him to exchange the requested data.  
 
The knowledge bases of both agents contain the following domain rules (see 
appendix section starting on page 159): rOlderThanOneYear_F, 
rExceptionalSituation_OTOY, rQueen_ES, rWpolr14a_1. The responding agent has  
‘holds( dataOlderThanOneYear(3))’ as factual statement in his knowledge base. 
The requesting agent has ‘holds(attemptAssaultQueen(3))’ as factual statement is 
his knowledge base. Furthermore, both agents have a low role authority, apply the 
context criteria specified in on page 111, and their dialogue policies use justified 
arguments in the selection of allowed moves. Note that Figure 1 gives a graphical 
representation of the reply structure of this dialogue. The dialogue starts with the 
request from agent p to agent o to give him intelligence data about a possible 
terrorist assault: 
 
p1:  request(p, o, exchangeData(o, p, terrorists, DATA_UNIT_ID),) 
 
The responding agent o finds a matching data-unit identifier (‘3’) matching 
the query. However, he rejects the request because negotiation policy step 
2.3 is applicable: 
 
IF [KBargumentation-engine ∪  
{requested(exchangeData(o, p, terrorists, 3))}] 
⊢justified  
obliged(not(exchangeData(o, p, terrorists, 3))) 
THEN  
OutgoingMoves <- OutgoingMoves +  
reject(o, p, exchangeData(o, p, terrorists, 3),) 
 
The rejection in negotiation policy step 2.3 is based upon the domain rule 
rOlderThanOneYear_F which states that it is forbidden to exchange 
requested data older than one year (see page 168) and that the found data 
unit ‘3’ is older than one year: 
 
[ 
obliged(not(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID))  
<- 
holds(dataOlderThanOneYear(DATA_UNIT_ID)), 
requested(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)), 
valid(rOlderThanOneYear_F(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)) 0.6.  





valid(rOlderThanOneYear_F(o, p, terrorists, 3)) 0.6.  
] 
⊢justified obliged(not(exchangeData(o, p, terrorists, 3))) 
 
Therefore, the responding agent o rejects the request to give agent p the 
found intelligence data about terrorist attack: 
 
o2:  reject(o, p, exchangeData(o, p, terrorists, 3),) 
 
Since the incoming move is a reject, agent p applies step 3.1 of the 
negotiation policy.  
 
Policy step 3.1 first backtracks to determine if the reject move has not been 
made before. This is the case, and therefore he reacts with a why-reject 
move that will initiate an embedded persuasion dialogue. Until it is 
terminated, no negotiation moves are allowed by the protocol: 
 
p3:  why-reject(p, o, exchangeData(o, p, terrorists, 3)) 
 
In responding to the why-reject move, agent o first applies negotiation 
policy step 4.1. In this step the negotiation policy checks if the 
argumentation system can create a justified argument for the fact it is 
forbidden to exchange the data: 
 
IF [KBargumentation-engine ∪ {requested(exchangeData(o, p, 
terrorists, 3))}] 
⊢justified obliged(not(exchangeData(o, p, terrorists, 3))) 
THEN  
  OutgoingMoves <- OutgoingMoves +  
  claim(R, S, obliged(not(Arg))) 
 
This is possible, based upon domain rule rOlderThanOneYear_F: 
 
[ 
obliged(not(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID))  
<- 
holds(dataOlderThanOneYear(DATA_UNIT_ID)), 
requested(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)), 
valid(rOlderThanOneYear_F(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)) 0.6.  
 
holds(dataOlderThanOneYear(3)). 
requested(exchangeData(o, p, terrorists, 3)). 
valid(rOlderThanOneYear_F(o, p, terrorists, 3)) 0.6.  
]  




Therefore the conclusion that it is forbidden to exchange data about 
terrorist activities is returned as the claim. 
 
o4:  claim(o, p, obliged(not(exchangeData(o, p, terrorists, 3))) 
 
Now agent p applies step 3 of the persuasion policy. Agent p cannot 
concede the claim based on his context criteria (persuasion policy step 3.1), 
since agent o has a low role authority. If the responding agent o had a high 
role authority, agent p had to concede the claim and therefore could not 
persuade the responding agent to exchange the requested data. Moreover, 
requesting agent p cannot derive the claim from his knowledge base (step 
3.2) and also cannot create a counterargument (step 3.3), so he applies step 
3.4 to ask ‘why is it forbidden to exchange that data?’. 
 
p5:  why(p, o, obliged(not(exchangeData((o, p, terrorists, 3)))) 
 
To react to the why move, agent o applies step 2.1 of the persuasion policy. 
In step 2.1, the policy first checks if the argumentation system cannot 
derive the claim (which can occur as a result of updating his knowledge 
during the processing of other parts of the dialogue); it is possible to derive 
the claim, therefore step 2.2 is applicable. In step 2.2 a top-level argument 
(which in this case equals the argument) ‘it is forbidden to exchange the 
data since the data is too old’ for the claim is returned. 
 
o6:  argue(o, p, 
 obliged(not(exchangeData(o, p, terrorists, 3))).  
 
obliged(not(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID))  
<- 
holds(dataOlderThanOneYear(DATA_UNIT_ID)), 
requested(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)), 
valid(rOlderThanOneYear_F(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)).  
 
holds(dataOlderThanOneYear(3)). 
requested(exchangeData(o, p, terrorists, 3)). 
valid(rOlderThanOneYear_F(o, p, terrorists, 3))). 
) 
 
To respond to the argument, agent p applies step 1 of the persuasion policy. 
In step 1.1 he checks if the argument can be accepted on the basis of the 
context criteria, which is not the case (similar to the response from agent p 
to move o4). Therefore, he continues with step 1.2 where he checks if he 
can derive the conclusion of the argument from his knowledge base, this 
also not the case. Step 1.3 is applicable, because he can create an undercut 
for the argument: 





  ~rOlderThanOneYear_F(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID) 
 <- 
holds(exceptionalSituation(DATA_UNIT_ID)), 






  valid(rQueen_ES(DATA_UNIT_ID)). 
 




⊢justified ~rOlderThanOneYear_F(o, p, terrorist, 3). 
 
 
The undercut argument for ~rOlderThanOneYear_F(o, p, terrorists, 3) 
is based on the domain rules rExceptionalSituation_OTOY and rQueen_ES. 
The domain rule rExceptionalSituation_OTOY (see page 170) states that in 
a exceptional situation the rule stating that it forbidden to exchange 
requested data older than one year is not applicable, and the domain rule 
rQueen_ES (see page 169) states that if there is an attempted assault on the 
head of state then an exceptional situation occurs.  
 
Based on domain rules rExceptionalSituation_OTOY, rQueen_ES and the 
factual statement ‘holds(attemptAssaultQueen(3)).’ the agent concludes 
that domain rule rOlderThanOneYear_F, is not applicable in this situation 
and puts the top-level argument  
 
argue(p, o,  
~rOlderThanOneYear_F(o, p, terrorist, 3). 
 







valid(rExceptionalSituation_OTOY(o, p, terrorists, 3)) 
) 
 




Agent p continues with step 1.5 to evaluate the premises of the argument.  
 
The first premise of the argument is ‘holds(dataOlderThanOneYear(3))’. 
Since the argument is not of the form p since p step 1.5.1 is no applicable. 
Step 1.5.2 and step 1.5.3 are not applicable since agent p cannot derive the 
premise or the negated premise of the argument. Therefore, step 1.5.4 is 
applicable, and he puts  
 
why(p, o, holds(dataOlderThanOneYear(3))) 
 
in his OutgoingMoves. (move p8 reacting to move o6) 
 
The second premise of the argument is ‘requested(exchangeData(o, p, 
terrorists, 3))’.  
Assuming that the requested action ‘requested(exchangeData(o, p, 
terrorists, 3))’ is conjoined with the knowledge during the embedded 
persuasion dialogues, agent p can derive the second premise from his 
knowledge base. Therefore, persuasion policy step 1.5.2 is applicable, and 
he puts 
 
concede(p, o, requested(exchangeData(o, p, terrorists, 3)) 
 
in his OutgoingMoves (move p9 reacting to move o6) 
 
The third premise of the argument is ‘valid(rOlderThanOneYear_F(o, p, 
terrorists, 3).’ Since the argument is not of the form p since p step 1.5.1 
is not applicable. However, he can create a justified argument which makes 
step 1.5.2 applicable, therefore he puts  
 
concede(valid(rOlderThanOneYear_F(o, p, terrorists, 3))) 
 
in the OutgoingMoves (move p10 reacting to move o6).  
 
Finally, in step 4 the policy returns the moves contained in OutgoingMoves, 
and the selection mechanism states moves at this turn in the dialogue. 
(moves p7, p8, p9 and p10). 
 
p7-o6: argue(p, o,  
~rOlderThanOneYear_F(o, p, terrorist, 3). 
 
~rOlderThanOneYear_F(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID) 
 <- 
holds(exceptionalSituation(DATA_UNIT_ID)), 
valid(rExceptionalSituation_OTOY(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)).  





valid(rExceptionalSituation_OTOY(o, p, terrorists, 3)). 
) 
 
p8-o6: why(p, o, holds(dataOlderThanOneYear(3)))  
 
p9-o6: concede(p, o, requested(exchangeData(o, p, terrorists, 3)) 
 
p10-o6:concede(valid(rOlderThanOneYear_F(o, p, terrorists, 3))) 
 
At this turn the responding agent reacts to moves p7 and p8. The selection 
mechanism of the agent first passes move p7 to the policy.  
 
For move p7, persuasion policy step 1.5 is applicable. In the evaluation the 
premises, steps 1.5.4 and 1.5.2 are applicable. Therefore, the responding 
agent makes the following moves. 
 
o11-p7:why(o, p, holds(exceptionalSituation(3)))  
 
o12-p7: concede(o, p, valid(rExceptionalSituation_OTOY(o, p, terrorists, 
3)))  
 
The selection mechanism of the agent then passes move p8 to the policy. 
For move p8, persuasion policy step 2.2 is applicable; therefore, the policy 
returns a top-level argument for holds(dataOlderThanOneYear(3)). 
 




  ) 
 
At this turn the requesting agent reacts to moves o11 and o13. The selection 
mechanism of the agent first passes move o11 to the policy.  
 
The selection mechanism of the agent then passes move o11 to the policy. 
For move o11, persuasion policy step 2.2 is applicable. Therefore he puts 
the argument  
 














in the OutgoingMoves.  
 
For move o13, persuasion policy step 1.5.1 is applicable, since the factual 
statement has a high reliability for both data and supplier and thus 
satisfying the context criteria, he puts 
  
concede(p, o, holds(dataOlderThanOneYear(3))) 
 
in his OutgoingMoves and adds the factual statement 
‘holds(dataOlderThanOneYear(3))’ to his knowledge base. 
 
Finally, in step 4 the policy returns the moves contained in OutgoingMoves, 
and the selection mechanism states moves at this turn in the dialogue 














p15-o13:concede(p, o, holds(dataOlderThanOneYear(3))) 
 
To react to the argument stated in move p14, agent o applies step 1 of the 
persuasion policy. Steps 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 are not applicable and agent o 
continues with step 1.5 to evaluate the premises of the argument.  
 
The first premise of the argument is ‘holds(attemptAssaultQueen(3))’. 
Since step 1.5.4 is applicable, he puts  
 
why(o, p, holds(attemptAssaultQueen(3))) 
 
in his OutgoingMoves (move o16 as reaction to move p14). 
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The second premise of the argument is ‘valid(rQueen_ES(3))’. Since step 
1.5.2 is applicable, he puts 
 
concede(o, p, valid(rQueen_ES(3))) 
 
in his OutgoingMoves (move o17 as reaction to move p14).  
 
Finally, in step 4 the policy returns the moves contained in OutgoingMoves, 
and the selection mechanism states those moves at this turn in the dialogue 
(move o16 and move o17 as reaction to move p14): 
 
o16-p14:why(o, p, holds(attemptAssaultQueen(3))) 
 
o17-p14:concede(o, p, valid(rQueen_ES(3))) 
 
 
At this turn the responding agent reacts to move o16 for which persuasion policy 
step 2.2 is applicable; therefore, the policy returns a top-level argument for 
holds(attemptAssaultQueen(3)). 
 






Note that move p18 illustrates that the agents trust each other, and do not only 
negotiate and persuade. 
 
Persuasion policy step 1.5.1.1 is applicable when reacting to move p18 since the 
argument is of the form p since p and satisfies his context criteria (similar to 
response p15 to move o13). Therefore:  
 
o19-p18:concede(o, p, holds(attemptAssaultQueen(3))) 
 
Furthermore, the factual statement ‘holds(attemptAssaultQueen(3))’ is added to 
his knowledge base.  
 
Agent o’s original reason for ‘obliged(not(exchangeData(o, p, terrorists, 3))’ 
is now defeated and therefore concedes to p’s negotiation. With this move the 
responding agent o backtracks to move p5, now surrendering to that move (move o20 
as reaction to move p5). This move terminates the persuasion dialogue so that 
negotiation moves are allowed again by the protocol. 
 




After move o20 the agent backtracks to move p1. Agent o now knows that it is not 
forbidden to exchange the requested data about terrorist attacks.  
Domain rule rWpolr14_a__1 states that it is obliged to exchange data with other 
CIE officers (based on the assumption that they need the data for the execution of 
the police task). Initially the argument based on domain rule rWpolr14a__1 (see 
page 159) was rebutted by an argument based on rule rOlderThanOneYear_F (see 
move o2), but is now reinstated. The argument based on rule rOlderThanOneYear_F 
is undercut by an argument based on the rExceptionalSituation_OTOY and 
rQueen_ES domain rules. Therefore, the responding agent offers to exchange data 
about terrorist attacks. 
 
o21-p1: offer(o, p, exchangeData(o, p, terrorists, 3))) 
 
The requesting agent accepts the offer. 
 
p22-o21:accept(p, o, exchangeData(o, p, terrorists, 3))) 
 
Finally, the responding agent sends the requested intelligence data about terrorist 
attacks. 
 






Figure 1: Reply structure of the terrorist attacks example 
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5.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter presented the dialogue policies for negotiation with embedded 
persuasion. The policies promote the goal to execute the police task by enabling 
more data exchanges and the goal to protect local investigations and informants. 
For example, the negotiation policy for an offer could reject requests for data if 
there is no justified argument which says that it is obliged to exchange the found 
data. However, this action is not in line with the goal to execute the police task. 
Therefore the policy tries to exchange data such that it is not forbidden to exchange 
the requested data and that the agents’ own interests are not violated. Also, when an 
agent receives a rejection, he will try to persuade the other agent to exchange 
intelligence data. A second example of how the policies promote the goal to execute 
the police task is that an agent only asks why P questions if he does not have an 
argument for P. Finally, an example of how the policies balance the goals is that 
they give the minimal version of arguments (top-level argument). Top-level 
arguments promote the goal to execute the appointed police task by cooperating by 
giving an argument (contrasted to not saying anything at all, or simply lying), while 
furthering the goal local investigations and informants by giving the minimal 
version of the argument. 
 
Assumptions about cooperativeness and data protection are applicable in all 
domains where data is exchanged between organizations. Therefore those 
assumptions are “hard coded” into the policies. The dialogue policies are partly 
domain-specific in that the required status types (justified or defensible) of 
arguments and context criteria to evaluate arguments are parameterized. The next 
chapter presents a multi-agent system architecture where the dialogue policies are 
implemented to optimize regulated data exchange. 
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Chapter 6  
Specification and implementation of the 
MAS architecture 
This chapter describes the specification and implementation of the multi-agent 
system architecture for the Dutch police domain19. In section 6.1 the design of the 
multi-agent system and individual agent architecture is presented. In section 6.2 the 
implementation of the agent architecture is discussed. 
6.1 MAS architecture design 
This section discusses the design of the multi-agent system architecture. First the 
high-level architecture of the multi-agent system for data exchange between 
criminal investigation units is described (6.1.1). Then the architecture of an 
individual agent is specified (6.1.2). 
6.1.1 Multi-agent system architecture 
Figure 2 gives a high-level view of the multi-agent architecture consisting of a 
requesting and a responding agent. In this architecture, the requesting agent 
requests for data and the responding agent responds to requests from the requesting 
agent. Both agents have access to their data sources within their local organization 
and act on behalf of their users. In the Dutch police domain, typical users are CIE 
officers who want to gather or protect intelligence data about severe crime. The 
agents communicate with other agents through the agent communication channel. 
Given that the architecture consists of two agents, multi-agent issues such as how 
agents can locate each other and how to communicate with multiple agents do not 
occur in the present situation. An assumption for the multi-agent architecture is that 
agents trust each other (see section 2.4 on page 18). Therefore, security issues such 
as identification (how is an agent identified), authentication (verifying the identity 
                                                        
19 Note that this chapter is based on earlier work published in Dijkstra et al. (2007) . 
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of an agent) and authorization (who is qualified to access a data source) are subject 



























Figure 2: The multi-agent architecture 
 
 
When user 1 from organization P (see Figure 2) wants to obtain data from 
organization O, he submits a search query to agent p. On behalf of user 1, the 
requesting agent p will request data from agent o. The responding agent o will 
search in data source 2 for data matching the request. Depending on his knowledge, 
agent o can give the following responses to agent p: that that no matching are data 
found, that data is found which can be exchanged, that data is found which can only 
be exchanged under certain conditions, or that data is found which cannot be 
exchanged. In the present research, the focus is on scenarios where data is found but 
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where the responding agent infers that the found data can only be exchanged under 
certain conditions (as illustrated in Example 1: source protection & analysis 
purposes on page 33) and on scenarios where the responding agent infers that the 
found data cannot be exchanged (as illustrated in Example 3: the investigation 
protection & national importance on page 36). 
 
As described in section 3.3 (page 47), dialogues between agents about regulated 
data exchange are interpreted as dialogues starting as a negotiation that may shift to 
embedded persuasion. The dialogue protocol suitable for the required interactions 
was specified and formalized in chapter 4. The policies for the negotiation and 
persuasion dialogues were specified and formalized in chapter 5. Recall that the key 
idea of the dialogue policies is that they prescribe the best reaction during the 
dialogues, i.e., the reaction which is expected to further the different goals while 
respecting the attitude of the criminal investigation unit towards data exchange.  
 
To allow this research to be generalizable to other domains, such as to regulated 
data exchange in the medical domain or between tax authorities, terminology 
specific to the Dutch police is abstracted in the MAS architecture. In the Dutch 
police domain, data is divided into separate registrations, which in turn consist of 
mutations (see section 2.2 on page 13). Based upon the assumption (see section 2.4 
on page 18) that data is stored in local severe-crime registers, registers will be 
abstracted as data sources and mutations as data units. A data unit is a grouped 
piece of data, which has an associated identifier. The data usage codes (see 
subsection 2.4.3 on page 25) are abstracted as metadata used to describe data. 
Furthermore, the criminal investigation units are abstracted as organizations. The 
agents have an ontology (Gruber 1993) of the domain to represent knowledge of the 
data sources, applicable regulations and to be able to exchange data. Ontology 
research is a broad research area, for example how to achieve interoperability 
between concepts belonging to heterogeneous ontologies, which is commonly 
called ontology alignment (Euzenat 2004). In this multi-agent system architecture, 
all agents use the same ontology of the domain so problems with different 
ontologies are avoided.  
6.1.2 Individual agent architecture 
This section describes the components of an individual agent (see Figure 3).  
A: Communication modules 
The user communication module provides for the external communication with the 
user of the agent. The external input is a query from the user and the external output 
is the outcome of the interaction between software agents. Internally, the user 
communication module parses the queries and the outcomes of the agent 
interactions between the execution cycle module and the user. For example, assume 
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that a CIE officer wants to gather intelligence data about Soprano from another 
criminal investigation unit. First the CIE officer enters ‘Soprano’ as a search query. 
Then the software agent will, on behalf of his CIE officer, search for intelligence 
data about Soprano. While searching for data, the software agent will interact with 
the software agent from the other criminal investigation unit. During the interaction, 
the software agent will sometimes negotiate and persuade to try to obtain all 
available data about Soprano. When interaction between the agents has ended, the 
agent will present the outcome of the interaction to his user.  
 
The data source communication module is responsible for the communication with 
the external data source. The external data source contains data units and data-unit 
identifiers referring to those data units. A data unit is a grouped piece of data and 
has metadata to describe it. 
 
The agent communication module provides for the communication with other 
agents and parses messages for further processing in the agent execution cycle. The 
data-unit identifiers are also used in the communication with other agents to refer 
anonymously to data units. 
B: Execution cycle module 
The execution cycle module processes messages from the agent, data and user 
communication modules, and from the move selector module. If an incoming 
message is a move originating from the agent communication module and the move 
is a request, then the move is first instantiated with a matching data-unit identifier 
(by calling the data source communication module). If the incoming message is an 
accept move, then the data unit corresponding to the data-unit identifier data is sent 
to the agent communication module by obtaining it from the data source 
communication module. Except for the accept and withdraw moves, the execution 
cycle module passes all incoming moves on to the move selector module. Finally, 
the outcome of a dialogue is passed on to the user communication module, which 
presents the outcome to the user of the requesting agent.  
C: Move selector module 
The move selector module processes the incoming moves from the execution cycle 
module and chooses the moves which will be replied to in a dialogue. The chosen 
moves, in turn, are passed on to the dialogue policies module. 
 



































Figure 3: Individual agent architecture 
 
D: Dialogue policies module 
The dialogue policies module is called from the move selector module and 
prescribes the best reactions to each chosen move to fulfill the agent goals during 
negotiation and persuasion dialogues. When an agent is in a requesting role, he uses 
his dialogue policies module to try to fulfill his goal to gather intelligence data for 
his appointed police task. A scenario is Example 3 (page 36). In this scenario, the 
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responding agent initially rejects the request for intelligence data. A possible 
reaction could be that the requesting agent accepts the rejection. However, since the 
requesting agent wants to gather as much data as possible, he will react by asking 
for the reason for the rejection. This reaction starts an embedded persuasion 
dialogue where the requesting agent tries to persuade the responding agent to 
exchange data. When the agent is in a responding role, he uses the dialogue policies 
module to deliberate how such an exchange will affect his goal to protect local data 
and his goal to execute his appointed police task as well. For instance, in Example 1 
(page 33) the responding agent could simply reject the request for data, which 
fulfills his goal to protect local investigations or informants. Another response is to 
offer the found data under the condition that the data will only be used for analysis 
purposes, which also promotes the goal to execute the appointed police task. In this 
scenario, the policy prescribes the exchange data for analysis purposes. The 
dialogue policies module is also used to respond to the other agent during 
embedded persuasion dialogues (for instance, attacking an argument).  
E: Context criteria module 
The dialogue policies module calls the context criteria component to decide 
whether arguments containing new knowledge can be accepted, challenged or 
preferred to other arguments. For this decision, the context criteria module applies 
the implemented criteria specific for the chosen application domain.  
F: Knowledge base updater module 
The dialogue policies module calls the knowledge updater module when knowledge 
must be updated. The knowledge base updater in turn adds the new knowledge to 
the knowledge base of the argumentation engine.  
G: Argumentation system module 
The argumentation system module consists of an argumentation engine and a 
knowledge base. The knowledge base contains the knowledge of the relevant 
regulations for data exchange, the local interpretations of those regulations, the 
goals of the agents and how actions can violate or promote those goals. The 
knowledge base also contains data-unit identifiers, which are references to the data 
units in the external database. Each agent has his own knowledge base, which is not 
directly accessible for other agents 
6.2 Implementation  
This section briefly describes the implementation of the MAS architecture for 
regulated data exchange between CIE officers in the Dutch police domain.  
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The functionality of the components from the architecture is partly implemented. 
The dialogue policies, knowledge base updater and context criteria modules are 
implemented in Java as a set of forward chaining if-then rules. The execution cycle 
module is implemented in Java as a while loop. For the argumentation system 
component, the argumentation engine is implemented by embedding the ASPIC 
inference engine (see subsection 4.1.1 on page 53) as a Java object. The ASPIC 
inference engine can be downloaded from http://aspic.cossac.org/components.html. 
Recall from section 5.1 that the negation policy uses abductive reasoning to find a 
condition under which a new offer can be made. However, the ASPIC inference 
engine does not support abductive reasoning; for that reason this is done manually 
in the current implementation. The knowledge base of the argumentation system 
component is implemented as an ASCII file, which specifies the rules and factual 
statements in the prolog-like syntax of ASPIC (see Appendix 1 on page 159).  
 
Let us illustrate the implementation with the start of the dialogue presented in 
Example 8 from page 113 (which in turn is based on Example 2: the terrorist assault 
on the queen example). The dialogue starts with the request from agent p to agent o 
to give him intelligence data about a terrorist group: 
 
p1:  request(p, o, exchangeData(o, p, terrorists, DATA_UNIT_ID),) 
 
The responding agent processes the incoming message as follows. The execution 
cycle module calls the communication module, which returns the incoming 
message parsed as a move. Since the performative of the move is a request, the 
execution cycle module calls the data source communication component to retrieve 
a data-unit identifier matching the request. In this case the data source 
communication module returns 3 as the matching data-unit identifier, and the 
execution cycle instantiates the move as  
 
request(p, o, exchangeData(o, p, terrorists, 3),). 
 
After the instantiation, the execution cycle module calls the move selector module. 
The move selector selects the instantiated move as the move to be replied to and 
calls the dialogue policies module. The ASPIC reasoner is in turn called by the 
dialogue policies module to determine whether the reasoner can create a justified 
argument for  
 
obliged(not(exchangeData(o, p, terrorists, 3),). 
 
Figure 4 shows a graph of the justified argument that the ASPIC reasoner creates 
for the conclusion that it is forbidden to exchange the found data unit 3 about 
terrorists. 





Figure 4: ASPIC reasoner 
 
 
Figure 4 also illustrates that the ASPIC reasoner substitutes  
 




~obliged(exchangeData(o, p, terrorists, 3)) 
 
using the [r4] axiom (see subsection 4.1.2 on page 61). The reasoner then 
determines that the argument for 
 
~obliged(exchangeData(o, p, terrorists, 3),)  
 
successfully rebuts the argument for  
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obliged(exchangeData(o, p, terrorists, 3),) 
 
as illustrated by the green marking in Figure 4. As a results, the ASPIC reasoner 
returns ‘yes’ to the policy call (indicating that it is possible to create a justified 
argument). Therefore, the dialogue policies module (see step 2.3 on page 90) 
returns a reject move to the move selector module. The execution cycle module 
then calls the agent communication module to send the reject move the other agent. 
 
o2:  reject(o, p, exchangeData(o, p, terrorists, 3),) 
 
6.3 Chapter summary 
This chapter presented the specification and implementation of the multi-agent 
system architecture for the Dutch police domain. Section 6.1 presented the design 
of the multi-agent system and individual agent architecture. The architecture 
abstracts terminology specific to Dutch police domain in order for the architecture 
to be generalizable to other domains. Section 6.2 discussed a partial implementation 
of the agent architecture. Subsection 8.2.1 will discuss whether the proposed multi-
agent system can genuinely support automated regulated data exchange in practice. 
First, however, the next chapter will discuss related research on the subject of 




Chapter 7  
Related research 
This chapter discusses related research on the topic of agents engaging in 
argumentation dialogues to regulate data exchange. Section 7.1 discusses two 
papers of Parsons, Wooldridge and Amgoud (2002; 2003), since they also 
investigated policies for argumentation dialogues. Section 7.2 discusses the 
research of Perrussel et al. (2007), because they also view interactions about 
exchanging data as argumentation. Similar to Perrussel et al., Doutre, McBurney 
and Wooldridge (2005) model regulated data exchange in the medical domain as 
argumentation. However, Doutre et al. (2005) is a research abstract, which does not 
provide sufficient details for a comparison. Therefore, Doutre et al.’s research will 
not be further discussed in this chapter. Section 7.3 discusses the research of 
Buchanan et al. (2010), because they have a different approach to support 
automated regulated data exchange. (i.e., instead of formalizing the written 
regulations and the legal reasoning process , Buchanan et al. propose to mimic its 
outcomes). 
7.1 Parsons, Wooldridge, and Amgoud  
Parsons, Wooldridge, and Amgoud (2002; 2003) analyzed information-seeking, 
inquiry and persuasion dialogues from the typology of dialogue types defined by 
Walton and Krabbe (1995). The authors specified protocols for the analyzed 
dialogue types and examined some properties of each protocol. Furthermore, 
Parsons et al. defined a set of performatives and dialogue policies which relate what 
arguments an agent can construct and what performatives he can make. Parsons et 
al. were the first who studied formal dialogue policies for argumentation dialogues 
and called them “agent attitudes”. To compare Parson’s dialogue policies with the 
policies of the present research, let us first investigate the differences in the 
underlying argument and dialogue game systems for persuasion dialogues. 
 
The main difference between the argumentation systems is the used logical 
language: Parsons et al.’s system uses a propositional logic language, while the 
system proposed in this thesis uses ASPIC as logical language. Contrary to the 
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propositional language of Parsons et al., the ASPIC language supports defeasible 
rules (see subsection 4.1.1 on page 53). With deductive rules only premises can be 
attacked. Furthermore, when premises of an argument (constructed with deductive 
rules) are conceded then the conclusion must be conceded too. In the police 
domain, it is necessary that conclusions of arguments and domain rules used to 
create arguments can be attacked (see Example 2: the terrorist assault on the queen 
on page 34); these requirements are supported by the ASPIC language (see 
subsection 4.1.1 on page 53). ASPIC also supports variables, which enables 
reasoning about the validity of rules. A minor difference is the underlying 
semantics argumentation logic. In Parsons et al. the acceptability of individual 
arguments is defined with grounded semantics, while the present research also 
allows for preferred semantics (see the discussion about the supported argument 
games by ASPIC on page 61).  
 
Let us next compare the communication language of Parsons et al.’s dialogue 
system with the present system. Table 5 compares the speech acts of Parsons et al.’s 
persuasion system with the persuasion speech acts of the proposed system and 
Figure 5 specifies the persuasion protocol of Parsons et al. The communication 
language of Parsons et al. consists of assert, accept, and challenge performatives. 
Both assert and accept performatives can be used with propositions (denoted by P) 
and with sets of propositions (denoted by S). Though the communication language 
of Parsons et al. does not explicitly define arguments, their assert(S) speech act has 
a meaning similar to the argue(Arg) speech act of the system of this thesis. When 
looking at Parsons et al’s persuasion protocol described in Figure 5, it can be 
observed in step 4 that an agent can only assert S when a previous assertion of a 
proposition P is challenged. Since the combination of assert(P) and assert(S) is 
built in a similar way as claim(P) and argue(Arg), assert(P) can be regarded as 
similar to claim(P) and assert(S) regarded as similar to argue(Arg). In contrast to 
Parsons et al.’s system, the communication language of the present framework does 
not allow for accepting sets of premises with a single speech act. However, the 
present system’s persuasion policies can evaluate all the premises of the speech act 
within a single turn. Therefore this speech act is not required in the present 
research. Furthermore, Parsons et al.’s persuasion protocol does not utilize their 




Table 5: Comparison of the persuasion communication languages 
Parsons et al. 
Framework 
 Present Framework 
assert(P) ≈ claim(P) 
assert(S) ≈ argue(Arg)  
accept(P) ≈ concede(P) 
accept(S) ≈  
challenge(P) ≈ why(P) 
 
 
1. A asserts P. 
2. B accepts P if his acceptance attitudes allows, if not B assert ¬P if he is 
allowed to, or otherwise he challenges P. 
3. If B asserts ¬P, then goto 2 with the agent roles reversed and ¬P in place 
of P. 
4. If B has challenged, then: 
a. A asserts S, the support for P; 
b. Goto 2 for each s ∈ S in turn. 
5. B accepts P if his acceptance attitude allows, or the dialogue terminates. 
Figure 5: Specification of the persuasion protocol of Parsons et al. 
 
Let us next compare the protocol design of Parsons et al.’s (see Figure 5) and the 
present system. As discussed in chapter 4 on page 70, the system proposed in this 
thesis uses a multi-move and multi-reply protocol. Parsons et al. also uses a multi-
move and multi-reply protocol, though in Parsons et al. those properties are only 
applicable to replies to assert(S) moves. For example, if a player asserts S, then the 
other player makes a move for every S’ ∈ S (see step 4.b of their persuasion 
protocol) before the turn shifts, therefore their system uses a multi-move protocol. 
Furthermore, since the assert S is a single move which is replied to with moves for 
every S’ ∈ S, their protocol is designed as a multi-reply protocol. However, the 
proposed protocol allows for alternative replies to the same claim or argument, 
where in Parsons et al.’s protocol a player has only one chance to respond to the 
same claim or premise. Note that the notion of who is on the winning side is not 
used in the protocol of Parsons et al., thus determining whether their protocol is 
immediate or non-immediate reply is not applicable. 
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Now the dialogue policies of both systems can be compared. Parsons et al. 
distinguish two types of agent attitudes for persuasion: assertion attitudes determine 
if something can be asserted (or claimed or argued in the system of this thesis) and 
acceptance attitudes determine whether something can be accepted (or conceded in 
the present system). An agent can have one of the following three assertion 
attitudes. 
• A confident agent can assert any proposition P for which he can construct 
an argument. 
• A careful agent can assert any proposition P for which he can construct an 
argument and he cannot construct a stronger argument for ¬P. 
• A thoughtful agent can assert any proposition P for which he can construct 
a justified argument. 
 
An agent can have one of following the three acceptance attitudes. 
• A credulous agent can accept proposition P for which he can construct an 
argument. 
• A cautious agent can accept any proposition P for which he can construct 
an argument and he cannot construct a stronger argument for ¬P. 
• A thoughtful agent can accept any proposition P for which he can construct 
a justified argument. 
 
In comparing the dialogue policies of Parsons et al. with the policies of the present 
research, the following differences can be noted. First Parsons et al. only define 
policies for persuasion dialogues, while in the present approach also defines 
policies for negotiation dialogues. In addition Parsons et al.’s persuasion policies 
are incorporated in their protocols, while in the present research they part of the 
agent design. By keeping the dialogue policies part of the agent design, the 
proposed protocol does not refer to an agent’s internal state, which enables to verify 
an agent’s allowed moves externally (Walton and Krabbe 1995). Moreover the 
persuasion policies of the present research allow for more complex dialogues since 
they have a richer logic and communication language. Furthermore, in contrast to 
the dialogue policies of Parsons et al., the policies of the present research allow for 
domain-specific context criteria to determine whether arguments can be accepted, 
challenged or preferred to other arguments (see section 5.3 on page 111). An 
example from the Dutch police domain illustrating the need to allow for domain-
specific context criteria is that arguments originating from police officers with a 
high authority are always accepted. What is more, as described in Prakken (2006), 
dialogues based on the system of Parsons et al. tend to be one-sided since only one 
player can build his arguments.  
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Finally when a policy requires an agent to construct arguments, in the present 
research an agent only reasons with his initial knowledge base plus the propositions 
that he has explicitly conceded to in the persuasion dialogue, while in Parsons et al. 
an agent must also reason with everything the other agent has said, regardless of 
whether he has conceded to this or not. Therefore, in the system of Parsons et al. it 
is possible to force another agent to reason with any proposition, which is 
impossible with the dialogue policies of the present research. For example, assume 
that both players have a thoughtful attitude and that the proponent p has {b <- ¬a. 
¬a.} as his knowledge base and the opponent o has {a.} as his knowledge base. 
Now consider the following start of a dialogue between p and o. 
p1: claim b 
The best move for the opponent in step o2 is why b (or challenge b in the 
communication language of Parsons et al.) since this move will reveal that p uses 
¬a, which conflicts with o’s knowledge base. However, at this stage opponent o has 
to reason with his own knowledge base conjoined with the commitments of 
proponent p ({a.} ∪ {b.}). As a response the initial claim, opponent o applies step 
2 of Parsons et al.’s persuasion protocol, and has to concede b because o has a 
thoughtful acceptance attitude and can create a justified argument for b. {b.}. 
Furthermore, it is easy to verify that if o has a thoughtful acceptance attitude then it 
also holds that o has to concede b if he has a cautious or credulous attitude.  
?o2: concede b 
When the persuasion policies of the approach the present research are applied 
(assuming that o will not accept the claim based on his context criteria), o continues 
with policy step 3.4 and in this step o makes the preferred move: 
O2: why b 
To summarize the comparison with Parsons et al., the present research is more 
extensive because of the richer logic and language, and because of the additional 
policies for negotiation. Moreover, the present research allows for agents to decide 
whether new knowledge can be accepted using domain-specific context criteria. 
Finally the present protocol is more flexible because it allows agents to explore 
alternative moves and it avoids the one-sidedness of Parsons et al.’s persuasion 
protocol. 
7.2 Perrussel et al.  
Perrussel et al. (2007) also view agent interactions about gaining access to sensitive 
data as argumentation dialogues. Similar to the present research, they model how 
two agents, a server (responding agent) and a client (requesting agent), try to 
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persuade each other whether data can be exchanged in cases when a server refuses a 
request. 
 
Let us investigate the differences between the present research and Perrussel et al. 
The first difference is the way the interactions between agents are viewed. As 
presented in section 3.3 (page 49), interactions are modeled starting as a 
negotiation, which may shift to embedded persuasion if the requesting agent tries to 
persuade the responding agent that he is wrong about a rejection. When the 
negotiation terminates successfully, it is followed up with an information-seeking 
dialogue. Perrussel et al. view the interactions starting as information-seeking, 
which may shift to persuasion, and eventually shifts back to information-seeking. In 
contrast to Perrussel et al., the interaction model of the present research leaves room 
for negotiation, including the possibility of stating a condition to accept a request. 
 
The second difference is the specification of arguments, Perrussel et al. leave the 
internal structure of arguments unspecified, while the present research applies 
ASPIC as a logic for defeasible argumentation and as knowledge representation 
language to define and reason with arguments. For the present research the structure 
of arguments needs to be specified, since the modeling of data exchange in the 
Dutch police domain required an analysis of permissions and the relations between 
goals, actions and possible consequences other goals. In the present research those 
permissions, goals and actions are explicitly modeled in the ASPIC language. 
Furthermore, the argumentation framework of Perrussel et al. requires that agents 
share the same set of arguments, while in the present research agents have 
individual knowledge bases from which they can construct their own arguments.  
 
The third difference is the way the moves are specified. To illustrate the 
differences, each dialogue move presented in Perrussel et al. is compared with a 
similar move from the present research. As for notation, X indicates the requesting 
agent, Y indicates the responding agent and DATA_UNIT_ID denotes the data-unit 
identifier. Note that to denote the actual data unit corresponding with the data-unit 
identifier, Perrussel et al. use <content DATA_UNIT_ID >, while the present 
research uses DATA_UNIT. Furthermore, in the move notation I denotes the 
permission to have access to the data unit, elements A and C denote the action and 
the condition, and Arg denotes an argument. In the comparison of similar moves, 
the first bullet describes the meaning of the move in Perrussel et al.’s system, and 
the second bullet specifies the move with a similar meaning from the present 
research.  
 
openDialogue(X, Y) ≈  




• In the present research no move is defined for opening a dialogue, since a 
request move implicitly initiates a dialogue. 
 
ask(X, Y, DATA_UNIT_ID) ≈ request(X, Y, A, C) 
• Requesting agent X asks responding agent Y to provide him with data. 
• Requesting agent X asks responding agent Y to perform action A (for 
example provide him with data), under condition C. 
 
tell(Y, X, <content DATA_UNIT_ID >) ≈ sendData(Y, X, DATA_UNIT) 
• Responding agent Y provides requesting agent X the actual data unit 
corresponding with data-unit identifier DATA_UNIT_ID. 
• Responding agent Y provides the data unit to requesting agent X.  
 
dontTell(Y, X, DATA_UNIT_ID) ≈ reject(Y, X, A, C) 
• Responding agent Y indicates to requesting agent X that he cannot provide 
agent X with data corresponding with DATA_UNIT_ID. 
• Responding agent Y rejects the request or offer from requesting agent X to 
perform action A (for example, provide him with data) under condition C. 
 
endDialogue(Y, X) ≈ withdraw 
• Responding agent Y indicates to requesting agent X that he wants to leave 
the dialogue.  
• An agent indicates he wants to leave the dialogue. 
 
argue(X, Y, I, Arg, DATA_UNIT_ID) ≈ argue(X, Y, Arg)  
• Requesting agent X gives to responding agent Y an argument Arg stating 
why the permission to access DATA_UNIT_ID should be equal to value I, 
where I can have value 1 or 0. 
• Requesting agent X states argument Arg to responding agent Y. 
 
Perrussel et al. have no counterparts for the following moves: claim(X, Y, P), 
why(X, Y, P), concede(X, Y, P), retract(Y, X, P), and deny(X, Y, P). This move 
comparison illustrates that the communication language of the present research is 
more expressive than Perrussel et al.’s research. 
 
To illustrate how moves with arguments can be represented in both dialogue 
systems, consider the following example: agent o gives the argument to agent p that 
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it is not permitted to exchange Robert’s health record, because Robert has given his 
Doctor limited consent to exchange his health information. With the system of 
Perrussel et al., this example can be represented as: 
 
argue(o, p, 0, Arg1, robert’s health record)  
 
Where Arg1 informally denotes: “Robert has only given his doctor limited consent 
to exchange his health record information”. Note that in Perrussel et al. the internal 
structure of Arg1 cannot be specified explicitly.  
 
With the system proposed in this research, this example can be represented as: 
 
 argue(o, p, 
 obliged(not(exchangeData(o, p, robert’s health record, 2))).  
 
obliged(not(exchangeData(X, Y, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID))  
<- 
 
holds(limitedConsent(DATA_UNIT_ID, PATIENT, DOCTOR)), 
requested(exchangeData(X, Y, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)), 
valid(rLimitedConsent(X, Y, QUERY,DATA_UNIT_ID, 
PATIENT,DOCTOR)).  
 
holds(limitedConsent(2, robert, o)). 
requested(exchangeData(o, p, robert’s health record, 2)). 
valid(rLimitedConsent(o,p,robert’s health record,2,robert,o))). 
) 
 
Where ‘obliged(not(exchangeData(o, p, robert’s health record, 2))).’ denotes that it 
is forbidden for agent o to exchange the data unit 2 matching query ‘robert’s health 
record’ with agent p. 
 
In the two representations of the example, several differences in the move 
specification can be observed. First, in Perrussel et al. the persuasion topic is fixed 
to convincing the other agent about the permission to access data. For example, 
argue(o, p, 1, Arg, d) represents that agent o gives argument Arg to agent p why he 
should have permission to access d, while argue(p, o, 0, Arg, d) denotes that agent 
p gives argument Arg to agent o why he cannot have permission to access d. In the 
present research, the persuasion topic is not restricted to convincing the other agent 
about the permission to access data (any action is possible) and other deontic 
modalities besides permission can be expressed. Moreover, since Perrussel et al. do 
not specify the internal structure of arguments, no moves related to the internal 
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structure are listed in their paper. The present research does specify moves related 
to argument structure, which allows attacking or surrendering to premises of 
arguments.  
 
The fourth difference is the protocol design. The protocol of Perrussel et al. can be 
summarized as follows. When an agent wants to initiate a dialogue to obtain data 
from another agent, he starts with making an openDialogue move followed with an 
ask move, When a responding agent receives an ask move and controls the 
requested data, he will exchange the data using the tell move if the requesting agent 
has permission to access the data. After the responding agent has provided data, he 
closes the dialogue by making the endDialogue move. When a responding agent 
receives an ask move and does not control the requested data, he will end the 
dialogue using the endDialogue move. When a responding agent receives an ask 
move and controls the requested data, he refuses to exchange the data using the 
dontTell move if the requesting agent has no permission to access the data. After 
the refusal of the responding agent, he has to motivate his refusal, which starts the 
argumentation stage of the dialogue. During the argumentation stage, the agent to-
move gives all the counter arguments for the received argument(s) for every turn. If 
one agent cannot counterattack anymore, the other agent has won. When the 
requesting agent has won, the responding agent changes the permission and 
exchanges the requested data.  
 
Similar to the system of the present research, Perrussel et al.’s system uses a multi-
move and multi-reply reply protocol. For instance, every dialogue according to the 
system of Perrussel et al. begins with the requesting agent making two moves 
before the turn shifts, therefore their system uses a multi-move protocol. 
Furthermore, their system utilizes a multi-reply protocol since agents give all 
counterargument moves for a received argument. Note that the notion of who is on 
the winning side in a dialogue is not applied in the protocol of Perrussel et al., 
therefore nothing can be said about whether their protocol is immediate or non-
immediate reply. 
 
The fifth difference is that, contrary to Perrussel et al., the system of this research 
allows agents to learn from each other. In Perrussel et al. agents share all 
arguments, while in system proposed in this research agents can update their 
knowledge bases after concede moves. To illustrate the importance of this feature, 
recall Example 2: the terrorist assault on the queen from page 34. In this example 
the responding agent initially refuses to exchange data. However, after the 
responding agent learns from the requesting agent that the request is an exceptional 
situation, he offers the requested data. 
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The sixth difference is that only the present research allows for domain-specific 
context criteria to determine whether arguments can be accepted, challenged or 
preferred to other arguments (see section 5.3 on page 111).  
 
The seventh difference is that Perrussel et al. do not address dialogue policies. Their 
protocol even seems to be deterministic; in that case there is no point having 
dialogue policies since they are used to specify the best choice from the moves 
allowed by the protocol. 
 
To summarize, both approaches view agent interactions to gain access to sensitive 
data as argumentation dialogues. However, the present research allows for 
negotiation and stating conditions during dialogues. As for argument specification, 
Perrussel et al. leave the internal structure of arguments unspecified, while the 
present research applies ASPIC as a logic and knowledge representation language 
to specify goals, actions and permissions. Furthermore, the system proposed in this 
research uses a richer communication language and specifies dialogue policies, 
which are absent in Perrussel et al. Therefore, more elaborate discussions are 
allowed, such as exchanging counter-counter arguments about a subconclusion. 
Moreover, in the system of this research, the persuasion topic is not restricted to 
convincing the other agent about having permission to access data. Finally, in 
contrast to Perrussel et al., the system proposed in this research allows agents to 
learn from each other and to use domain-specific context criteria determine whether 
arguments can be accepted, challenged or preferred to other arguments. 
7.3 Buchanan et al.  
Buchanan et al. (2010) also observe that regulated data exchange between 
organizations is often suboptimal. In theory, the regulation of data exchange should 
ensure that the privacy of the persons who are the subjects of the data is protected 
and that an optimal balance can be found between the different goals the 
organizations try to achieve. However, in practice this is not always realized 
because the norms from regulations are not well known and local policies are more 
aimed at the protection of local data, which results in not enough legitimate and too 
many illegitimate data exchanges. In Scotland, the norms expressing the necessity 
for organizations to exchange data are not well known because acts such as the 
Health and Social Care Act 2001, Police Reform Act 2002, Community Care Act 
2003 and the Children Act 2004 are too unspecific for practical use for not legally 
trained personnel. Information-sharing agreements are used by the data exchanging 
organizations to operationalize the law. However, the information-sharing 
agreements strive to cover every possible situation and have become so complex 
and detailed that they are rarely used by the Scottish organizations. Furthermore, 
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the regulations give only vague guidance on how to balance competing goals. 
Buchanan et al. also give an example, which nicely illustrates how goals can 
conflict. In the example, a social worker, trying to establish a trust relation with a 
client will be hesitant to pass on information about low level drug dealing to the 
police, if he fears that the information will result police in activity that would make 
his work impossible (Richardson and Asthana 2006).  
 
Buchanan et al. propose an information-sharing framework to support regulated 
data exchange. In this framework, they use the concept of single point of contact 
(SPoC) to serve as a data gateway between organizations, which is implemented as 
a SPoC agent. A SPoC agent is similar to a responding agent in the system of this 
research in that both agents validate requests. Moreover, both systems support 
regulatory compliance, since they validate requests based on domain rules derived 
from the legal framework and local policies and agreements. For their information-
sharing framework Buchanan et al. propose that exchanging organizations have an 
information-sharing agreement which defines a role-based architecture and a syntax 
for information requests, where SPoC (Single Point-of-Contact) agents control the 
exchange of data. The roles identify who need access to information in order to 
fulfill their tasks and the SPoC agents validate requests using the domain rules 
defined by information-sharing agreements.  
 
Lessig (1999) popularized the idea to let computer software force users to act 
according the applicable regulations by embedding legal concepts directly into the 
code (i.e., the source code of computer software). However, this approach only 
works in domains where the regulations have few open-textured terms and give few 
discretionary powers. Instead of embedding legal concepts directly into code or 
modeling the written regulations and the legal reasoning process used in the 
balancing act between the different goals each organization tries to fulfill, 
Buchanan et al. propose to mimic its outcomes. The outcomes are domain rules for 
specific classes of situations and are the result of the balancing act for those types 
of situations. The outcomes are acquired using empirical methods such surveying 
personnel and those outcomes are formalized using the syntax of an information-
sharing agreement. Buchanan et al. state that the representations need to be 
validated by legal experts to be consistent with the legal framework. Their reason 
for choosing to model the outcomes of the legal reasoning process is that - in the 
short term - it can have a greater impact than explicit modeling of the legal 
reasoning process. Buchanan et al.’s approach is to use context levels for a request, 
where the information-sharing agreement defines the rights based on the context of 
the request. Buchanan et al. give the example that the rights to data will be higher 
within the context of a missing persons query than for a trivial access to data. 
Buchanan et al. use their survey-based approach to determine the access rights 
based on context.  




Their approach on how to support the balancing act differs from the present 
research. Buchanan et al. incorporate outcomes of the balancing act in the 
representation of the information-sharing agreement between organizations itself. 
That is, before actual data exchanges, organizations are asked which contexts give 
access rights to which types of data. In the present research, each agent has his own 
rules and can negotiate and argue with other agents why data can or cannot be 
exchanged. Furthermore, in contrast to Buchanan et al., the balancing act is not 
represented in rules, but in the negotiation and persuasion policies of an agent, 
where the agent internally reasons about the consequences of (not) exchanging data.  
 
To illustrate that the approach of finding a balance between different goals in the 
interaction can be a better approach, let us use the system of this research to model 
the example from the introduction of the social worker who is trying to establish a 
trust relation with a client. If the police officer is hesitant to give the context for his 
request (for example, because he does not want to unnecessarily inform other 
people that the requested data is of national importance), he could first try to simply 
request the data. If the data was not related to drug dealing, he would easily obtain 
the data and the social worker would not be unnecessarily informed about the 
officer’s investigation. Let us next assume that the social worker initially refuses to 
exchange the sensitive data about his client, since he wants to establish a trust 
relation. At this point, the police officer can try to persuade the social worker that 
he needs the data for a case of national importance. Assuming that the social worker 
is persuaded by the argument, he then can also state conditions to minimize the 
possible negative consequences of the exchange. Let us next apply the approach of 
Buchanan et al. to model the example from the introduction. If the information-
sharing agreement states that social workers do not exchange sensitive data with 
police officers, then with the approach of Buchanan et al. the requested data would 
not be exchanged. If the information-sharing agreement states that social workers 
exchange sensitive data in case of national importance, then they would always be 
informed about those cases. In the system of this research, the balance between 
goals is ultimately found in the interaction. In the example, a social worker will 
only be informed about national importance cases when he refuses, and sensitive 
data will only be exchanged in exceptional situations such as national importance.  
 
Let us next discuss how the criminal investigations units currently balance their 
goals in the Dutch police domain and compare this with how the balancing act 
could be improved with the approach of Buchanan et al. and with the approach of 
this research. In the current situation, police departments use data usage codes (see 
subsection 2.4.3) to determine the allowed usage of data. However, the data usage 
codes are applied in such a way that protected data will never be automatically 
exchanged using the information systems, while sometimes protected data can be 
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exchanged if CIE officers engage in dialogues (see the examples described in 
section 2.5). Thus in practice, the balancing act is geared towards the goal to protect 
local investigations and informants 
If Buchanan et al.’s approach is applied to support regulated data exchange in the 
Dutch police domain, then information-sharing agreements need be used to specify 
the types of situations in which protected data can be exchanged. Assuming that the 
information-sharing agreements are the outcomes of a fair and serious balancing act 
between different goals the criminal investigation units try to fulfill, Buchanan et 
al.’s approach could be used to support regulated data exchange. However, in 
practice it is not possible to specify every possible type of situation beforehand.  
 
If the approach of this research is used to support regulated data exchange, the 
balancing act is not fixed as with the automated exchange in current situation and 
with the approach of Buchanan et al., but is found in the interaction. Finding the 
balance in the interaction can result in better support of regulated data exchange, 
because it allows the agents to reason with their own knowledge to show that an 
agreed rule based on a typical situation is not applicable in a specific situation. For 
example, with Buchanan et al.’s approach it is not possible to give arguments based 
on knowledge which are not known by the other agent. A second example is the 
ability to state conditions to be fulfilled by the requesting agent, which is also not 
possible with Buchanan et al.’s approach.  
 
To summarize, Buchanan et al., also observe that in practice regulated data 
exchange between organizations is often suboptimal because the norms from 
regulations are not well known and local policies are more aimed at the protection 
of local data. Buchanan et al.’s approach to support regulated data exchange is to 
propose an information-sharing framework. In this framework, data exchanging 
organizations have an information-sharing agreement, where SPoC (Single Point-
of-Contact) agents are used to control the exchange of data. A SPoC agent can be 
compared with a responding agent used the system of this research in that they both 
validate requests. Buchanan et al.’s approach on how to support the balancing act 
differs from the approach of the present research. Buchanan et al. incorporate the 
outcomes of the balancing act between different goals the organizations try to fulfill 
with exchanging data in the representation of the information-sharing agreement 
itself, while in the present research the negotiation and persuasion policies are used 
to assist the agents to balance their goals in their interactions. Furthermore, in 
contrast to Buchanan et al., each agent has his own rules and reasons about the 
consequences of (not) exchanging data and can negotiate and argue with other 
agents whether data can or cannot be exchanged. Therefore, with the approach of 
this research the balancing act is not fixed as with the approach of Buchanan et al., 
but is found in the interaction. Finally, the comparison of the approaches of the 
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present research with Buchanan et al.’s research illustrated how finding the balance 
in the interaction can result in better support of regulated data exchange.  
 
7.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter compared related research on the subject of automated support of 
regulated data exchange. Similar to Perrussel et al. (2007), the present research 
views agent interactions to gain access to sensitive data as argumentation dialogues. 
However, the present research proposed a new way to model the interactions as 
negotiation dialogues with embedded persuasion dialogues. An important 
contribution of this research has been the specification of realistic dialogue policies 
to help agents to balance their goals they try to fulfill with the exchange of data. As 
for the specification of dialogue policies, Parsons et al. (2002; 2003) have not 
specified policies for negotiation dialogues and in Perrussel et al. they are absent. 
Supporting the balancing act in the context of regulated data exchange is only 
described in Buchanan et al. (2010). However, Buchanan et al. use another 
approach. Instead of specifying dialogue policies to find a balance in the 
interaction, Buchanan et al. mimic and fixate the outcomes of the balancing act for 
agreed types of situations. Finally, in contrast to the discussed research in this 
chapter, the system proposed in this research allows agents to learn from each other 




Chapter 8  
Conclusion 
The problem statement of this thesis has been if it is possible to develop a realistic 
and implementable architecture for a multi-agent system that can provide a basis for 
automated support of regulated data exchange between organizations. The support 
of regulated data exchange was defined as facilitating fewer unlawful data 
exchanges (exchanges which are forbidden do occur in practice) and more lawful 
data exchanges (exchanges which are permitted do not occur in practice). Section 
8.1 summarizes the results based on the problem statement of this thesis. Section 
8.2 discusses whether the proposed system can provide support of regulated data 
exchange in practice and the contributions of this research. Finally, section 8.3 
presents the wider applicability of this research and discusses the need for future 
research. 
8.1 Answers to the research questions 
Answering the problem statement is divided into several steps, which each have 
their own specific research questions. Therefore, every research question will be 
answered separately below. 
Chosen domain with regulated data exchange 
RQ 1 How does the problem of regulated data exchange manifests itself in the 
Dutch police domain?  
As discussed in chapter 1, the Dutch police domain provides a worthwhile example 
of the problem of regulated data exchange because it illustrates that not always an 
optimal balance is found in the exchange of data. To answer the first research 
question, a description and analysis was made which was based on a study of the 
literature, the relevant regulations and interviews with police officers. The 
description and analysis showed that regional police departments need to exchange 
data, because departments often need data held by other departments in order to 
solve crime cases (see sections 2.1 and 2.2). Furthermore, each regional police 
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department has a criminal investigations unit for gathering intelligence data on 
severe crime. The analysis also showed that the criminal investigation units have to 
balance the goal to execute their appointed police task with the goal to protect their 
interests at the local level (i.e., their investigations and informants), while staying 
within the law. Ideally, criminal investigation units find an optimal and legitimate 
balance of their goals by engaging in dialogues about regulated data exchange. 
However, this ideal is not always realized because criminal investigation units do 
not know all the applicable regulations and prefer their goal to protect their own 
their interests by refusing to exchange data.  
RQ 1.b   What is the legal framework for the Dutch police domain?  
In order to answer research question 1.a, a description was made of the legal 
framework for regulated data exchange in the Dutch police domain (see sections 
2.1, 2.3 and 2.4). At the time of this research, the Police Registers Act (Wet 
politieregisters, Wpolr) was applicable for the exchange of severe-crime data 
between Dutch criminal investigation units, which is further detailed in the Police 
Registers Decree (Besluit politieregisters, Bpolr) and the CIE regulation (regeling 
CIE)20. The legislator intended a free-flow of data within parts of the Dutch police 
organization and has created many rules which obligate the exchange of data. To 
enable criminal investigation units to protect their investigations and informants, 
the legislator also allows grounds for refusal as a legal way to refuse the exchange 
of data. It was the legislator’s objective that in specific cases, the relevant interests 
are weighed against each other. However, as indicated above, the analysis of the 
Dutch police organization revealed that in practice the grounds for refusal are most 
of the time used as default instead of using them with serious deliberation in 
specific cases. Since the grounds of refusals are used as default, only a part of the 
permitted data exchanges occurs in the Dutch police domain. 
 
The main rule promoting the exchange of data is Wpolr article 14, paragraph a, 
which states that it is obliged to exchange data if the other party needs it for the 
execution of the police task; here the police task is used as a ground to promote the 
exchange of data. The main rule limiting the exchange of severe-crime data is 
Wpolr article 13a, paragraph 3, which states that the exchange of data can be 
refused if necessary for the proper execution of the police task; here the police task 
is used as a ground to refuse to exchange data. Wpolr, article 13a, paragraph 3 
specifies which grounds for refusals can be used for exceptions for Wpolr art. 14 
par a. The police officer interviews showed that those exceptions in turn can also 
have exceptions. Those exceptions are called exceptional situations and specify in 
which cases exceptions can be set aside. The analysis also showed that there are 
different types of local interpretations of the regulations. First, there are the data 
                                                        
20 See section 2.3 for a brief discussion of the changed regulations. 
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usage codes which determine the allowed usage of data. In addition to the data 
usage codes, there are explicit grounds for refusal, such as when the data is used for 
an internal investigation, when the data is no more up to date, or when the data is 
traceable to informants.  
 
To keep the model of regulated data exchange in the Dutch police domain 
manageable, assumptions were made to select the relevant excerpts of the 
applicable regulations and their local interpretations (see subsection 2.4.1). 
Furthermore, to allow for easier validation, the selected applicable rules were 
rewritten into an intermediate representation before they were formalized. 
RQ 1.b.  What are the relevant interactions in this domain?  
Research question 1.b concerned the typical examples of interactions between 
Dutch police departments. The interactions were selected based on data gathered 
from interviews with police officers and were used to clarify the requirements for 
the multi-agent system architecture (see section 2.5). The examples are interactions 
where agents try to persuade or negotiate with each other in order to exchange data.  
RQ 1.c.  What is the relation between goals and actions and 
possible consequences on other goals related to data 
exchange?  
Based on the literature study and interviews with police officers, the significant 
relations between goals and actions and possible consequences on other goals 
related to data exchange were identified (see section 2.6). 
A multi-agent system as model for regulated data exchange  
The second research question concerned the requirements to be met by the multi-
agent system architecture in order to be a model of regulated data exchange in the 
Dutch police practice. 
RQ 2: What are the requirements for a multi-agent system suitable to support 
regulated data exchange in the Dutch police organization? 
The requirements are that the agents must have knowledge about the domain, are 
able to reason with their knowledge and are able to model the typical interactions in 
the Dutch police domain (see section 3.3). 
RQ 2.a:  Which kinds of knowledge do agents need to have?  
The agents must have knowledge of the relevant regulations and the local 
interpretations of those regulations and have knowledge of the local intelligence 
data. Furthermore, the agents must have knowledge of their goals and the possible 
consequences of their actions (see section 3.3, page 48). 
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RQ 2.b:  Which reasoning capabilities do the agents need? 
The requirements for the agent’s reasoning capabilities are that they must be able to 
reason with their knowledge of the relevant regulations, their goals they try to 
realize and the likely consequences of their actions. The examples of dialogues 
about regulated data exchange showed that the interaction between agents often 
involves argumentation. Therefore, the agents must be capable of generating and 
evaluating arguments for and against certain claims and they must be able to update 
their knowledge as a result of the dialogues (see section 3.3, page 48).  
RQ 2.c: Which interaction types in this domain need to be 
supported by the multi-agent system? 
For answering research question 2.c, the typical interactions types in the problem 
domain were analyzed. The examples identified in chapter 2 illustrated that agents 
engage in dialogues to negotiate about and to persuade each other whether 
intelligence data can be exchanged. The analysis showed that three dialogues types 
are necessary to model regulated data exchange: information-seeking, negotiation 
and persuasion dialogues. For the police domain, the relation between the dialogue 
types was interpreted as starting as a negotiation dialogue, which may shift to an 
embedded persuasion. If the negotiation terminates successfully, an information-
seeking dialogue starts and its termination also terminates the overall interaction 
(see section 3.3, page 49). 
Formalization of the multi-agent system  
The third research question concerned the formalization of the requirements 
identified by answering the second question. 
RQ 3:  How can the requirements for the multi-agent system be formalized? 
For answering research question 3, each requirement is discussed individually 
below. 
RQ 3.a:  How can the internal reasoning of an agent be formalized? 
The internal reasoning was modeled as defeasible reasoning and formalized with 
the ASPIC argumentation system (see section 4.1). ASPIC was chosen because it 
supports defeasible reasoning and since the ASPIC inference engine can be used in 
the proof-of-concept implementation. 
RQ 3.b:  How can the knowledge of an agent be represented?  
ASPIC was also used as a knowledge representation language. Since deontic 
modalities are not part of the ASPIC logic, they are expressed as predicates and 
with reification of the statements in their scope. For the same reasons the agent 
goals are expressed with reification (see subsection 4.1.2). 
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RQ 3.c:  How can the agent interactions be represented?  
As stated above, the agent interactions are interpreted as negotiation which can shift 
to embedded persuasion dialogues. Since this kind of embedding is modeled in Van 
Veenen and Prakken (2006), the dialogue system to model the interactions is based 
on their work. The dialogue system was adapted to be compatible with the ASPIC 
inference engine and to support the regulated data exchange between CIE officers 
(see section 4.2).  
RQ 3.d:  How can dialogue policies (or strategies) be defined that 
assist agents to balance their goals?  
Two types of dialogue policies were specified for the agents, viz. for negotiation 
(see section 5.1) and for persuasion (see section 5.2). The negotiation policies help 
to balance the agent’s goals when the agent is permitted to exchange data but there 
is a violation of his interests. An agent could simply refuse to exchange data based 
on the violation of interests. However, with the negotiation policy the agent tries to 
find a condition under which there will be no violation of his interests. If he 
succeeds then also his goal to execute the police task by exchanging data is 
fulfilled. The persuasion policies help to persuade the other agent to exchange data 
in case of rejection of a request for data. Since in the current police practice the 
grounds of refusals are used as default (see research question 1.a), helping to 
persuade can help to allow for more permitted data exchanges in the Dutch police 
domain. Furthermore, the policies model a fair and serious balancing act between 
assumptions like cooperativeness and protection of own interests since they are 
applicable in all domains where data is exchanged (see subsection 5.2.1). In the 
context of regulated data exchange between criminal investigation units, 
cooperativeness promotes the goal to execute the police task by enabling more data 
exchanges and the goal to protect their own interests promotes the goal to protect 
local investigations and informants.  
RQ 3.e:  Dialogues can result in knowledge updates. How can 
these changes in knowledge be modeled?  
A reasonable policy for such updates was defined but the research revealed that 
with this and similar policies dialogue moves can be undermined by later 
knowledge updates during dialogues (see subsection 5.2.3). This problem was in 
this research solved with a pragmatic solution, leaving a more principled solution to 
future research. 
Specification and implementation of the architecture  
RQ 4:  What is the architecture of the multi-agent system for regulated data 
exchange between different organizations?  
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The architecture of the multi-agent system was developed using typical examples of 
dialogues between Dutch criminal investigation units about regulated data exchange 
(see section 6.1).  
RQ 4.a:  How can the architecture of the multi-agent system be 
generalized to be applicable to similar domains?  
In order for the architecture to be generalizable to other domains, all terminology 
specific to the Dutch police domain was abstracted in the architecture (see 
subsection 6.1.1).  
RQ 4.b:  How can the architecture be implemented into a proof-of- 
concept application for a problem domain?  
The functionality was partly implemented in the Java programming language. The 
argumentation system engine was implemented by embedding the ASPIC inference 
engine in the agents (see section 6.2).  
8.2 Discussion and contribution 
This section discusses whether the proposed system can provide the basis for 
automated support of regulated data exchange in practice and it discusses the 
contribution of this research to the fields of multi-agent systems research, AI & 
Law research and argumentation theory research. 
8.2.1 Applicability in practice 
As stated in the first chapter, the research aim of this thesis has been to investigate 
how theories from multi-agent systems research, AI & Law research, and 
argumentation theory research can be further developed and applied in a realistic 
problem domain to provide the basis for automated support of organizations in 
promoting their goals in the context of regulated data exchange. The combination of 
a multi-agent system approach and argumentation approach allowed the modelling 
of data exchanging organizations that try to promote their goals by engaging in 
dialogues about regulated data exchange. Multi-agent system theory has been used 
to model data exchanging organizations, where the agents represent the members of 
the organizations. Furthermore, a multi-agent system allows organizations to keep 
their own data. Keeping data locally is important for a system to be accepted in the 
Dutch police domain because the criminal investigation units want to be able to 
control their data (see section 3.2). Argumentation theory has been used to model 
dialogues and the internal reasoning of the software agents. The approach of this 
research to allow organizations to promote their goals was to develop policies for 
the agent dialogues about regulated data exchange. The dialogue policies model a 
fair and serious balancing act between assumptions like cooperativeness and 
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protection of own interests. A fair and serious balancing act allows for more 
permitted data exchanges and fewer forbidden data exchanges, while staying within 
the law (see also the answer to research question 3.d).  
 
Let us next discuss if it is possible to develop a realistic and implementable 
architecture for a multi-agent system that can provide the basis for automated 
support of regulated data exchange between organizations. By using the research 
described above, the multi-agent system architecture has been specified and 
implemented to illustrate that it can in principle support data exchange in the Dutch 
police domain. However, to determine whether the proposed multi-agent system 
can genuinely support automated regulated data exchange in the Dutch police 
practice, with the intended positive effects on data exchange, two issues need to be 
addressed.  
 
The first issue is that it is not known how a system based on the model of this 
research will be used in practice. The second issue is that the implementation of the 
multi-agent system is dependent on the quality of the formalization of the 
applicable domain knowledge.  
 
With regards to the first issue, the system’s policies model a fair balancing act, 
while in practice CIE officers are geared towards the protection of data. Therefore, 
while the system allows for more permitted data exchanges based on a fair 
balancing act, the police officers could interpret this as undesirable. This 
interpretation can result in police officers not accepting the system or using the 
multi-agent system in an unintended way. For example, CIE officers could try to 
circumvent the system by using informal ways to exchange data. Moreover, the 
multi-agent system also shows which data exchanges are forbidden, which could be 
interpreted in practice as being too restrictive, which also can result in 
circumventing or not accepting the system. A solution to this problem probably 
requires organizational measures and additional training of police officers. A study 
of such solutions is clearly outside the scope of the present research.  
 
Besides the actual usage in practice, the system’s ability to provide the basis of 
automated support of regulated data exchange is also dependent on the formalized 
domain knowledge elicited from the legal sources and their local interpretations. 
Moreover, this formalized knowledge needs to be maintained. Making domain 
knowledge explicit and formalize it in a language executable by a software system 
is a difficult task, and is known as the knowledge-acquisition bottleneck 
(Feigenbaum 1984). The knowledge-acquisition bottleneck is an issue in several 
stages in creating a model of regulated data exchange in the Dutch police domain. 
The first stage is the acquisition and formalization of the applicable regulations. For 
this research assumptions (see subsection 2.4.1 on page 18) were made to keep the 
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model of regulated data exchange in the Dutch police domain manageable and 
generalizable. For an application in practice, the scope of the model needs to be 
extended, which involves formalizing more applicable regulations and validation by 
domain experts. The second stage is the acquisition and formalization of the local 
interpretations. In the Dutch police domain, many local rules are available 
informally only (i.e., undocumented knowledge that sits in the heads of CIE officers 
and is not written into local rules). When acquiring informal knowledge, the CIE-
officers may provide incomplete or incorrect knowledge and they may not be able 
to explicate their knowledge. Therefore, user experiments in realistic scenarios are 
necessary to address the above mentioned issues and to determine how an 
implementation of the system in practice can support regulated exchange in 
practice. 
8.2.2 Contributions to research 
This thesis contributes to the fields of multi-agent systems, argumentation, and AI 
& Law in their combination and application in a serious problem domain. The 
multi-agent system architecture combines and adapts several elements from the 
literature: defeasible-argumentation for the agents’ internal reasoning and a 
dialogue system to model the agent dialogues. The research has thus by way of a 
realistic case study provided support for the naturalness and applicability of ideas 
from the literature.  
 
Furthermore, this research has proposed a novel view on the nature of dialogues in 
the context of regulated data exchange, i.e., as negotiation with embedded 
persuasion. An important contribution to the research literature has been the 
specification of dialogue policies to assist the agents to balance their goals. The 
dialogue policies were made applicable to other domains were data is exchanged by 
incorporating assumptions, such as cooperativeness and protection of own interests. 
Moreover, the policies were parameterized, which allows them to be fine tuned for 
the chosen application domain. To the best of my knowledge this is the first 
research which specified realistic negotiation and persuasion policies in the context 
of regulated data exchange.  
 
Another research contribution has been the definition of realistic knowledge update 
policies for agents during dialogues about regulated data exchange. Research on 
this issue has also identified a new research issue in designing dialogue systems for 
persuasion, by identifying the problem that during a dialogue between agents, 
previous dialogue moves sometimes can no longer be maintained as a result of 
knowledge updates at later stages in a dialogue. In this thesis a pragmatic solution 
to this problem was provided, while the topic of knowledge updates during 
dialogues was identified as an important issue for future research. 
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8.3 Wider applicability and the need for future research 
This section discusses the applicability of this research to other domains and 
describes the need for further research.  
 
In this research, terminology specific to the Dutch police was abstracted and the 
dialogue policies were parameterized. Therefore, this research can be used in other 
domains where data exchanging organizations must balance the goal to execute 
their tasks with the goal to protect their interests at the local level. An example of a 
domain for which this research is applicable, is the exchange of patient data. 
Similar to criminal investigation units, hospitals may want keep their sensitive data 
locally and different hospitals may use a different policy towards data exchange. A 
reason for hospitals to keep their data local is that they are responsible of their 
patient data (Aldea et al. 2001). Furthermore, hospitals have to interact to achieve 
their goals such as providing the appropriate care to a patient (Huang et al. 1995), 
while complying with the applicable laws and regulations. For instance21, assume 
that a traveler gets a heart attack and is taken into a hospital in the foreign country 
he currently visits. In order for the staff of the hospital to prescribe the appropriate 
drugs, they have to obtain the traveler’s medical history from his doctor. However, 
the traveler’s doctor initially refuses to exchange the requested data because the 
traveler has given limited consent to exchange the data. To find a balance between 
their goals, the hospital and the doctor can try to negotiate and persuade each other 
whether and on which terms the data can be exchanged. Note that the continual 
growth of the internet can cause an increase in the number of regulated data 
exchanges, which will make this research more widely applicable. 
 
As discussed in the previous section, more research with user experiments in 
realistic scenarios is necessary to determine if an implementation of the multi-agent 
system architecture can support regulated exchange in practice. Furthermore, to 
improve the ability of the system to support regulated data exchange, the possibility 
of more extensive user interaction needs to be investigated. For example when a 
software agent in a requesting role cannot persuade the other software agent to 
exchange data, the requesting agent could query his human user to state other 
reasons which may help with his persuasion. A second example is when a software 
agent receives an unknown condition or argument and queries the user if this new 
knowledge can be added to the software agent’s knowledge base. Note that in the 
present research context criteria are used to evaluate new arguments (see section 
5.3). A third example is that when a human user decides to deviate from the 
decision made by the software agent, the software agent could ask for the reason for 
his decision. Possible research questions related to more extensive user interaction 
                                                        
21 This example is based on the example described in Perrussel et al. (2007). 
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are: how can knowledge from users be acquired, and what are typical examples of 
more extensive user interaction? A suggestion for further research is to investigate 
other combination patterns of dialogue types to model regulated data exchange and 
compare them with the approach of this research. As stated in the previous section, 
this research revealed the complication that dialogue moves can be undermined by 
later knowledge updates during dialogues (see also subsection 5.2.3). For the 
present research a pragmatic solution was chosen. A suggestion for future research 
is to investigate this problem to provide a more systematic solution. 
 
Concluding, this research has shown that it is possible to develop a realistic and 
implementable multi-agent system architecture that can provide the basis for 
automated regulated data exchange. For this research, theories from multi-agent 
systems research, AI & Law research and argumentation theory research have been 
further developed and applied in realistic domain. If the present research results are 
further developed in research based on an implementation in practice combined 
with the possibility of more extensive user interaction, then automated regulated 
data exchange between organizations in practice may well become possible and 
beneficial for society. 
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Appendix  
Representation of domain rules in 
ASPIC 
This appendix concerns the representation of the domain rules in the ASPIC logic 
(for a description of ASPIC, see subsection 4.1.1 on page 53). In section 2.4, the 
selected applicable rules were rewritten into an intermediate representation, which 
in turn are formalized in this appendix. In the formalization, the variable S denotes 
the responding agent, the variable R denotes the requesting agent, the variable QUERY 
represents the search query, the variable CIE_OFFICER denotes the CIE officer, the 
variable INFORMANT represents the informant, and the variable DATA_UNIT_ID denotes 
the data unit identifier, which is associated with a data unit (see subsection 6.1.1). 
Furthermore, every domain rule is accompanied with a factual statement matching 
the valid condition. To enable arguing about grounds for a rule, the factual 
statements about the validity can be replaced by domain rules (see also page 60). 
Domain rule rWpolr14_a__1  
(Wpolr14.a implication 1) 
IF  a CIE agent needs data for the execution of the police task,  
THEN  
it is obliged to exchange the data from the severe-crime register 
with the CIE agent. 
 
Based on the assumptions (see page 18) that CIE officers only request data for the 
proper execution of the police task and that all CIE agents are authorized to receive 
intelligence data, Wpolr article 14, paragraph a, implication 1 (page 20) can be 
represented in ASPIC as: 
 
[rWpolr14_a__1(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)] 
obliged(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID))  
<-  
requested(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)),  
valid(rWpolr14_a__1(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)) 0.1. 
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valid(rWpolr14_a__1(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)) 0.1. 
Domain rule rWpolr13a_3__1 
(Wpolr13a.3 part 1) 
IF  a refusal to exchange data is necessary for the proper execution of 
the police task, 
THEN  
it is permitted to refuse to exchange data. 
 
Part 1 of Wpolr article 13a, paragraph 3 is instantiated with article 11 of the Bpolr 
and with the rOlderThanOneYear_F domain rule. Therefore, this rule is not 
represented in ASPIC. 
Domain rule rWpolr13a_3__2 
(Wpolr13a.3 part 2) 
IF  a refusal to exchange data is necessary for the proper execution of 
the police task, 
THEN  
it is permitted to exchange data with restricting conditions 
regarding to further use. 
 
Part 2 of Wpolr article 13a, paragraph 3 is instantiated with article 11 of the Bpolr. 
Hence, this rule is not represented in ASPIC. 
Domain rule rBpolr11_1_a 
(Bpolr 11.1. a) 
IF   the data about informants concerns crimes which were or are 
going to be committed 
THEN  
an administrator is permitted to refuse the exchange of data. 
 
Article 11, paragraph 1, subparagraph a, of the Bpolr is an instantiation of article 
13a, paragraph 3, sentence 1, of the Wpolr for administrators of criminal 
investigation units. Bpolr, article 11, paragraph 1, subparagraph a (rBpolr11_1_a), 
concerns protecting data originating from informants. Data originating from 
informants have ‘source protection’, which is a special case of a ground for refusal. 
rBpolr11_1_a is not represented in ASPIC, but is implemented with the following 
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local domain rules: rDataUsageCode300_SP, rSourceProtection_NP, 
rSourceProtection_F, and rTraceable_SP.  
Domain rule rBpolr11_1_b 
(Bpolr 11.1. b) 
IF  the data originates from a register of which, given the special 
nature of the register, in case of exchanging data, creates 
immediate danger for the registered person or third parties 
THEN  
an administrator is permitted to refuse the exchange of data.  
 
Article 11, paragraph 1, subparagraph b, of the Bpolr is an instantiation of article 
13a, paragraph 3, sentence 1, of the Wpolr for administrators of criminal 
investigation units. Bpolr, article 11, paragraph a, subparagraph b (rBpolr11_1_b), 
concerns the risk of revealing the registered people or third parties. Data with risks 
have a ‘risk factor, which is a special case of a ground for refusal. Bpolr, article 11, 
paragraph a, subparagraph b, is not directly represented in ASPIC, but is 
implemented with the following domain rules: rDataUsageCode200_RF, 
rRiskFactor_F and rInternalInvestigation_RF. 
Domain rule rBpolr11_3__1 
(Bpolr 11.3 sentence 1) 
IF  a refusal to exchange data is not necessary for the proper 
execution of the police task, 
THEN  
(Bpolr 11.1) is not applicable.  
 
An assumption (see page 18) is that CIE officers only refuse to exchange data for 
the proper execution of the police task. Therefore, Bpolr article 11, paragraph 3, 
sentence 1 is not represented in ASPIC. 
Domain rule rBpolr11_3__2 
(Bpolr 11.3 sentence 2) 
IF  data is exchanged 
THEN  
it is permitted to enforce restrictions on the usage of data.  
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Article 11, paragraph 3, sentence 2 of the Bpolr is an instantiation of article 13a, 
paragraph 3, part 2 of the Wpolr for administrators of criminal investigation units. 
Bpolr article 11, paragraph 3, sentence 2 is interpreted in the local rules as ‘can be 
used for analysis purposes only’, and therefore serves as a justification for those 
local rules. The following domain rules are interpretations of Bpolr article 11, 
paragraph 3, sentence 2: rDataUsageCode200A_P, rDataUsageCode300A_P, 
rSourceProtectionAnalysis_P, rRiskFactorAnalysis_P and rAnalysiQuery_AP. 
Domain rule rDataUsageCode11_O 
Data usage code 11 
IF  data has usage code 11 
THEN   
it is obliged to exchange the data. 
 
This rule is an interpretation of Wpolr article 14, paragraph a, implication 1. The 
domain rule states that it is obliged to exchange data with usage code 11, and be 
represented in ASPIC as: 
 
[rDataUsageCode11_O(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)] 
obliged(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID))  
<-  
holds(dataUsageCode11(DATA_UNIT_ID)), 
requested(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)), 
valid(rDataUsageCode11_O(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)) 0.5. 
 
 
valid(rDataUsageCode11_O(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)) 0.5. 
 
Note that ‘requested(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID))’ is added as a 
premise since determining whether an action is obliged, presupposes that the action 
is requested. 
Domain rule rDataUsageCode200_F 
Data usage code 200 forbidden  
IF  data has usage code 200  
THEN 
it is forbidden to use the data for operational usage 
 
This domain rule concerns the usage of data with usage code 200 outside the 
criminal investigation units (cf. ‘operational usage’). Based on the assumptions (see 
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page 18) that CIE officers do not exchange intelligence data outside criminal 
investigation units, this domain rule is not represented in ASPIC. 
Domain rule rDataUsageCode200A_P 
Data usage code 200 coordination and analysis 
IF  data has usage code 200 
THEN 
it is permitted use the data only under certain conditions for 
coordination and analysis purposes 
 
This domain rule is interpretation of Bpolr article 11, paragraph 3, sentence 2 
(rBolr11_3__2) and allows data with data usage code 200 to be used for analysis 
purposes. The domain rule can be represented in ASPIC as: 
 
[rDataUsagecode200A_P(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID, CIE_OFFICER)]  




requested(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)), 




valid(rDataUsagecode200A_P(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID, 
CIE_OFFICER)). 
 
Note that ‘permitted(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID))’ is substituted 
with ‘~obliged(not(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)))’, see subsection 
4.1.2 on page 62). 
Domain rule rDataUsageCode200_RF 
Data usage code 200 risk factor  
IF  data has usage code 200  
THEN 
the data is a risk factor 
 
This domain rule is an interpretation of Bpolr, article 11, paragraph a, subparagraph 













Domain rule rDataUsageCode300_F 
Data usage code 300 forbidden  
IF  data has usage code 300 
THEN 
it is forbidden to use the data for operational usage 
 
This domain rule concerns the usage of data with usage code 300 outside the 
criminal investigation units (cf. ‘operational usage’). Based on the assumptions (see 
page 18) that CIE officers do not exchange intelligence data outside criminal 
investigation units, this domain rule is not represented in ASPIC. 
Domain rule rDataUsageCode300A_P 
Data usage code 300 coordination and analysis 
IF  data has usage code 300 
THEN 
it is permitted use the data only under certain conditions for 
coordination and analysis purposes 
 
This domain rule is an interpretation of Bpolr article 11, paragraph 3, sentence 2 
(rBolr11_3__2) and allows data with usage code 300 to be used for analysis 
purposes. The domain rule can be represented as: 
 
[rDataUsagecode300A_P(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID, CIE_OFFICER)]  




requested(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)), 




valid(rDataUsagecode300A_P(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID,  
CIE_OFFICER)). 
 
Note that In the formalization ‘permitted(P)’ is substituted with 
‘~obliged(not(P))’, see subsection 4.1.2 on page 62. 
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Domain rule rDataUsageCode300_SP  
Data usage code 300 source protection 
IF  data has usage code 300  
THEN 
the data has source protection 
 
This domain rule concerns the protection of informants (cf ‘source protection’ 
described in subsection 2.4.3 on page 24). The domain is an interpretation of Bpolr, 
article 11, paragraph 1, subparagraph a (rBpolr11_1_a) and states that data with 
usage code 300 has source protection. This domain rule can be represented in 
ASPIC as: 
 
[rDataUsagecode300_SP(DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)]  








Domain rule rSourceProtection_NP 
This domain rule is an interpretation of Bpolr, article 11, paragraph 1, subparagraph 
a (rBpolr11_1_a) and states that if data has source protection and the data is 
exchanged, then the informant who has supplied the data has no protection (see 
page 37). The domain rule can be represented as: 
 
[rSourceProtection_NP(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)] 
holds(not(protection(DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)))  
<-  
holds(sourceProtection(DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)),  
happens(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)), 
valid(rSourceProtection_NP(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)). 
 
 
valid(rSourceProtection_NP(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)). 
Domain rule rSourceProtection_F  
Source protection forbidden to exchange data  
IF   data has a source protection 
THEN  
it is forbidden to exchange the data. 
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This domain rule is an interpretation of Bpolr, article 11, paragraph 1, subparagraph 
a (rBpolr11_1_a) and states that it is forbidden to exchange data with source 
protection. The domain rule can be represented in ASPIC as: 
 
[rSourceProtection_F(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)]  
obliged(not(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)))  
<-  
holds(sourceProtection(DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)),  
requested(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)),  




valid(rSourceProtection_F(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)) 
0.6. 
Domain rule rSourceProtectionAnalysis_P  
Source protection and analysis permitted to exchange data  
IF   data has a source protection and a CIE officer uses the data for  
   analysis purposes only  
THEN  
it is permitted to exchange the data. 
 
This domain rule is an interpretation of Bpolr article 11, paragraph 3, sentence 2 
(rBolr11_3__2) and states that data with source protection can be used for analysis 
purposes. The domain rule can be represented in ASPIC as: 
 
[rSourceProtectionAnalysis_P(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID, 
CIE_OFFICER, INFORMANT)]  
~obliged(not(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)))  
<-  
holds(sourceProtection(DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)),  
holds(analysisPurposesOnly(CIE_OFFICER, DATA_UNIT_ID)), 
requested(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)),  
valid(rSourceProtectionAnalysis_P(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID, 
CIE_OFFICER, INFORMANT)) 0.7. 
 
 
valid(rSourceProtectionAnalysis_P(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID, 
CIE_OFFICER, INFORMANT)) 0.7. 
Domain rule rRiskFactor_F  
Risk factor forbidden to exchange 




it is forbidden to exchange the data. 
 
This domain rule is an interpretation of Bpolr, article 11, paragraph a, subparagraph 
b (rBpolr11_1_b) and states that it is forbidden to exchange data which is a risk 
factor. The domain rule can be represented in ASPIC as: 
 
[rRiskFactor_F(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)]  
obliged(not(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)))  
<-  
holds(riskFactor(DATA_UNIT_ID)),  
requested(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)),  
valid(rRiskFactor_F(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)) 0.6. 
 
 
valid(rRiskFactor_F(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)) 0.6. 
Domain rule rRiskFactorAnalysis_P  
Risk factor and analysis permitted to exchange data 
IF   data has a risk factor and are used for analysis purposes 
THEN  
it is permitted to exchange the data. 
 
This domain rule is interpretation of Bpolr article 11, paragraph 3, sentence 2 
(rBolr11_3__2) and allows data with a risk factor to be used for analysis purposes. 
The domain rule can be represented in ASPIC as: 
 
[rRiskFactorAnalysis_P(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID, CIE_OFFICER)]  




requested(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)),  




valid(rRiskFactorAnalysis_P(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID, 
CIE_OFFICER)). 
Domain rule rTraceable_SP 
Traceable source protection 
IF  data is traceable to an informant 
THEN   
the data originating from the informant have source protection.  




This domain rule is interpretation of Bpolr, article 11, paragraph 1, subparagraph a 
(rBpolr11_1_a) and states that if data is traceable to an informant then the data 
originating from the informant have source protection (see page 30). This rule can 
be represented in ASPIC as: 
 
[rTraceable_SP(DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)]  
holds(sourceProtection(DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT))  
<- 
holds(traceable(DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)), 
valid(rTraceable_SP(DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)) 0.6. 
 
 
valid(rTraceable_SP(DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)) 0.6. 
Domain rule rInternalInvestigation_RF 
Colleague then risk factor 
IF  data is used for internal investigation about a colleague 
THEN  
the data has a risk factor 
 
This domain rule is an interpretation of Bpolr, article 11, paragraph a, subparagraph 
b (rBpolr11_1_b) and states that if data is used for an internal investigation about a 
colleague, then the data is a risk factor. The domain rule can be represented is 
ASPIC as: 
 








Domain rule rOlderThanOneYear _F 
Older than one year forbidden to exchange data 
IF  data is older than one year 
THEN  
It is forbidden to exchange the data. 
 
This domain rule is interpretation of Wpolr article 13a, paragraph 3, part 1 
(rWpolr13a_3__1). In the Dutch police practice, data older than one year is 
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considered as not up to date, and could therefore hinder the proper execution of the 
police task. The domain rule stating that it is forbidden to exchange requested data 
older than one year can be formalized as: 
 
[rOlderThanOneYear_F(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)]  
obliged(not(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)))  
<-  
holds(dataOlderThanOneYear(DATA_UNIT_ID)), 
requested(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)),  
valid(rOlderThanOneYear_F(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)) 0.6. 
 
 
valid(rOlderThanOneYear_F(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)) 0.6. 
Domain rules ExceptionalSituations 
Exceptional situations 
IF  National importance 
 OR 
 Attempted assault on the queen 
THEN 
an exceptional situation occurs 
 
In exceptional cases the rules forbidding the exchange of data can be set aside. 
Examples of exceptional cases are national importance and an attempted assault on 
the queen. Of course, other examples of exceptional situations exist. Since this 
domain rule covers multiple exceptional situations, every example of an exceptional 
situation is represented a with specific ASPIC domain rule. 
 


























Domain rule rSetAsideProtection 
Exceptional situation set aside protection 
IF  an exceptional situation occurs 
THEN 
the rules forbidding the exchange of data is not applicable 
 
 
Since setting aside the rules forbidding the exchange of data covers multiple 
domain rules, every concerned rule is represented as a separate ASPIC rule.  
 
The domain rule stating that in an exceptional situation, the rule stating that it 
forbidden to exchange requested data older than one year is not applicable can be 
formalized in ASPIC as: 
 
[rExceptionalSituation_OTOY(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)]  
~rOlderThanOneYear_F(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID) 
 <- 
holds(exceptionalSituation(DATA_UNIT_ID)), 
valid(rExceptionalSituation_OTOY(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)) 0.7.  
 
 
valid(rExceptionalSituation_OTOY(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)) 0.7.  
 
The domain rule stating that in an exceptional situation, the rule stating that it 
forbidden to exchange requested data which is a risk factor is not applicable can be 
formalized in ASPIC as: 
 
[rExceptionSituation_RF(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)]  
~rRiskFactor_F(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID) 
 <- 
holds(exceptionalSituation(DATA_UNIT_ID)), 
valid(rExceptionSituation_RF(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)) 0.7.  
 
 
valid(rExceptionSituation_RF(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)) 0.7.  
 
The domain rule stating that in an exceptional situation, the rule stating that it 
forbidden to exchange requested data which has source protection is not applicable 




[rExceptionSituation_SP(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)]  
~ rSourceProtection_F(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)  
<- 
holds(exceptionalSituation(DATA_UNIT_ID)), 
valid(rExceptionSituation_SP(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID,  
INFORMANT)) 0.7.  
 
 
valid(rExceptionSituation_SP(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID,  
INFORMANT)) 0.7.  
Domain rule rProtectionGoal 
An agent goal is the protection of his local investigations and informants (see page 
37). The domain rule rProtectionGoal states that if data of an agent originates from 
an informant, then the goal of the agent is to protect the informant, which can be 
represented in ASPIC as: 
 
[rProtectionGoal(S, DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)] 
goal(S, protection(DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT))  
<-  
holds(informantOf(INFORMANT, DATA_UNIT_ID, S)), 
valid(rProtectionGoal(S, DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)). 
 
 
valid(rProtectionGoal(S, DATA_UNIT_ID, INFORMANT)). 
Domain rule rAnalysisQuery_AP  
IF a query is made for analysis purposes and data is exchanged 
based on that query 
THEN 
it is obliged to use the data for analysis purposes only. 
 
This domain rule is interpretation of Bpolr article 11, paragraph 3, sentence 2 
(rBolr11_3__2) and states that data obtained for analysis purposes can only be used 
for analysis purposes, which can be represented in ASPIC as: 
 
[rAnalysisQuery_AP(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)] 
obliged(analysisPurposesOnly(R, DATA_UNIT_ID))  
<-  
holds(analysisQuery(R, QUERY)), 
requested(exchangeData(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)), 
valid(rAnalysisQuery_AP(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)). 
 
 
valid(rAnalysisQuery_AP(S, R, QUERY, DATA_UNIT_ID)). 
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Domain rules violationOfOwnInterestesA, 
rViolationOfOwnInterestsB 
The violation of interests rule is related to the rProtectionGoal domain rule, and 
expresses how an agent goal is violated. The domain rule states that if something is 
(not) a goal of an agent but the opposite holds, then his interests are violated (see 
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In many organizations data has to be exchanged, an activity which is often 
regulated by law. In most cases there is a central institution (for example, the 
mother company or the ministry of Justice) that is interested in both optimal and 
legitimate data exchange, because it has to give account of the effectiveness and 
lawfulness of its operations to the outside world (for example, the shareholders or 
the parliament). Besides the central institution there are regionally or functionally 
distributed local institutions with their own interests. The central institutions take 
the interests at the distributed level into account by formulating legal norms and 
central policies, which give room for fine tuning in local policies and individual 
decisions.  
 
The regulation of data exchange serves several objectives. On the one hand, the 
privacy of persons must be protected. On the other hand, the legitimate goals of the 
exchanging organizations must be served. Typically, organizations must balance the 
goal to execute their tasks by exchanging data with the goal to protect their interests 
at the local level by not exchanging confidential data, while staying within the law.  
 
The balancing act between goals is caused by two characteristics of the applicable 
laws and regulations. First, the regulations give discretionary power to 
organizations in which types of situations organizations can decide (not) to 
exchange data. In those cases where it is permitted to exchange data, an 
organization makes a decision which is expected to further its goals. Second, the 
regulations use open-textured concepts, which can have different local 
interpretations (for example ‘the proper execution of the police task’). A concept is 
open textured if it is impossible to determine beforehand which situations can be 
classified as an instance of the concept. 
 
In practice, data exchanging organizations can engage in dialogues and use their 
own interpretations of the regulations to further their goals. Therefore, during the 
interactions a definitive balance is sought between the goals of the organizations, 
which may give rise to interesting dialogues. For example, when an organization 
requests another organization to exchange data, the responding organization has to 
determine if its interests are served. The responding organization can negotiate by 
stating conditions under which it is willing to exchange data (for example that the 
data cannot be exchanged with other organizations). Furthermore, when a 
responding organization refuses a request, the requesting organization can try to 
persuade the other organization to exchange data. Ideally, these dialogues guarantee 
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that an optimal and legitimate balance is found in the exchange of data 
characterized by different goals. However, in practice this ideal is not always 
realized: the norms from regulations are not well known and local policies are more 
aimed at the protection of local data, which has as consequences that only a part of 
what can be exchanged legitimately is actually exchanged and that sometimes data 
is exchanged illegitimately.  
 
The distributed nature of many organizations suggests that it may be worthwhile to 
use multi-agent technology. A multi-agent system is a collection of artificial agents, 
where each agent has some degree of control over his actions and interacts with 
other agents to fulfill his own and/or the system’s goals. A multi-agent system 
arguably provides a natural means to model organizations, where the agents 
represent the organization’s members. Furthermore, organizations typically interact 
with each other to try to achieve their goals, which is also typical for agents in 
multi-agent systems.  
 
The Dutch police domain provides a worthwhile example of the problem of 
regulated data exchange, as it illustrates that not always an optimal and legitimate 
balance is found in the exchange of data. This thesis has investigated the idea of 
utilizing multi-agent technology to support regulated data exchange between Dutch 
police departments.  
 
Chapter 2 presented a description and analysis of regulated data exchange in the 
Dutch police domain. The analysis showed that regional police departments need to 
exchange data, because departments often need data held by other departments in 
order to solve crime cases. Furthermore, each regional police department has a 
criminal investigations unit for gathering intelligence data on severe crime.  The 
analysis also showed that the criminal investigation units have to balance the goal 
to execute their appointed police task with the goal to protect their interests at the 
local level (i.e., their investigations and informants), while staying within the law. 
In practice, criminal investigation units do not find an optimal and legitimate 
balance between their goals because they do not know all the applicable regulations 
and prefer their goal to protect their own their interests by refusing to exchange 
data. Chapter 2 also made a description and analysis of the legal framework for 
regulated data exchange in the Dutch police domain, which was rewritten into an 
intermediate representation and formalized in Appendix 1. The analysis illustrated 
that the legislator intended a free flow of data within the Dutch police organization 
and has created many rules which obligate the exchange of data. To enable criminal 
investigation units to protect their investigations and informants, the legislator 
allows grounds for refusal as a legal way to refuse the exchange of data. It was the 
legislator’s objective that in specific cases, the relevant interests are weighed 
against each other. However, the analysis of the Dutch police organization revealed 
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that in practice the grounds for refusal are most of the time used as default instead 
of using them with serious deliberation in specific cases. Since the grounds of 
refusals are used as default, only a part of the permitted data exchanges occurs in 
the Dutch police domain. 
 
Chapter 3 described how a multi-agent system can model regulated data exchange 
between organizations and argued why the Dutch police organization is a 
representative problem domain. Dialogue examples from chapter 2 about regulated 
data exchange were used to clarify the functional requirements for a multi-agent 
system. The requirements are that the agents must have knowledge about the 
domain, are able to reason with their knowledge and are able to have the typical 
interactions in the Dutch police domain. The examples also illustrated that agents 
engage in dialogues to negotiate about and to persuade each other whether data can 
be exchanged. The analysis showed that three dialogues types are necessary to 
model regulated data exchange: information-seeking, negotiation and persuasion 
dialogues. For the police domain, the relation between the dialogue types was 
interpreted as starting as a negotiation dialogue, which may shift to an embedded 
persuasion. If the negotiation terminates successfully, an information-seeking 
dialogue starts and its termination also terminates the overall interaction. 
 
Chapter 4 specified the argumentation system to model the internal inferences of an 
agent and the dialogue system to model the interaction between agents. The internal 
reasoning was modeled as defeasible reasoning and formalized with the ASPIC 
argumentation system. ASPIC was chosen because it supports defeasible reasoning 
and since the ASPIC inference engine can be used in the proof-of-concept 
implementation. Deontic modalities and agent goals are not part of the ASPIC 
logic. However, they are expressed to be compatible with the ASPIC inference 
engine and to support the regulated data exchange between CIE officers.  
 
Whereas a dialogue system’s communication protocol specifies all the allowed 
utterances in a dialogue, a policy specifies the best choices from those utterances. In 
case of dialogues between CIE agents about regulated data exchange, the best 
utterance is one that is expected to further the goal to execute the appointed police 
task and the goal to protect local investigations and informants. Chapter 5 specified 
two types of dialogue policies, viz. for negotiation and for persuasion. The 
negotiation policies help to balance the agent’s goals when the agent is permitted to 
exchange data but there is a violation of his interests. An agent could simply refuse 
to exchange data based on the violation of interests. However, with the negotiation 
policy the agent tries to find a condition under which there will be no violation of 
his interests. If he succeeds then also his goal to execute the police task by 
exchanging data is fulfilled. The persuasion policies help to persuade the other 
agent to exchange data in case of rejection of a request for data. Since in the current 
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police practice the grounds of refusals are used as default, helping to persuade can 
help to allow for more permitted data exchanges in the Dutch police domain. The 
dialogue policies were made applicable to other domains were data is exchanged by 
incorporating assumptions, such as cooperativeness and protection of own interests. 
Moreover, the policies were parameterized, which allows them to be fine tuned for 
the chosen application domain. 
 
Chapter 6 presented the specification and implementation of the multi-agent system 
architecture for the Dutch police domain. The architecture, which meets the 
requirements specified in chapter 3, was developed using typical examples of 
dialogues about regulated data exchange. In order for the architecture to be 
generalizable to other domains, all terminology specific to the Dutch police domain 
was abstracted.  
 
The research aim of this thesis has been to investigate how theories from multi-
agent systems research, AI & Law research, and argumentation theory research can 
be further developed and applied in a realistic problem domain to provide the basis 
for automated support of organizations in promoting their goals in the context of 
regulated data exchange. Based on the research, a multi-agent system architecture 
has been specified and implemented to illustrate that it can provide a basis to 
support data exchange in the Dutch police domain. The support of regulated data 
exchange was defined as facilitating fewer unlawful and more lawful data 
exchanges. However, to determine whether the proposed multi-agent system can 
genuinely support automated regulated exchange of data in the Dutch police 
practice, more user experiments in realistic scenarios are necessary. 
 
This thesis contributes to the fields of multi-agent systems, argumentation, and AI 
& Law in their combination and application in a serious problem domain. The 
multi-agent system architecture combines and adapts several elements from the 
literature: defeasible argumentation for the agents’ internal reasoning and a 
dialogue system to model the agent dialogues. The research has by way of a 
realistic case study provided support for the naturalness and applicability of ideas 
from the literature. Furthermore, the present research has proposed a novel view on 
the nature of dialogues in the context of regulated data exchange, i.e., as negotiation 
with embedded persuasion. An important contribution to the research literature has 
been the specification of dialogue policies to assist the agents to balance their goals. 
To the best of my knowledge this is the first research which has specified realistic 
negotiation and persuasion policies in the context of regulated data exchange. 
Another research contribution has been the definition of realistic knowledge update 
policies for agents during dialogues about regulated data exchange. Research on 
this issue has also identified a new research issue in designing dialogue systems for 
persuasion, by identifying the problem that during a dialogue between agents, 
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previous dialogue utterances can sometimes no longer be maintained as a result of 
knowledge updates at later stages in a dialogue.  
 
In this research, terminology specific to the Dutch police was abstracted and the 
dialogue policies were parameterized. Therefore, this research can be used in other 
domains where the exchange of data is regulated (for example, the exchange of 
patient data). This thesis has shown that it is possible to develop a realistic and 
implementable multi-agent system architecture that can provide the basis for 








Veel organisaties wisselen gegevens uit en dat wordt vaak gereguleerd door 
wetgeving. In de meeste gevallen is er een centrale institutie (bijvoorbeeld het 
moederbedrijf of het ministerie van justitie) die geïnteresseerd is in zowel een 
optimale als een rechtmatige uitwisseling van gegevens. De reden hiervoor is dat de 
centrale institutie zich moet verantwoorden voor de effectiviteit en de 
rechtmatigheid van haar activiteiten aan de buitenwereld (bijvoorbeeld de 
aandeelhouders of het parlement). Naast de centrale institutie zijn er regionaal of 
functioneel verdeelde instituties met hun eigen belangen. De centrale instituties 
houden rekening met de lokale belangen bij het formuleren van centraal beleid en 
wettelijke normen, die ruimte laten voor het precies afstemmen in lokaal beleid en 
individuele beslissingen. 
 
De regulering van gegevensuitwisseling dient meerdere doelen. Aan de ene kant 
moet de privacy van de personen worden beschermd. Aan de andere kant moeten de 
rechtmatige doelen van de gegevensuitwisselende organisaties worden gediend. 
Meestal wegen organisaties het doel om hun taken uit te voeren (door het 
uitwisselen van gegevens) af met het doel om hun belangen op lokaal niveau te 
beschermen (door het niet uitwisselen van vertrouwelijke gegevens), terwijl er 
binnen de wet moet worden gebleven. 
 
De afweging tussen doelen wordt veroorzaakt door twee kenmerken van de 
geldende wet- en regelgeving. Ten eerste geeft de regelgeving discretionaire 
bevoegdheden aan organisaties om in bepaalde situaties te beslissen om wel of niet 
gegevens uit te wisselen. In die gevallen waarin het is toegestaan om gegevens uit 
te wisselen, neemt een organisatie een beslissing waarvan verwacht wordt  dat die 
het behalen van de doelen bevordert. Ten tweede gebruikt de regelgeving vage 
begrippen, die verschillende interpretaties kunnen hebben (bijvoorbeeld 'de goede 
uitvoering van de politietaak'). In de praktijk kunnen gegevensuitwisselende 
organisaties deelnemen aan dialogen en hun eigen interpretaties van de regelgeving 
gebruiken om het halen van hun doelen te bevorderen. Daarom wordt er tijdens de 
interacties tussen organisaties een definitieve balans gezocht tussen de 
verschillende organisatiedoelen, en dat kan aanleiding geven tot interessante 
dialogen. Bijvoorbeeld, wanneer een organisatie een andere organisatie vraagt om 
gegevens uit te wisselen, dan moet de reagerende organisatie bepalen of haar 
belangen worden gediend. De reagerende organisatie kan gaan onderhandelen door 
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voorwaarden te stellen onder welke zij bereid is om gegevens uit te wisselen. 
Bovendien kan de verzoekende organisatie de andere organisatie proberen te 
overtuigen om gegevens uit te wisselen, als een reagerende organisatie een verzoek 
tot gegevensuitwisseling heeft afgewezen. In het ideale geval garanderen deze 
dialogen dat er tijdens de gegevensuitwisseling een optimale en rechtmatige balans 
tussen de doelen wordt gevonden. In de praktijk wordt dit ideaal niet altijd 
gerealiseerd. De normen van de regelgeving zijn niet goed bekend en het lokale 
beleid is meer gericht op de bescherming van lokale gegevens. Dit heeft als gevolg 
dat slechts een deel van wat rechtmatig kan worden uitgewisseld daadwerkelijk 
wordt uitgewisseld en dat soms gegevens onrechtmatig worden uitgewisseld. 
 
De gedistribueerde aard van veel organisaties suggereert dat het de moeite waard 
kan zijn om multi-agenttechnologie te gebruiken. Een multi-agentsysteem is een 
verzameling van artificiële agents 22 , waarbij elke agent een zekere mate van 
controle heeft over zijn acties en interacteert met andere agents om zijn eigen en/of 
zijn systeemdoelen te vervullen. Een multi-agentsysteem lijkt een natuurlijke 
manier te zijn om organisaties te modelleren, waarbij agents de leden van 
organisaties representeren. Bovendien interacteren organisaties meestal met elkaar 
om hun doelen te verwezenlijken, wat ook typisch is voor agents in een multi-
agentsysteem. 
 
De Nederlandse politieorganisatie levert een waardevol voorbeeld van het probleem 
van gereguleerde gegevensuitwisseling, omdat het illustreert dat niet altijd een 
optimale en rechtmatige balans wordt gevonden bij het uitwisselen van gegevens. 
Dit proefschrift heeft onderzocht hoe agenttechnologie gebruikt kan worden om 
gereguleerde gegevensuitwisseling tussen de Nederlandse politiekorpsen te 
ondersteunen. 
 
Hoofdstuk 2 presenteerde een beschrijving en analyse van gereguleerde 
gegevensuitwisseling in het Nederlandse politiedomein. De analyse toonde aan dat 
politieregio’s gegevens moeten uitwisselen voor het oplossen van misdaadzaken, 
omdat regio’s vaak behoefte hebben aan gegevens die aanwezig zijn in andere 
politieregio’s. Verder heeft elke politieregio een criminele inlichtingen eenheid 
voor het verzamelen van gegevens over zware criminaliteit. De analyse toonde ook 
aan dat criminele inlichtingen eenheden het doel om hun politietaak uit te voeren in 
balans moeten brengen met het doel om belangen te beschermen op lokaal niveau 
(dat wil zeggen, hun eigen onderzoeken en informanten), terwijl er binnen de wet 
gebleven moet worden. In de praktijk blijkt dat criminele inlichtingen eenheden niet 
                                                        
22 Om verwarring te voorkomen wordt het Engelse “agent” gebruikt om te verwijzen 
naar een intelligente (software) agent en wordt de Nederlandse term “agent” gebruikt 
om te verwijzen naar een politieagent. 
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een optimaal en rechtmatig evenwicht tussen hun doelen vinden, omdat ze niet op 
de hoogte zijn van de geldende regelgeving en de voorkeur hebben voor het doel 
om hun eigen hun belangen te beschermen. Hoofdstuk 2 gaf ook een beschrijving 
van het juridisch kader voor gereguleerde gegevensuitwisseling in het Nederlandse 
politiedomein, die werd herschreven in een tussenrepresentatie en geformaliseerd in 
appendix 1. Uit de analyse blijkt dat de wetgever een vrij verkeer van gegevens 
binnen delen van de Nederlandse politieorganisatie als doelstelling had en daarom 
veel regels heeft opgesteld die de uitwisseling van gegevens verplicht. Om 
criminele inlichtingen eenheden de mogelijkheid te geven om hun onderzoeken en 
informanten te beschermen, heeft de wetgever weigeringsgronden beschreven om 
op een rechtmatige manier de verstrekking van gegevens te weigeren. De wetgever 
had als doelstelling dat in specifieke gevallen de relevante belangen tegen elkaar 
worden afgewogen. Echter, uit de analyse van de Nederlandse politieorganisatie is 
gebleken dat in de praktijk de weigeringsgronden in de meeste gevallen als 
standaard worden gebruikt in plaats van ze te gebruiken na een zorgvuldige 
overweging. Omdat weigeringsgronden worden gebruikt als standaard, vindt in het 
Nederlandse politiedomein maar een deel van de toegestane gegevensuitwisseling 
plaats. 
 
In hoofdstuk 3 werd beschreven hoe een multi-agentsysteem gereguleerde 
gegevensuitwisseling tussen organisaties kan modelleren en werd betoogd waarom 
de Nederlandse politieorganisatie een representatief probleemdomein is. 
Dialoogvoorbeelden uit hoofdstuk 2 over de gereguleerde gegevensuitwisseling 
werden gebruikt om de functionele eisen voor een multi-agentsysteem te 
verhelderen. De vereisten zijn dat de agents kennis over het domein moeten hebben, 
in staat moeten zijn om te redeneren met hun kennis en in staat moeten zijn om te 
interacteren op manieren die typisch bij de Nederlandse politie voorkomen. De 
voorbeelden illustreerden ook dat politieagenten met elkaar in dialoog gaan om te 
onderhandelen en om elkaar te overtuigen of er wel of geen gegevens kunnen 
worden uitgewisseld. De analyse toonde aan dat drie dialoogtypen nodig zijn om 
gereguleerde gegevensuitwisseling te modelleren: informatieuitwisseling, 
onderhandeling en multi-agentsysteem overtuigingsdialogen. Voor het 
politiedomein werd de relatie tussen de dialoogtypen geïnterpreteerd als een 
onderhandeling, die kan overgaan naar een ingebedde overtuigingsdialoog. Als de 
onderhandeling succesvol eindigt, wordt een informatieuitwisselingsdialoog gestart 
en wanneer deze vervolgens is beëindigd, is ook de gehele dialoog beëindigd. 
 
Hoofdstuk 4 specificeerde het argumentatiesysteem om de interne redeneringen van 
een agent te modelleren en het dialoogsysteem om de interactie tussen agenten te 
modelleren. Het intern redeneren werd gemodelleerd als weerlegbare argumentatie 
en geformaliseerd met het ASPIC-systeem. ASPIC werd gekozen omdat het 
weerlegbare argumentatie ondersteunt en omdat het redeneermechanisme van 
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ASPIC gebruikt kan worden in de proof-of-concept implementatie. Deontische 
modaliteiten en agentdoelen maken geen deel uit van de ASPIC logica. Echter, deze 
worden uitgedrukt als predicaten en met reificatie van de uitspraken in hun scope. 
Het dialoogsysteem om de interacties tussen agents te modelleren werd aangepast 
om compatible te zijn met ASPIC en om gereguleerde gegevensuitwisseling tussen 
criminele inlichtingen eenheden te ondersteunen. 
 
Waar een communicatieprotocol van een argumentatiesysteem alle toegestane 
uitingen in een dialoog bepaalt, specificeert een dialoogstrategie de beste keuze uit 
de toegestane uitingen. In het geval van dialogen tussen de agents over de 
gereguleerde gegevensuitwisseling, is de beste keuze de uiting die de doelen van de 
agent bevordert. Voor de criminele inlichtingen eenheden zijn de doelen de goede 
uitoefening van de politietaak en de bescherming van lokale onderzoeken en 
informanten. Hoofdstuk 5 specificeerde dialoogstrategieën) voor de 
onderhandelings- en overtuigingsdialogen. De onderhandelingstrategie helpt de 
doelen van een agent af te wegen. Bijvoorbeeld, een agent is toegestaan om 
gegevens uit te wisselen, maar daarbij kunnen zijn doelen worden geschonden. De 
agent kan dan simpelweg weigeren om gegevens op basis van de doelschending uit 
te wisselen. Echter, met de onderhandelingstrategie gaat de agent op zoek naar een 
voorwaarde waaronder zijn doelen niet worden geschonden. Als hij hierin slaagt 
dan kan hij de gegevens alsnog uitwisselen waardoor het doel om de politietaak uit 
te voeren wordt bevorderd. De overtuigingstrategie kan bij een weigering tot 
uitwisseling van gegevens helpen de andere agent te overtuigen om gegevens 
alsnog te verstrekken. Gegeven dat in de huidige politiepraktijk verzoeken tot 
uitwisseling van gevoelige gegevens meestal worden geweigerd, kan ondersteuning 
bij het overtuigen er voor zorgen dat er meer gegevens in het Nederlandse 
politiedomein kunnen worden uitgewisseld. De dialoogstrategieën werden 
toepasbaar gemaakt op andere domeinen waar gegevens worden uitgewisseld door 
het incorporeren van assumpties, zoals de coöperativiteit en de bescherming van 
eigen belangen. Bovendien werden de dialoogstrategieën geparametriseerd, 
waardoor ze kunnen worden afgestemd op het gekozen toepassingsdomein. 
 
Hoofdstuk 6 presenteerde de specificatie en implementatie van het multi-agent 
systeem voor het Nederlandse politiedomein. De architectuur, die voldoet aan de 
functionele eisen beschreven in hoofdstuk 3, is ontwikkeld met behulp van typische 
voorbeelden van dialogen over gereguleerde gegevensuitwisseling. Om de 
architectuur generaliseerbaar te maken naar andere domeinen, is alle terminologie 
geabstraheerd die specifiek is voor de Nederlandse politie. 
 
Het doel van dit proefschrift was om te onderzoeken hoe theorieën uit de 
onderzoeksgebieden van multi-agentsystemen, kunstmatige intelligentie & recht en 
argumentatie verder kunnen worden ontwikkeld en toegepast in een realistisch 
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probleemdomein. Daarbij wordt de basis gecreëerd voor geautomatiseerde 
ondersteuning van organisaties voor het verwezenlijken van hun doelen in het kader 
van gereguleerde gegevensuitwisseling. Op basis van het onderzoek is er een 
architectuur van een multi-agentsysteem gespecificeerd. Dit systeem is 
geïmplementeerd om te illustreren dat het een basis kan bieden voor de 
ondersteuning van gegevensuitwisseling in het Nederlandse politiedomein. De 
ondersteuning van de gereguleerde gegevensuitwisseling werd gedefinieerd als het 
bevorderen van minder onrechtmatige en meer rechtmatige gegevensuitwisselingen. 
Echter, om te bepalen of het voorgestelde multi-agentsysteem de gereguleerde 
gegevensuitwisseling in de Nederlandse politie in de praktijk kan ondersteunen, zijn 
vervolgexperimenten in realistische scenario's noodzakelijk. 
 
Dit proefschrift draagt bij aan de gebieden van multi-agentsystemen, argumentatie 
en kunstmatige intelligentie & recht door hun combinatie en toepassing in een 
realistisch probleemdomein. De architectuur van het multi-agentsysteem 
combineert een aantal elementen uit de literatuur: weerlegbare argumentatie voor 
het interne redeneren van de agenten en een dialoogsysteem om de dialogen tussen 
agents te modelleren. Het onderzoek heeft door middel van een realistische 
casestudy de toepasbaarheid van ideeën uit de literatuur aangetoond. Bovendien 
heeft het onderzoek een nieuwe visie op de aard van de dialogen in het kader van 
gereguleerde gegevensuitwisseling voorgesteld, namelijk als onderhandeling met 
ingebedde overtuigingsdialoog. Een belangrijke bijdrage aan de literatuur is de 
specificatie van dialoogstrategieën om de agenten te helpen hun doelen te af te 
wegen. Naar mijn weten is dit het eerste onderzoek dat realistische 
dialoogstrategieën heeft gespecificeerd in het kader van de gereguleerde 
gegevensuitwisseling. Een andere onderzoeksbijdrage is de definitie van 
realistische kennis-updatestrategieën gedurende dialogen. Onderzoek naar dit 
onderwerp heeft een nieuw aandachtspunt geïdentificeerd voor het ontwerpen van 
dialoogsystemen voor overtuigingsdialogen. Het nieuwe onderzoeksonderwerp is 
dat gedurende een dialoog tussen agenten, eerdere dialooguitingen soms niet meer 
kunnen worden gehandhaafd als gevolg van kennis-updates in latere stadia van een 
dialoog.  
 
In dit onderzoek is de terminologie die specifiek is voor de Nederlandse politie 
geabstraheerd en zijn de dialoogstrategieëën geparametriseerd. Daarom kan dit 
onderzoek ook gebruikt worden in andere domeinen waar gegevensuitwisseling 
wordt gereguleerd (bijvoorbeeld de uitwisseling van patiëntgegevens). Dit 
proefschrift heeft aangetoond dat het mogelijk is om een realistisch en 
implementeerbaar multi-agentsysteem te ontwikkelen dat de basis biedt om 
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